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In this thesis I consider the development of space-based ballistic missile defence in the late 
1970's and early 1980's, leading up to President Reagan's speech on 23 March 1983, in 
which he announced a research and development programme to make nuclear weapons 
"impotent and obsolete". I focus on four groups, which I call the 'space-weapons lobby', 
which were pushing for the development of ballistic missile defence during this period: 
the 'laser lobby'. High Frontier, Edward Teller and his colleagues, and a group of 
strategists from the Hudson Institute. The study of these groups is used for two 
purposes. Firstly, to explain how and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to 
be a national priority in the United States. Secondly, to explore and extend a model of the 
weapons development process based mainly on the work of Mary Kaldor, Donald 
MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, and Langdon Winner. 
I trace the evolution and progress of the 'space-weapons lobby', paying particular 
attention to the ideology of the different groups, the interests which they brought to bear 
on the problem of ballistic missile defence, and the way in which the ideology and 
interests of the different groups influenced the technologies which they were advocating 
for ballistic missile defence. I also consider the way in which the groups comprising the 
'space-weapons lobby' attempted to sell the idea of space-based ballistic missile defence 
to the Reagan Administration, and the way in which the Army and the Air Force reacted to 
the proposals which they were putting forward. 
An interesting feature of this case study is that all of the groups which comprised the 
'space-weapons lobby' shared a common ideology which led them to advocate ballistic 
missile defence. This ideology was just that of the Committee on the Present Danger, 
which formed in the mid-1970's and set as its mission the revival of concem about the 
Soviet threat, and the reassertion of US military superiority. Although the different 
groups shared a common ideology, they were all pushing for essentially different 
technologies to implement this BMD system. The reason for this seems to have been the 
interests that these groups brought to bear on the problem. Thus, while the broad nature 
of the BMD system was largely shaped by the ideology of the groups, the components of 
the system were largely shaped by the interests. The final 'shape' of the ballistic missile 
defence system that the different groups advocated reflected an interplay between the 
ideology and the interests. 
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CH. 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE 'STAR WARS' SPEECH 
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest 
upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could 
intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or 
that of our allies? 
I call upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great 
talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering 
these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. 
A world free of the threat of nuclear annihilation. Such was the vision that was offered by 
President Reagan in his "Address to the Nation" on the evening of March 23,1983. This 
vision has since become the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a multi-billion dollar 
research and development programme to develop an ensemble of land-based and space-
based, conventional and exotic ballistic missile defence weapons in an attempt to erect a 
'nuclear umbrella' over the United States. The SDI or 'Star Wars', has become the focus 
of a national, and indeed international, debate which has concentrated on the technical 
merits of such a system, on the economic implications of such a massive research and 
development project, and on the strategic implications of space-based ballistic missile 
defence. 
There has been much less debate on how and why the Strategic Defense Initiative came 
about. Many of Reagan's advisers seem to have been unaware that the President was 
going to make the speech. John Gardner, Director of Defensive Systems at the Pentagon, 
and Robert Cooper, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, who 
together supervised most of the United States' research on ballistic missile defence, 
listened in surprise as the President elevated this research to a national priority. The 
assumption that has been drawn is that the decision to implement this new policy was 
largely taken by President Reagan. As Dr. George Keyworth, the President's Science 
Adviser, has said: "This was not a speech that came up; it was a top-down speech ... a 
speech that came from the President's heart".^ 
It is the questions of how and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to be a 
national priority which will form one of the two main axes around which this thesis 
revolves. The other main axis is how technology in general, and military technology in 
1 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reagan Plans New ABM Effort", Science, Vol. 220, 8 
April, 1983, p. 170. 
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the United States in particular, comes to be shaped. I start by developing in section 1.2 a 
model of how the weapons development process in the United States operates, based 
largely on the work of Mary Kaldor, Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, and 
Langdon Winner. It is this model which is used to inform my analysis of the development 
of space-based ballistic missile defence in the late 1970's and early 1980's, leading up to 
President Reagan's March 23 speech. At the same time, I shall use the questions of how 
and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to be a national priority as a case 
study of the weapons development process, and thus to shed light on the model that has 
been developed. 
1.2 THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
Encapsulated within the term "arms race" is the notion that the weapons development 
process is driven by intemational competition between two or more states, such as the 
United States and the Soviet Union, through an action-reaction phenomenon. ̂  However, 
most of the recent writing on weapons development, particularly in the United States, has 
come down strongly on the side of domestic influences as being the most important 
determining factor, particularly in peacetime. Kaldor has noted that pressures for 
increases in military expenditure in the United States do indeed coincide "with growing 
fears about the Soviet Union, and with, perhaps, a wider sense of economic and social 
insecurity". But the type of weapons produced, she argues, "can only be explained in the 
terms of the structure of the military industrial institutions - the competitive dynamic of the 
armourers combined with thé conservatism of the armed forces".^ 
In peacetime, the weapons that are developed do not have to respond to actual military 
threats, and so do not undergo the "test of war". This is particularly so if we are 
considering the development of nuclear weapons and their supporting systems. Domestic 
influences tend to prevail in peacetime, Kaldor points out "because there are so many 
different ways of assessing and responding to the circumstances in which armaments 
might be used". In the absence of the "test of war" the quantity and nature of the weapons 
^ Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNaiuara is one of the strongest 
proponents of this view. In a speech in September 1 9 6 7 in which he 
announced the plan to deploy the Sentinal ABM system, McNamara 
concisely stated this theory: "What is essential to understand here is 
that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one 
another's strategic plans. Whatever their intentions or our 
intentions, actions - or even realistically potential actions - on 
either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces necessarily 
trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-
reaction phenomenon that fuels the arms race". (Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, MacMillon Press, London, 1 9 8 3 , p. 2 5 4 . ) 
2 Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, Abacus, London, 1 9 8 3 , p. 1 6 6 . 
the United States acquires is determined "as much by the environment in which we take 
decisions as it is by the posture of a potential adversary".^ 
If domestic factors are taken to be the most important determinant influencing the 
weapons development process, then weapons technology can be analysed in much the 
same way as civilian technologies, albeit with different domestic institutions and social 
factors shaping the development of the weapons technology. MacKenzie and Spinardi, 
amongst others, have pointed out that discussions concerning the domestic influences on 
the development of weapons are characterized by two extreme views. On the one hand 
there is the 'hard' "technological determinist"^ viewpoint which holds that weapons are 
out of control, that they are an independent variable which develop autonomously, driving 
the arms race and determining military strategy.^ An alternative to this 'hard' 
determinism, so-called 'soft' technological determinism, allows for slightly more human 
agency, but essentially still sees the development of weapons as being out of control. 
There are two slightly different forms of this 'soft' determinism. Firstly, the 
"technologist-out-of-control" argument holds that it is the weapons designers and 
developers (i.e. scientists and engineers) who, because of their expertise, take control of 
weapons development, and "build up a personal and institutional momentum" around 
various projects.^ Another form of 'soft' technological determinism has been called 
"technology creep".^ This is where the "advance of science and technology on a broad 
front will..quietly but inexorably change the strategic landscape". For example, Dietrich 
1 Ibid., p. 4. 
2 MacKenzie and Wajcman define "technological determinism" as the view 
that firstly "technological change is in some sense autonomouSf 
'outside' of society, literally or metaphorically", and secondly that 
"technological change causes social change". See 'Introduction' to 
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman(ed), The Social Shaping of 
Technology, Open Uni. Press, Milton Keynes, 1985, pp. 4-5. 
^ Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Politics and Technology in the 
Arms Race: A Case-Study in the History of Nuclear Weapons Systems", 
University of Edinburgh, 1987, p. 3. 
^ Ibid. MacKenzie and Wajcman point out that according to this view 
these technologists are "indeed members of society, but their activity 
is in an important sense independent of their membership of society. 
In the most common version of technological determinism, these 
technologies are seen as 'applying science', as working out the 
practical implications of new scientific discoveries. ... Scientists 
discover, technologists follow the logic of those discoveries in 
turning them into new techniques and new devices, and these techniques 
and devices are then introduced into society and have (often 
unpredicted) 'effects'". (D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, 1985, op. cit., 
p. 4.) 
^ See Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1985, pp. 88-100, for a discussion of this view. 
Schroeer has claimed that the advance of computer technology has been the major driving 
force behind the improvement of missile accuracy, calling forth new strategic doctrines.^ 
At the other extreme of the spectrum are the 'hard' social determinist arguments, or the 
"politics-in-command" view in which technology is claimed to be merely a 'dependent 
factor' in the arms race, the technology and the technologists being under the control of 
the political leaders. According to this view, elite groups, such as the President and his 
Executive or the Office of the Secretary of Defense, consciously shape technology to meet 
their goals. 2 
MacKenzie and Spinardi, in exploring the development of weapons in the US Navy's 
ballistic missile programme, have concluded that the truth is much more complex than 
either of these two extreme views would suggest, and that it lies somewhere between the 
two: 2 
Technological change appears to be the outcome of a complex, interactive, and 
sometimes contradictory process. There is no single dominant determining factor 
which can be distinguished. Indeed, the social and the technical are hard to 
differentiate, and paths of influence are neither unidirectional nor stable in their 
effects through time. 
They have argued, in a general way, that the development of weapons is influenced by 
both social and technological fac.tors. In the social realm, technical choices are influenced 
by the 'macro politics' of US defence policy, by organizational politics of the different 
armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force), and by the 'micro politics' of the technical 
community.^ They point out that '"the social' does not simply operate at the level of 
preferences between pre-defmed technical options. It also shapes the options that are 
available, and may on occasion actually eliminate the possibility of explicit choice. The 
social can enter into the definition of what is possible".^ Russell has made a similar point. 
He argues that because the research and design processes are controlled by certain 
interests this means that "a limited number of trajectories are accepted as progress, that 
some criteria for 'improvement' are taken as given and others are ignored, that 'needs' are 
interpreted, and thus that many options never surface for 'selection' in any conscious 
sense". Such direction may take place, Russell claims, through institutional or financial 
means, "or more subdy through the training and ideology of personnel".^ 
1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics and Technology op. cit., 
p. 3. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
3 Ibid.r pp. 31-32. 
4 Ibid., p. 12. 
5 Ibid., p. 13. 
^ Stewart Russell, "The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to 
Pinch and Bijker", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, 1986, p. 334. 
While 'hard' technological determinism, or even the 'soft' versions of this cannot be 
sustained, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that technology "is not simply a dependent 
variable either, as a simplistic 'social shaping of technology' view might have it. Instead, 
technology can sometimes be important as an enabling capability or a limiting 
constraint".^ Similarly, Winner points out that the extreme social shaping view, while it 
might provide an "antidote to naive technological determinism", has its own 
shortcomings. Taken literally, Winner argues, "it suggests that technical things do not 
matter at all".^ 
'Enabling' technologies, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue, provide possibilities for the 
development of new weapons, but need not determine the actual course that is followed. 
It is important to remember that these technologies have themselves been socially 
shaped.^ Similarly, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that technology can provide a limiting 
constraint to the weapons development process. They give as an example the physical size 
of submarine missile tubes, (which are related to the size of the submarine), which serve 
to limit the size of missile possible. However, such technical constraints may also be 
social.'̂  They conclude that: "Technological development thus has the potential to follow a 
number of different courses, rather than one single pathway. It provides capability and 
sets some constraints, but is profoundly shaped by social factors".^ 
It is these domestic "social factors" which "profoundly shape" the weapons development 
process which I seek to map out. MacKenzie and Spinardi have not set them out 
explicidy, but point towards theories of 'bureaucratic politics' (albeit modified) as being 
the way forward. There is a need now, I think, to move beyond the knocking down of the 
"straw men" of 'technological determinism' and to a lesser extent that of 'social 
determinism', and to move towards a more sophisticated theory of how the weapons 
development process operates and how weapons are actually shaped, or at least to set out 
a methodological framework through which the weapons development process can be 
more sensibly analysed. Empirical studies would then serve to sharpen this model. 
MacKenzie and Wajcman have argued that the 'bureaucratic politics' model has become 
the best developed approach to the shaping of military technology. According to this 
approach, countries are not seen as single actors, and weapons development is seen 
largely as the outcome of a process of bargaining and competition between bureaucratic 
1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi^ op c i t , p.14. 
2 Langdon Winner, "Do Artefacts Have Politics?", Daedalus, Vol. 109, 
Winter 1980, p. 122. 
3 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, o p c i t . , pp. 14-15. 
4 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
5 Ibid., p. 17. 
organizations. While the individuals within these organizations may see their goal as 
being the enhancement of national security, those with different 'institutional locations' 
may approach this goal in quite different ways.^ Given that it is the 'bureaucratic politics' 
model which is considered to be the best developed, one useful way to proceed is, I 
think, to pick up on one of the more sophisticated theories of weapons development that 
has been cast in the 'bureaucratic politics' mould and to move forward from this point. 
One such model is the notion of the "baroque arsenal" which has been put forward by 
Mary Kaldor. 
I have chosen to adopt the 'bureaucratic politics' approach to the shaping of military 
technology in preference to the so-called "new sociology of technology" approach for two 
reasons^. Firstiy, I am interested in studying military technology at the systems level, in 
this instance the development of a ballistic missile defence system, and the general 
features of this system, such as the different types of weapons that are employed -
ground-based and space-based, conventional and exotic. 1 am not interested in how the 
fine detail of these systems has been shaped. The "new sociology of technology" 
approach which is oriented towards micro-sociology would seem to be more appropriate 
to this latter endeavour. Secondly, I believe that it is important to study the shaping of 
technology at the systems level because this provides a context for studying the shaping 
of the components of the system, 
MacKenzie and Spinardi point out that 'bureaucratic politics' is sometimes taken to mean 
that only domestic considerations have an effect on the development of weapons, the 
'Russian Threat' being only an "image conjured up by domestic forces - and conjured up 
in a form that best suits domestic forces". This, they point out, may be partially tine, but 
it is neither "theoretically logical or empirically supportable" to discount all 'external 
factors'. "Empirically it seems beyond dispute that Soviet behaviour has made a 
difference".3 Kaldor has resolved this conundrum by distinguishing between a systemic 
aspect of the demand for weapons, that is, the "potential requirement for weapons as 
defined by the international situation", and the institutional aspect of the demand for 
1 "Introduction" to section on Military Technology, D. MacKenzie & J. 
Wajcinan(ed) , 1985, op. cit, p. 227. 
2 Examples of the literature on the "new sociology of technology" are: 
M. Gallon, "The State and Technical Innovation: A Case Study of the 
Electric Vehicle in France", Research Policy, Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 358-
376; T. Pinch & W. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and 
Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of 
Technology Might Benefit Each Other", Social Studies of Scie/ice, Vol. 
14, 1984, pp. 399-441. For a critique of this literature see: S. 
Russell, "The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch 
and Bijker", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 331-346. 
3 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology ..", op cit, p. 
27. 
weapons, that is, the way in which the systemic aspect is "mediated by the perceptions of 
the armed services, various bureaucratic departments and politicians".^ 
Mary Kaldor has applied a 'bureaucratic politics' approach to the weapons development 
process in Western, industrialized, capitalist nations - in particular in the United States. 
The starting point for Kaldor's argument is her notion of the 'weapons system', around 
which the armed forces have become functionally organized.^ The 'weapons system' is 
both a technology^, and a social organization. At the level of technology it consists of the 
weapon delivery system, or delivery platform, and the weapon, combined with the means 
of command and communication. In addition, the 'weapons system' includes the body of 
"interrelated knowledge, and a set of linked techniques" needed to develop, produce and 
operate the weapons hardware. At the level of social organization it consists of "people 
and institutions who possess the knowledge and are responsible for the technology -
scientists, engineers, workers managers, soldiers, technicians, bureaucrats" and so on. 
"They possess their knowledge as members of the social organization and not as 
individuals"."^ 
Kaldor argues that the major weapons systems serve two functions. Firstly, they act to 
differentiate the individual armed services as military units "through independent 
strategies associated with particular weapons systems". Secondly, they serve to define the 
lines of command within the different armed services.^ For example, the US Navy is 
organized hierarchically into task forces. At the apex of each task force is the aircraft 
carrier, which requires destroyers, submarines and aircraft for protection, and supply 
ships of various kinds for replenishment. The bomber and the battle tank are held to play 
a similar role in the Air Force and the Army.^ 
It is to these weapon systems - a technological system interlinked with a social 
organization - that Kaldor applies the theories of bureaucratic politics. She points out that 
bureaucratic politics models cannot, in themselves, explain technological change. They 
point only to the "overwhelming conservatism of military institutions, armed services and 
1 Mary Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", World Politics^ Vol. 
38, No. 4, July 1986, p. 580. 
2 Mary Kaldor, "The Armament Process", in D. MacKenzie & J. 
Wajcman{eds), 1985, o p . c i t . , p. 264. 
2 Kaldor uses 'technology' in the same way that it is defined by 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, to have three 'layers' of meaning: (i) 
hardware; (ii) technique, or how to use the hardware; and, (iii) 
technical know how. (D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, o p c i t , pp. 3-4.) 
4 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. cit., p. 579. See 
also M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. c i t . , pp. 7-8. 
5 M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. c i t . , pp. 8-9. 
6 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p . c i t . , p. 204. 
bureaucratic departments"; all they can show is "that the future will look much like the 
past".^ This conservatism, Kaldor argues, "can partly be explained by the uncertainties 
that exist in the absence of the test of war", the military clinging to the technologies that 
have been proven in past use. As each service, and military unit, is associated with a 
certain military mission, and the capabilities required to undertake this mission have 
become embedded in both the weapons and the social organization of that military unit, 
any radically new technologies pose a risk for organizational survival, and so tend to be 
resisted.2 
What bureaucratic politics models can explain is how "bureaucratic politics mediates an 
impetus for technological change". Such an impetus might come from the political 
leadership (for reasons of demand) or from other domestic institutions, although 
"evolutionary" technological change might occur in the absence of other pressures for 
technological change. In the absence of wars Kaldor argues that "impulses for radical 
technical change" must come from what she calls supply-side factors.^ Kaldor argues that 
there are two types of supply-side institutions: "those associated with the invention stage 
of the weapons succession process and those associated with the innovation stage". 
Those associated with the invention stage are primarily government, university, or private 
non-profit laboratories. From these institutions new military technologies emerge, "some 
of which may be 'revolutionary' in the sense that they challenge existing doctrine and 
organization".^,Kaldor argues that many of these "revolutionary" technologies emerge 
from the defence laboratories, "and sometimes acquire maverick constituencies within the 
armed forces".^ However, she does not go into detail as to how this process might 
operate. 
At the innovation stage, Kaldor argues that, in general, it is necessary to differentiate 
between institutions for development and production. In the case of the US, she points 
out, the so-called "prime contractors" generally undertake responsibility for both the 
development and production of complete weapons systems.^ These prime contractors are 
the manufacturers of weapons platforms, usually large aircraft, shipbuilding, automobile 
1 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. cit., p. 579, 583. 
For case studies which support this assertion see: Merritt Roe Smith 
(Ed.), Military Enterprise and Technological Change, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1985, pp. 22-26; Elting Morison, Men, Machines and 
Modern Times, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1966, Chapter 2; Susan 
Douglass, "The Navy Adopts the Radio, 1899-1919", in Merritt Roe Smith 
(Ed.), op. cit., pp. 117-174; James Fallows, "The American Army and 
the M-16 Rifle", in D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 
237-251. 
2 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession process", op. cit., pp. 581-582. 
3 Ibid., p. 583. 
^ Ibid., pp. 583-584. 
5 Ibid., p. 584. 
or engineering companies. The 'primes' assemble the complete weapon system, and 
subcontract out the subsystems - like the weapons and the electronics - thereby creating an 
interdependent network of big and small companies. They tend to specialize in particular 
types of weapons systems. For example, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Rockwell make 
bombers; Grumman and Vought make fighters for the Navy; McDonnell Douglas and 
General Dynamics make fighters for the Air Force. ̂  
The prime contractors and their related subcontractors tend to dominate particular regions, 
and thus the economic impact of producing a particular weapons system may be very 
great within these regions. Many thousands of people may work on a single defence 
contract "And", Kaldor points out, "if we also take into account the fact that many small 
firms which produce both military and civil goods are dependent on the military market to 
ensure their survival, then it is evident that the defence industry is deeply embedded in the 
economy as a whole". This means that large defence contracts and the large defence 
contractors can build up a political constituency in these regions, which will act to 
pressure Congress for the continuation of existing weapons programmes and the 
development of new ones.^ 
The prime contractors expect their defence divisions to be profitable. They are thus 
constantly seeking to maintain or increase profit margins and searching for new markets. 
Kaldor points out that US defence contractors frequendy testify to the intensity of 
competition over defence contracts.^ Although they are in some sense "commercial" 
enterprises, the defence divisions of the prime contractors are also dependent on the 
military - or, more specifically, on one branch of the armed services - for the bulk of their 
contracts. Thus they must obtain continuous contracts to ensure capacity employment.^ 
The technical and management personnel who work on defence programs become geared 
to the advanced military technology and complex equipment. The firms are not oriented 
towards civilian technologies, and do not have a tme commercial orientation. "By the time 
a firm has developed the personnel, facilities and equipment to handle large defence 
programs, management must keep the company operating at or near full strength or risk 
serious losses".^ 
1 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p . c i t . , p. 2 65; M. Kaldor, The 
Baroque Arsenal, op. c i t . , pp. 10-11; Kaldor points out that there are 
"literally thousands of subcontractors, some of whom are very large 
and are prime contractors themselves. In addition to the 
subcontractors there are also many suppliers. {Ibid., p. 11) 
2 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
3 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p . c i t . , pp. 265-266. 
4 Ibid. 
5 M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. c i t . , p. 50. 
This, according to Kaldor, is "particularly important with respect to research and 
development", as "in practice, production capacity fluctuates substantially". On the other 
hand, research and development makes use of more specialized equipment and more 
highly skilled workers than does production. The defence contractors, who depend on 
their technological capabilities in order to obtain contracts, cannot afford to disband 
design teams. "Hence", Kaldor argues, "whereas military units may be preoccupied with 
continued operation, the main supply enterprises are concerned with continuous 
development and, to a lesser extent, production''. ^ That this is so, Kaldor argues, "is 
suggested by the fact that the useful life of weapons systems tends to correspond to the 
manufacturing cycle. As development ends on one weapons system, development begins 
on another, and as production ends on one system, it begins on another".2 
In order for the prime defence contractors to ensure the continuous development that they 
require, they must obtain new orders "as soon as development of a particular weapons 
system is completed". Because the contractors are dependent on the military, the new 
orders are for new weapons systems. This process Kaldor has called the follow-on 
imperative.3 As part of tiiis process, the defence contractors "all" have planning groups 
who attempt to "predict what a particular branch of the armed services might require when 
current projects come to an end; and the various ways the corporation might meet that 
requirement". These planning groups work closely with similar groups in the military, 
and, Kaldor claims, "Because of the relationship with the armed forces, particularly 
during the so-called concept-definition phase, the prediction tends to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy".^ It is this effort to obtain follow-on orders which generates the 
intense competition between the contractors which has akeady been alluded to. The 
competition between the defence contractors takes on a technological rather than a price 
form and, Kaldor argues, is directed toward product rather than toward process 
improvement. "That is why the companies compete by offering technological 
improvements that will appeal to their customers, the armed forces".^ 
Kaldor points out tiiat the "shape" of the follow-on system is "severely constrained by the 
organizational rigidities of the armed forces". The new technologies will "only get 
through the innovation and integration stages if they conform to the requirements" of the 
particular branch of the service they are being developed for. It is acceptable for these 
technologies to be quite radical in themselves, but they must fit within the framework that 
1 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. c i t . , p. 266. 
2 M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal^ op. c i t . , p. 50. 
3 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. c i t . . , p. 585. 
4 M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. c i t . , p. 267; M. Kaldor, "The 
Armament Process", o p . c i t . , p. 267. 
5 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", o p . c i t . , p. 585. 
has been established by the weapons system. The designers themselves are the products 
of their military-industrial environment. Although it is the competition between the prime 
contractors which tends to drive the weapons development process, "this technological 
dynamism is confined within certain limits - limits that are defined by the stability of 
military and industrial institution, and stability which is guaranteed by the planning 
system". The result is an entirely introverted form of technological change; Kaldor has 
termed this "contradictory conservative but dynamic" form of technological change 
"baroque".! 
MacKenzie and Spinardi, while arguing that the 'bureaucratic politics' model "captures 
much of the complexity of organizational interactions which result in the formulation of 
policy, and the production of technology" level a number of criticisms at the theory as it 
has been formulated so far, and point to a number of factors which "need to be woven 
into the 'bureaucratic politics' framework to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
technological change".^ 
Firstly, they argue that neither the Executive Branch nor Congress have been iirelevant to 
the weapons development process, as a simplistic reading of 'bureaucratic politics' might 
imply.3 Kaldor, to a certain extent seems to fall into this trap, concentrating mainly on the 
relationship between the military and the defence contractors. The importance of Congress 
has been studied most closely by Gordon Adams. Adams argues that the arms race is 
driven by an 'iron triangle', that is, "a political relationship that brings together key 
participants in a clearly delineated area of policy making". The three sides of this triangle 
are the "Defense Department (plus NASA and the nuclear weapons branch of the 
Department of Energy); the House and Senate Armed Services Committee and Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as Congressional members from defense-related 
districts and states; and the firms, labs, research institutes, trade associations and trade 
unions in the industry itself'.^ Adams seems to underrate the importance of the President 
and the Executive Branch. MacKenzie and Wajcman argue that the President and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense are also "key actors" in the weapons development 
process, and are in some sense 'above' the other organizational actors. However, the 
armed services are not under the direct political control of their political superiors, but 
lobby actively for their goals. The relationship between the President and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the armed services "is more appropriately described as 
! Ibid., p. 585; M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. cit., p. 49. 
2 D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology op. cit., 
p. 26. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle, 
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, US- 198 6, p. 24. 
'bargaining' than as political command", MacKenzie and Wajcman argue.^ Other "actors" 
which perhaps should have a place in the 'bureaucratic politics' model of weapons 
development are the State Department, and organizations within this such as the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. 
Schurmann has argued that the office of the President of the United States is of prime 
importance in the policy making process, particularly in the area of foreign policy and 
defence. This is so, Schurmann argues, partly because of the President's constitutional 
powers, but also because it is the American public's "sense of security" which is 
important in determining the level of support which can be obtained for a change in 
defence policy. The President is "in the most decisive position to influence the public's 
sense of security" according to Schurmann.2 Further, the President occupies a special 
position at the apex of all the federal government bureaucracies. He is therefore in a 
position to arbitrate in disputes and competition between the armed services and other 
bureaucracies, and to impose a decision upon them.^ 
The bureaucratic politics model is further complicated, MacKenzie and Spinardi claim, by 
the need to consider the different levels at which the organizational actors operate. They 
delineate three such levels for the weapons development process in the United States: (i) 
rivaky between the different armed services; (ii) intra-service rivalry between the various 
military units within the one service; and, (iii) bureaucratic disputes which occur between 
groups within a certain military unit. These latter arise, they claim, because a complex 
weapons system is usually divided into subsystems which are worked on by small 
groups.^ 
Secondly, they point out that in addition to focusing on the organizations directly involved 
in weapons development the 'bureaucratic politics' model must take into account the 
wider political context. Any analysis of the weapons development process needs to take 
into consideration the fact that during the 1970's and 1980's there was a shift away from 
the liberal 'dovish' stance - typically supportive of arms control and the doctrine of mutual 
assured destruction - towards more conservative 'hawkish' stance which is opposed to 
arms control and favours the development of offensive weapons as part of a war-fighting 
1 Ibid. 
2 Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, Pantheon Books, New York, 
1974, p. 12, 23. 3 Ibid., pp. 21, 25. 
4 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology o p . c i t . , 
pp. 22-24. 
strategy. 1 To this could be added the need to set the weapons development process in the 
international context as well. 
Thirdly, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that 'bureaucratic politics' as ordinarily 
understood tends to underestimate the significance of the production of military 
technology. They argue that issues of producibility and reliability have an influence on the 
technical choices that are made in the weapons development process.^ 
Although Kaldor's concept of 'baroque' technology extended to handle the criticisms put 
forward by MacKenzie and Spinardi goes a long way to explain the type of technology 
that is developed by the United States and the reasons for this, it does not take into 
account the fact that the weapons may serve a function beyond their military or economic 
role. That is, that the weapons may have an ideological content, and serve, in part, some 
ideological mission. Merritt Roe Smith argues that it is important to emphasize "that 
technologies necessarily reflect the values and aspirations of their makers. Such norms, 
whether consciously espoused or not, pervade the entire spectrum of the development and 
are particularly important in setting the subsequent course of new technologies."^ 
The notion that technologies might come contain the ideologies of those in control of the 
development process has been expressed forcefully by Langdon Winner. Winner argues 
that we need to "pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of 
these characteristics".^ He identifies two ways in which "artifacts can contain political 
properties". Firstly there are "instances in which the invention, design, or arrangement of 
a specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an issue in a particular 
community". Secondly there are cases of what Winner calls 'inherently political 
technologies', that is, "man-made systems that appear to require, or be strongly 
compatible with particular kinds of political relationships". For our purposes, it is 
Winner's first argument about the way in which technology has a political nature that is 
important.^ Winner argues that the greatest latitude of choice exists "the very first time a 
particular instrument, system, or technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become 
strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original 
flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made".^ 
1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology op. cit., p. 
2 8 
2 Ibid., p. 29-30. 
^ "Introduction" to Merritt Roe Smith(ed) , Military Enterprise and 
Technological Change, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 6. 
^ Langdon Winner, "Do Artefacts Have Politics?", Daedalus, Vol. 109, 
1980, p. 123. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
In this thesis I shall use the development of space-based ballistic missile defences in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's, what eventually became President Reagan's Strategic 
Defense Initiative, to explore, refine and extend the model of the weapons development 
process that I have developed in section 1.2. With reference to this model, the case study 
that has been chosen is somewhat limited because it does not deal with the whole 
weapons development process - from conception through to development and deployment 
- but only with the early formative stages, leading up to the decision, announced by 
President Reagan on March 23,1983, to launch a research and development programme 
to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". 
In studying the early development of space-based ballistic missile defence I will focus on 
the factors that shaped the weapons development at this very early stage, and the factors 
that drove the process along. According to the model, the main driving factors should be 
the weapons laboratories and the prime defence contractors. I shall study four groups 
which were providing the "impulse" for weapons development: the 'laser-lobby' which 
was pushing for the development of space-based chemical lasers; High Frontier which 
was pushing for the deployment of orbiting 'space-trucks' which fired 'conventional 
missiles'; Edward Teller who was pushing for the development of space-based x-ray 
lasers; and, a group of strategists from the Hudson Institute who were pushing for the 
deployment of terminal defence systems to protect MX missiles. The first two of these 
groups were linked to defence contractors, the third to the weapons laboratories, and the 
final group to the military. These groups, which I have called collectively the 'space-
weapons lobby' are studied in Chapter 2. 
Based on the model of the weapons development process that has been developed it 
would be expected that the "impulse" provided by the 'space-weapons lobby' would be 
mediated by the military bureaucracy. In Chapter 4 I investigate the way in which the 
Army and the Air Force reacted to, and in fact opposed, the proposals that were being put 
forward by the 'space-weapons lobby'. I also focus on the role that was played by the 
Executive Branch and Congress in the early development of space-based ballistic missile 
defence, and the way in which this role was influenced by the wider political context and 
the public perception of the 'Russian threat'. This is dealt with mainly in Chapter 5, in 
which I investigate that factors which led to President Reagan making his March 23 
speech. 
One theme which it is my intention to pursue specifically is Winner's notion that 
technology comes to embody the ideology of the groups which have control over the 
shaping process. Thus, one of the main aims of my study will be to map out the ideology 
of these different groups. An interesting feature of the case study is that the different 
groups which comprised the 'space-weapons lobby' all operated within a similar 
ideological framework. This ideological framework was that of the Committee on the 
Present Danger, a group which was influential in publicly selling the notion of a growing 
Soviet threat throughout the second half of the 1970's, and which had close connections 
with the Reagan Administration. The link betv/een the 'space-weapons lobby' and the 
Committee on the Present Danger is explored in Chapter 3. Even though sharing the same 
ideological framework, these groups were all pushing for different technological solutions 
to the problem of ballistic missile defence - largely because of the different interests which 
were represented within the groups - and so to a certain extent were in competition with 
each other. Within each of these groups I shall seek to examine the interplay between their 
ideology and interests, and the consequence that this has for the weapons development 
process. 
CH. 2: THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A new push for the development of ballistic missile defences emerged in the United States 
towards the end of the 1970's, partly in response to some of the new technologies that 
were being developed in the weapons laboratories and by defence contractors, and partly 
in response to a new perception of the Soviet threat that had been popularized by groups 
such as the Committee on the Present Danger. In this chapter I concentrate on four main 
groups that were involved in the new push for ballistic missile defences: the so-called 
'laser lobby' led by Senator Malcolm Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla; Daniel 
Graham and the High Frontier study group; Dr. Edward Teller and his colleagues from 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and, a group of strategists from the Hudson 
Institute, Colin Gray and Keith Payne in particular. 
AU of these groups were advocating some form of ballistic missile defence, though based 
on different technologies. The 'laser lobby' advocated laser battle stations in space; High 
Frontier advocated orbiting 'space trucks' which fired missiles at ICBMs as they rose 
above the atmosphere; Edward Teller advocated x-ray lasers based in space or popped up 
from a patrolling submarine; and lastiy, Colin Gray and Keith Payne advocated the point 
defence of MX missile silos using fairly conventional technologies that were being 
developed by the Army, perhaps followed by space-based laser weapons at some stage in 
the future. In this chapter an attempt is made to trace the evolution and progress of these 
groups, noting in particular the ideologies and assumptions which inform their advocacy 
of ballistic missile defence, and the form that such a defence should take. I also consider 
the interests which these different lobby groups brought to bear on the problem of ballistic 
missile defence, and the way in which these interests helped to shape the technical form of 
the system that was proposed. Finally, I consider the links which the différents groups 
had with the Reagan Administration, which in 1983 initiated a national research and 
development programme incorporating all of the different technologies that the space 
weapons lobby was proposing. 
2.2 THE LASER LOBBY 
On Hallowe'en 1977 Dr. Maxwell Hunter, an executive of Lockheed Missiles and Space 
Company, in Sunnyvale, California, wrote a paper entitled "Strategic Dynamics and 
Space-Laser Weaponry", which outlined his views on the international balance of 
power. 1 Hunter, who was familiar with Lockheed's secret research on space-lasers, had 
1 Maxwell W. Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry", 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Inc., Sunnyvale, California, 31 
October 1977. Reprinted in Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, Mutual Assured 
become captivated by their "revolutionary potential", and when classification rules 
allowed, wrote his paper and sent it to a few key defence planners and federal officials. 
Hunter's paper apparentiy created a small sensation at this time, but it was not to be until a 
year and a half later that his ideas would be actively pushed by what came to be known as 
the 'laser lobby'.^ The central idea in Hunter's paper was that new technologies, 
particularly laser-weapons, held the promise of being able to shoot down Soviet ballistic 
missiles in flight, thus ending the reign of MAD and its concomitant "balance of terror".^ 
"It would be a terrible thing", said Hunter, "to condemn the human race to live forever in 
a grotesque world of Mumal Assured Destruction, if in fact, the advance of technology 
had given us the means to create more human alternatives''.^ 
Hunter was concemed that under the doctrine of MAD, ballistic missiles with nuclear 
warheads had come to be considered the "ultimate weapon", against which defence was 
well nigh impossible. It had become dogma, argued Hunter, "that there was no way to 
stop ballistic missiles after their launch", this having the unfortunate consequence of 
preventing the United States^ from launching its weapons through fear of retaliation.^ He 
argued that through the advance of technology, the time had come to implement a new 
strategic posture. Space transportation would be used to place high energy lasers in space, 
so that an effective defence against "massive ballistic missile exchanges" and high altitude 
bombers would soon be possible. Further, this system would have the added advantage 
that it "would utilize no weapons of mass destruction. Instead, a small but very adequate 
amount of energy would be placed very precisely at great ranges upon the necessarily 
flimsy vehicles which deliver the weapons of mass destmction".^ 
Survival, Baen Books, 1984. Hunter, then 61 years of age, was an 
aeronautical engineer with a long association with the defence 
industry. He had started at Douglas Aircraft Co. where he had worked 
on missiles, including the first anti-missile and anti-satellite 
programmes. Hunter began working for Lockheed in 1965, where he had 
helped design the fore-runners of the space shuttle. He had spent two 
years on the National Space Council advising Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. ("Maxwell Hunter: The Force Behind Reagan's Star Wars 
Strategy", Business Week, June 20, 1983, p. 40.) 
^ "Maxwell Hunter: The Force ...", op. cit.; Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, op. clt.r P- 48. 
2 "Maxwell Hunter: The Force ...", op. cit. 
^ Maxwell Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics ...", 31 Oct. 1977,op. cit., p. 
242. 
^ In this thesis I use the terms United States, US military, US 
government, Soviet Union, Soviet military, Soviet governmnet, and so 
on as a form of short hand. It is not meant to imply that any of these 
can be viewed as a single actor, it is just done for simplicity. 
5 Maxwell Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics ...", op. cit., pp. 229-230. 6 Ibid., p. 228. 
It was in January 1967 Maxwell Hunter first realized that lasers in space presented a 
"spectacular new strategic option". He was familiar with studies that had been conducted 
in the 1960's which considered the use of rockets launched from orbiting satellites to 
intercept missiles in their boost-phase, but he considered that such a scheme would 
require "vast quantities of interceptors for effective defense coverage", and that it was 
both economically and technically unfeasible.^ However, with the emergence of the 
Space Shuttle, and its potential for greatly reducing space transportation costs, and of 
high energy lasers^ which could deliver their destmctive energy with precision and at the 
speed of light. Hunter thought that it would be possible to overcome the shortcomings of 
the conventional technologies.^ According to Hunter's calculations for laser weapons in 
polar orbits, it would require 406 orbiting battle stations if the lasers had a range of 
1,000km, 21 if the range could be extended to 5,000km and only 9 if the range could be 
extended even further to 10,000km.^ To Hunter, these laser battle stations represented a 
revolution in weapons development:^ 
The ability to concentrate beams of energy moving at the velocity of light so 
narrowly that they overwhelmingly exceed nuclear bomb energy density delivery 
capability should be recognized as a weapons achievement with implications every 
bit as shattering as the development of the monstrous but uncontrolled energy 
release of the nuclear bombs themselves. This is interception par excellence. 
Laser weapons in space had the added advantage of being weapons of discrete 
destruction, rather than of mass destruction, which, argued Hunter, "is crucial for the 
human decision process".^ 
Hunter did not have purely defensive applications in mind for his orbiting laser weapons. 
As well as their potential to circumvent MAD, he argued that laser weapons in space could 
be used to gain tactical advantages, by beaming down from above to destroy airplanes, 
helicopters and tanks, and other such targets that one would want to destroy with pin 
1 Ibid., pp. 228, 232-233. 
2 Hunter thought that it would also be possible to generate directed 
energy beams using electrons or larger particles, but he considered 
only the use of lasers as these were likely to be the most effective 
directed energy weapon. {Ibid., p. 234.) 
3 Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
^ Ibid., p. 239. 
^ Ibid., p. 235. By placing laser weapons in space, it would be 
possible to intercept enemy missiles during their boost-phase when the 
missiles were most vulnerable as (1) minimum energy was required to 
destroy the missile as it was at maximum internal pressure and the 
tank walls were at maximum temperature; (2) they generated massive 
exhaust plumes which enhanced detection; (3) the destruction of the 
missile would destroy all of the MIRVed warheads that it contained; 
and (4) kill assessment would could be achieved reliably and 
accurately by measuring a change in the missile's velocity. (Ibid., 
pp. 236-237.) 
6 Ibid., pp. 234-236. 
point accuracy.^ Another motive seems to have been to lure wars away from earth and 
out into space. "If one must fight", argued Hunter, "it would be desirable to fight decisive 
strategic battles in an arena where no human lived. Space is that arena ... one where an 
advanced strategic arsenal can be detonated in its entirety with no direct damage to the 
earth or its peoples". Orbiting laser weapons would act as a magnet that attracted wars 
into space, by "strongly upsetting the opposing earth-bound strategic force balance".^ 
The United States was, argued Hunter, the nation that was best placed to take advantage 
of these new technologies, and would stand to benefit most from them, being the 
strongest nation - both technologically and economically - but also running into diplomatic 
and military problems maintaining its overseas forces and base structure.^ Hunter realized 
that it would not be an easy matter to convince either the military or arms controllers of the 
wisdom of his high-technology strategic vision, the military having a vested interest in a 
"violent offensive capability", and the arms controllers arguing that all weapons 
technology was bad. "Both parties would much rather hold all peoples, young and old, as 
hostages to the Balance of Terror."^ For Hunter, the position taken by the arms 
controllers was most worrying. If his strategic vision was ignored and arms control 
blindly pursued, he thought that it might place the United States in a disastrous position 
with respect to the future. Laser weapons in space, on the other hand, had the potential to 
place the US in a commanding position compared to its current situation.^ Lasers in space 
could fight and win the "impossible battle", stopping a full-scale ballistic missile attack 
with little cost to the defended area. However, once taken up, this strategic option 
required permanent vigilance against the possibility that "such a space weapon force could 
be defeated in space by a superior ... force of like composition. One would have to 
maintain his space laser force second to none into the future in order to remove the 
Balance of Terror permanendy from this land".^ 
Early in 1979 Maxwell Hunter visited Senator Malcolm Wallop (R - Wyoming)"', and, 
reportedly, found him reading a copy of his 1977 paper. According to Hunter, Wallop 
looked up and exclaimed: "By God we're going to do something to defend this country!"® 
Wallop had been impressed by Hunter's paper so Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla 
1 Ibid.r p p . 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 . 
2 Ibid.r p p . 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 . 
3 Ibid.r p p . 2 3 3 - 2 3 4 . 
4 Ibid.r p p . 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 . 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.r p . 2 4 4 . 
I will use the common short-hand form of indicating which political 
party a politician belongs to and which area they represent. In this 
case Wallop is a Republican senator from Wyoming. If a politician is a 
Democrat then the abbreviation D will be used. 
8 "Max Hunter; The Force . . June 2 0 , 1 9 8 3 , op. cit. 
urged Hunter to join with other proponents of laser weapons to take his proposal further. 
By November 1979 Codevilla and Hunter had put together a group of experts from 
private industry: Joseph Miller from TRW, which was building large chemical lasers, 
Norbert Schnog of Perkin-Elmer, which was building large precision optics, and Gerald 
Ouelette of Charles Stark Draper Laboratories, which was working on pointing, tracking 
and fire control, who without their companies' blessings prepared a classified briefing on 
how orbiting laser battle stations could be used to destroy missiles. Then, under Senator 
Wallop's auspices. Hunter's team conducted a series of briefing sessions. Firstly, there 
were two dry runs for 10 congressional aides, and then a group of four followed by 
another group of eight senators from the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services 
Committees.^ 
The members of the Hunter's team all came from companies which were working on 
contracts for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Space Laser 
Triad, a programme to develop on the ground the subsystems that would be required for a 
space-based chemical laser battle station. It was planned that these subsystems would be 
tested in 1983-1985. This programme consisted of three elements. Alpha was a project to 
develop a 5-megawatt hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser. There had originally been three 
companies competing for the Alpha project, TRW, Rockwell's Rocketdyne Division and 
Bell Aerospace Textron, but by 1980 Bell had been eliminated. Talon Gold was a project 
to develop technologies to acquire targets in space and for the pointing and tracking of 
space-based lasers. Two teams of contractors were competing on this project, one 
comprised of Rockwell International and Hughes Aircraft as associate contractors, and the 
other of Lockheed as the prime contractor with GTE Sylvania, Ford Aerospace and 
Hughes Aircraft. Lode was the Large Optics Demonstration Experiment which aimed to 
fabricate and control on the ground a 4-meter diameter mirror of the type required for a 
space-based laser. Two teams of contractors were competing on this project, one 
comprised of Hughes Aircraft with Perkin-Elmer, and the other of Lockheed Missiles and 
Space Company with Itek.^ 
^ Ibid.: Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, op. cit., p. 48; "Laser Weapons: 
An Omen of Real-Life Star Wars", Business Week, Dec. 11, 1979, p. 115; 
Jeff Hecht, Beam Weapons: The Next Arms Race, Plenum Press, New York, 
1984, p. 220; Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens, Dodd, Mead & Co., New 
York, 1984, p. 167; Patrick E. Tyler, "How Edward Teller learned to 
love the nuclear-piimped x-ray laser", Washington Post, 3 April, 1983, 
p. Dl. (Manno claims that Hunter's lobby group also included 
representatives from North American Rockwell and Bell Aerospace) 
2 "Laser Weapons: From Science Fiction to Fact", Business Week, July 
26, 1982, p. 58; "Technology Eyed to Defend ICBMs, Spacecraft", 
Aviation Week and Space Technology (AWST), July 28, 1980, pp. 40-41 
"Pentagon Studying Laser Battle Stations", AWST, July 28, 1980, p. 58 
"Laser Applications in Space Emphasized", AWST, July 20, 1980, p. 63 
"Defense Dept. Backs Space-Based Missile Defense", AWST, September 27, 
At the Senate briefings Maxwell Hunter provided information on the systems aspects of a 
space-based laser and the engagement of Soviet missiles; Joseph Miller provided 
information on chemical lasers; Gerald Oulette provided information on pointing and 
tracking technology for space-based lasers; and, Norbet Schnog provided information on 
the optical systems necessary for space-based lasers. The group claimed that an effective 
ballistic missile defence of the United States could be provided by the mid to late 1980's 
at a cost of US$10 billion, by placing 18 high-energy laser battle stations in polar orbits at 
an altitude of 1750km. ̂  Conservative senators were reported to have shown the most 
interest, especially Senators Henry Jackson (D-Washington), Jake Gam (R-Utah), John 
Tower (R-Texas), and Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), although a number of liberals 
too were supposed to be "flirting with the idea" of backing a space based laser defence on 
the grounds that it might be cheaper than building more offensive weapons.^ 
As well as the congressional briefings. Hunter's so-called 'gang of four' conducted 
briefings for Pentagon officials. Their proposals were reported to have been widely 
denounced as being "premature and unrealistic". Officials from the Army and the Defense 
Department charged that the group had not considered countermeasures, and that state-of-
the-art technology for the sensors and complex battle management required was not 
available. They ran into further trouble when they conducted a briefing for two Army 
generals who were in charge of conventional ballistic missile defence programs.^ The 
generals were outraged by the civilian lobbyists who were advocating exotic technologies 
in competition to their own, more conventional, programmes. The Defense Department 
put pressure on the group's employers to keep the members of the briefing team out of 
Washington. As the members of Hunter's team had no official standing, and as Hunter's 
employer (Lockheed) was an Army BMD contractor^, the team soon disbanded. The 
Senate forces were not so easily distracted. Led by Senator Wallop and his aide Angelo 
Codevilla, they continued to lobby Congress and the Pentagon, arguing that the pursuit of 
strategic defence based on laser weapons in space was a saner policy than MAD.^ 
1982, pp. 15-16. In 1980 DARPA selected Boeing for a follow-on effort 
to integrate the three triad subsystems for an overall "end-to-end" 
demonstration, in a, programme called Systems Integration of Triad 
Technology (SITT). ("Laser Applications in Space op. cit.) 
1 "Defense Dept. Experts Confirm Efficacy of Space-Based Lasers", AWST, 
July 28, 1980^ p. 65. 
2 "Laser Weapons: An Omen ...", op. cit. 
^ One of these was almost certainly Major General Grayson Tate, 
Ballistic Missile Defense Programme Manager. 
^ Lockheed was one of the major contractors for the Army's Homing 
Overlay exoatmospheric BMD system. 
^ "Max Hunter: The Force op. cit. Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, op. 
cit., p. 49; "Defense Dept. Experts Confirm Efficacy ...", op. cit., 
p. 65. 
Wallop's first lobbying effort in the Senate, an attempt in 1979 to pass a bill appropriating 
money for laser development, apparently also ran into trouble when it was rebuffed by 
Senator John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Air Force as being 
premature. Frustrated, Wallop went public with his campaign in an attempt to muster 
more support. ̂  One example of this campaign was a paper under the authorship of 
Malcolm Wallop that appeared in the Fall 1979 edition of Strategic Review. 2 The main 
point that Wallop was trying to get across in this paper was that technology was making 
the "balance of terror" obsolete, and now promised a "considerable measure of safety 
from the threat of ballistic missiles".^ 
According to Wallop, between 1966 and 1979 America had been in the "iron grip" of the 
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, and the possibility of a nuclear conflict was not 
taken seriously. This meant that both strategy and weapons development aimed to inflict 
damage on the Soviet Union, rather than limiting the Soviets' ability to inflict damage on 
the United States. However, he argued, proponents of MAD, and especially of arms 
control under the guise of SALT, had now been discredited. Not only were the Soviets 
involved in a massive arms build up, but they were also working on antiballistic missile 
defences with more verve than the US.^ Wallop reflected nostalgically on a period when 
the US military possessed "unquestioned strategic nuclear superiority" over the Soviet 
military, when "even with its then inaccurate missiles" it could have launched a 
"disarming strike at Soviet missiles deployed in 'soft' launch pads, while retaining most 
of its force in reserve". The strategy of MAD was the main vehicle through which this 
situation had been reversed, so much so that "a small portion of the Soviet missile force 
[was now] capable of destroying nearly all American land-based missiles in their silos, 
thereby blunting the United States' capability to inflict retaliatory destruction upon Soviet 
society".^ 
Wallop argued that through the SALT I treaty the US government had bargained away an 
ABM system. Safeguard, which even though it possessed certain faults was, 
nonetheless, superior to the Soviet ABM system. The Soviet military, argued Wallop, had 
1 Kent D. Lee, Strategic Defense and Congress: The Role of Scientific 
Advisers, summa cum laude thesis. College of Liberal Arts, University 
of Minnesota, Summer 1985, pp. 68-69. 
2 Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile 
Defense", Strategic Review, Fall, 1979. (It is claimed by Gregg Herken 
that this paper was actually written by Angelo Codevilla. Gregg 
Herken, letter to Ian McNicol, 15 December, 1987.) 
3 Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives op. cit., p. 13. 
^ Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
5 Ibid., p. 15. 
no system comparable to Sprint (one of the components of the Safeguard system); their 
phased array radars were primitive, and computers too slow to handle the data rates 
required to track and discriminate incoming missiles.^ However, new technologies were 
now being developed which promised to overcome the problems experienced by the early 
ABM systems. But these were just technical possibilities, the reality of the situation being 
that since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972 the US military had actually dismantled 
its only ABM site and had not moved to capitalize upon the new technologies.^ 
In contrast, argued Wallop, "since SALT I the Soviet Union not only has sustained its 
allotted ABM site, ... but it has constructed the foundation for a nationwide ABM 
system". It was constructing four huge phased-array radars, and had continued to conduct 
ABM research, bringing them to a level of technology comparable to that of the United 
States at the start of the seventies. All that was now needed to install a nationwide ABM 
system of the Safeguard type was to mass-produce the missiles and the small radar 
involved. While such a system, in American hands, was not all that threatening. Wallop 
argued that in Soviet hands it "looms as more significant", because of their contrasting 
strategic posture: ̂  
If the Soviets, following the path inherent in their strategic deployment, were to aim 
a disarming strike at the vulnerable land-based U.S. Minuteman force, they could 
then concentrate their ABM's against the residual American force of submarine-
launched missiles. If by the late 1980s the United States were to go ahead with the 
production and deployment of modernized MX land-based missiles, Soviet ABMs 
could provide a respectable point defense of Soviet weapons against the MX. 
The new technologies that Wallop thought looked promising for the defence against long-
range ballistic missiles were directed energy weapons, in particular laser weapons, 
because it was "far from clear" that particle beam weapons could ever "figure 
conclusively" in ballistic missile defence. Further, these laser weapons would be required 
to be based in space where they could attack the missiles in their boost-phase (where they 
were slower, more detectable and softer, and the multiple warheads had not been 
deployed), thus rendering a "radical improvement" in performance over the conventional 
ABM systems. Stationed in space. Wallop argued, "each of these weapons may project its 
1 Ibid. The Safeguard system was claimed by Wallop to be "potent but 
obviously limited" because its radars and computers could handle only 
a limited number of incoming missiles and could be easily overwhelmed; 
the cost of the defence required to shoot down an extra missile was 
greater than the cost of the extra missile; and, it would not provide 
a perfect defence, some warheads always getting through. (Jjbid., pp. 
15-16) 
2 ibid.r p. 17. 
3 Ibid, 
energy for thousands of miles, only a few dozen of these weapons could conceivably 
destroy a whole fleet of ballistic missiles".^ 
The ABM system that Wallop advocated was comprised of several dozen laser weapons 
systems deployed in space, a system he argued which would "revolutionize the strategic 
equation as we have known it for nearly two decades - above all by decisively tipping the 
balance of modem warfare in favor of the defense and radically mitigating the potential 
destructive effects of war". There were two possible lasers that could be used as the active 
element of such a system: chemical lasers which produced an infrared beam or Eximer 
lasers which produced an ultraviolet beam. Wallop felt that the chemical lasers should be 
used, as they were "much closer to being ready for use in space because they require 
relatively litde heavy equipment".2 Other elements of the system included a large main 
mirror to focus the beam over long distances, an accurate tracking and pointing 
mechanism to point the injfrared beam at a target missile some three to four thousand miles 
away and to hold it there for the few seconds required to destmct the missile, and sensors 
to detect that the missiles had been launched and a computer and communications system 
to assign each target to the laser battle station that was in the best position to engage it. 
Wallop argued that each of these technologies was now in place in the United States and 
could be integrated into a potent ABM system and placed in orbit by the mid-1980's if the 
political will to do so existed. ̂  
What was necessary, argued Wallop, was an all-out effort to build a space-based laser 
ballistic missile defence system on the scale of the Manhatten Project. What stood in the 
way of this were those in the scientific and technical community, and the Carter 
Administration and its congressional allies, who were committed to the doctrine of Mutual 
1 I b i d . , p. 17. Wallop argued that particle beams were peculiarly ill 
suited to deployment in space as (i) they would require such an 
enormous power source to drive them that deployment in space would be 
impractical, and (ii) the beam would be bent by the earth's magnetic 
field making accurate firing difficult. However, even though Wallop 
thought them impractical he argued that "despite their limitations, 
particle beam weapons could join the Soviet weapons inventory in the 
mid-1980's". { I b i d . , P- 18.) 
2 I b i d . Chemical lasers produced an infrared beam by burning hydrogen 
and fluorine. The products of this reaction needed to diffuse quickly 
into an area of low pressure. The vacuum of space provided an ideal 
working environment for such a weapon. Eximer lasers produced an 
ultraviolet beam by exciting molecules of xenon and krypton with 
electricity or nuclear radiation. They would thus require large power 
s o u r c e s . { I b i d . ) 
^ I b i d . , p. 19. This system would comprise about two dozen laser battle 
stations, each in an earth orbit of 800 miles, and with an effective 
range of some 3000 miles. Each laser battle station would carry enough 
fuel to fire 1000 'shots', and thus would be able to cope with a full-
scale attack launched by the Soviet Union. 
Assured Destruction. What Wallop's project stood for was a new strategic doctrine. It 
was not a weapon of mass destruction: "The laser does not loom as a weapon of mass 
destruction", Wallop claimed, "it threatens nothing except weapons of mass 
destruction".^ In light of the Soviet military's emerging offensive superiority vis-a-vis the 
US military, "what responsible American official", asked Wallop, "could counsel 
rationally that the U.S. forfeit the opportunity of effective defense? And, for that matter, 
what sincere advocate of arms control could not bring himself to admit that 'Assured 
Protection' would be preferable to 'Assured Destruction'?"^ 
Wallop and his allies kept the fight for space-based laser weapons alive in congress, 
pushing the same line that Wallop had put forward in his paper, and arguing that such a 
system "could dramatically boost defenses against land- and sub-launched missile 
attacks".^ This fight, which pitted a "cadre of Senate Republican staffers plus their allies 
in the aerospace industry against the Carter Administration Defense Department 
establishment" was about how fast such weapons should be developed. In 1980 Wallop 
was seeking a US$10 billion crash development programme over three to five years to 
develop a space-based laser BMD. He introduced an amendment to add US$160 million 
to the fiscal 1981 defence budget, and Jake Gam an amendment to add US$60 million for 
space-based laser BMD. In early July 1980, the Senate group lost this skirmish by a vote 
of 52-39, the Administration arguing that the weapons should not be brought into the 
military inventory until the 1990's. However, a small group of aerospace analysts led by 
Maxwell Hunter "did manage to persuade the Senate in top secret briefings to add 
[US]$22 million to the defense appropriation for laser development" and to generate 
support for the laser weapon concept as a way of redressing the "deteriorating balance of 
power between the US and the Soviet Union".^ 
The "cadre of senate staffers" was otherwise known as the 'Madison Group', a 
"particularly well-connected, powerful but discreet" group of "ultra-conservative" 
congressional aides, who came together on January 4th 1980 in Room 607 at the Madison 
Hotel at the initiative of Senator Jesse Helm's assistant, John Carbaugh, who, in 1979 
had helped organize successfully the opposition to ratifying the proposed SALT n 
1 Jbid.r p. 20. 
2 Ibid., p. 21. 
3 "Laser Weapons: An Omen op. cit., p. 43, p. 115. 
^ Evert Clark, "Laser Weapons pit Republicans against Democrats", 
Business Week, August 18, 1980, p. 43; Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens, 
op. cit., p. 167; Henry S. Bradsher, "Pentagon, Contractors at Odds On 
Laser Weapons Development", Washington Star, 10 May 1981, p. 5; Jeff 
Hecht, Beam Weapons, op. cit., p. 222; "Defense Dept. Experts Confirm 
Efficacy op. cit., p. 66. 
Treaty.^ The group consisted of about a dozen men, all present or former Congressional 
staffers, and all hawks on foreign policy and defence issues. They met every other Friday 
for lunch, to devise strategies to oppose arms control, increase military spending, and 
provide assistance to anti-communist forces in South America.^ Besides John Carbaugh, 
the group is reported to have included Angelo Codevilla, Tidal McCoy and Mark 
Schneider (Senator Jake Gam), Sven Kraemer (Sen. John Tower), Richard Perle (ex-
Sen. Henry Jackson), William Schneider (Representative Jack Kemp), Quentin 
Crommelin (Sen. Strom Thurmond), David Sullivan (Sen. Gordon Humphrey), Jack 
Davis (Sen. Stone), Robert Andrews (Sen. Glenn), Margo Carlisle (Sen. McClure), and 
Michel Pillsbury.^ Also, Charles Kupperman of the Committee on the Present Danger 
was a member'̂ , as were Seymour Weiss and William Van Cleave^, and Maxwell Hunter 
is reported to have been associated with the group®. Eugene Rostow claimed that the 
'Madison Group' was a group of young neo-conservative ideologues who wanted no 
arms control with the Soviets, were "neo-isolationist", and distrustful of all foreigners, 
even America's allies. This was in contrast to what he called 'old-line conservatism' 
espoused by himself and Paul Nitze.'' As well as having close links with the members of 
the 'laser lobby', the 'Madison Group' was also well placed to influence the Reagan 
Administration in the early 1980's, through membership of the President-elect's transition 
team,® 
Eugene Rostow considered Richard Perle to be the "intellectual leader" of the 'Madison 
Group'. ̂  Perle was both an ABM supporter and a hawk from way-back. In 1969 he was 
hired as the chief research assistant for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense 
Policy, which had been set up by Albert Wohlsetter, Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson to 
counter the anti-ABM campaign that was being waged at the time. After this he moved on 
^ Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence or 
Delusion? r Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 64; Gregg Herken, 
Counsels of War, pp. 325-32 6; William Safire, "The Madison Group", New 
York Times, December 4, 1980, p. A31. 
2 William Safire, "The Madison Group", op. cit. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Identified by Eugene Rostow in an interview in Gregg Herken, Counsels 
of War, op. cit., pp. 394, 326. 
^ Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, o p . c i t . , p. 330. 
7 Ibid., pp. 325-326, 329. 
8 Carbaugh, Kraemer, McCoy, Perle and Schneider were on Reagan's 
Defense Transition Team; Pillsbury and Sullivan were on the Arms 
Control Transition Team; Carbaugh and Perle were on the State 
Department Transition Team; and Codevilla and Schneider were on the 
CIA Transition Team. (William Safire, "The Madison Group", o p . c i t . ) 
9 Gregg Herken, Counsels of War, op. cit., p. 326. 
to work for Senator Henry Jackson and became notorious for his strong opposition to the 
SALT treaties.! 
The failure of the 'Madison Group' to win the Senate battle for immediate full scale 
development funding for chemical laser weapons in 1980 reportedly made them more 
determined than ever to succeed under the Reagan Administration. Their opposition to 
arms control was redirected from SALT 11 to the ABM Treaty. After Reagan had been 
elected, the Group continued to meet for its weekly lunches, despite being driven out of 
the Madison Hotel for short time by the glare of unwanted publicity.^ 
The group known as the 'laser lobby' seems to have been a fairly loose coalition of 
mainly Republican Senators - who supported space-based lasers for a variety of reasons -
linked through the membership of their aides in the 'Madison Group', and through a 
shared world view, in which the Soviets were seen as a growing and ominous threat, and 
space-based laser BMD the best way to curb this threat. The group was led by Senator 
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming) and also included Senators Harrison Schmitt (R-New 
Mexico), Henry Jackson (D-Washington), Jake Gam (R-Utah), John Tower (R-Texas), 
William Roth (R-Delware) and Representative Jack Kemp (R-New York). Jake Gam has 
suggested that Senator Pete Domenici (R-New Mexico) was a member of this group 
also. 3 
Although the 'laser lobby' seems to have been a loose coalition, all members shared a 
common ideology. They argued that SALT I was a bad and fundamentally flawed treaty, 
and that SALT n was even worse. A typical view was that expressed by Jack Kemp, who 
contended that SALT I had "done something worth doing - badly (limiting offensive 
! Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Touchstone, New York, 1983, 
pp. 387-388. An example of Perle's thinking at this time is provided 
by an article in Strategic Review. In this he argues that the SALT II 
Treaty will constrain the US but allow the Soviets to forge ahead with 
the development of offensive weapons, so that eventually they will 
have the capability to stage a "knock-out-blow" against US land-based 
ICBMs. Perle blames this situation on arms control advocates who have 
lobbied against new weapons programmes and the CIA who, he claims, 
have constantly underestimated the Soviet capabilities. Perle argues 
that the situation that the US faces in the early eighties is 
comparable to that of the British facing the Germans in the 1930's. 
(Richard Perle, "Echoes of the 1930's". Strategic Review, Winter 1979, 
pp. 12-13.) 
2 Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, o p . c i t . , p. 64. 18 months later John 
Carbaugh resigned from congressional service, his role in the group 
reportedly being taken up by Angelo Codevilla. {Ibid., p. 330) 
3 Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, o p . c i t . , p. 69; Kent D. Lee, op. 
c i t . , p. 68; Jake Garn, letter to Ian McNicol, 10 December, 1987 . 
(Garn claims that his role was "confined to support for the Senators 
who were actively lobbying the Administration".) 
weapons), while doing something not worth doing - too well (limiting ABM 
deployment). It had not constrained the build-up of the Soviet military's offensive 
power but had bargained away the US military's superior ballistic missile defence system. 
Throughout the 1970's the Soviet government had outspent the US government and 
indulged in a massive build up in offensive strategic weapons, while the US had stood 
still, or even gone backwards, so much so that the Soviet military was considered to be 
vastly superior, and the United States vulnerable to a first strike attack. If the SALT n 
treaty were to be adhered to, this would only set this dangerous vulnerability in concrete.^ 
To make matters worse, not only were the SALT treaties bad treaties, but the Soviets 
were held to cheat on them, especially the 1972 ABM Treaty. Three main supposed 
violations were frequently cited: (1) the Soviet military had constructed a number of large 
phased-array radars; (2) they had deployed a semi-mobile ABM radar, the ABM-X-3 -
comprised of the Flat Twin radar and SH-04 and SH-08 missiles - at a site on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula; and, (3) they had conducted more than fifty tests of the SA-2 and 
SA-5 SAM air defence interceptors in the ABM mode.^ Much of this world view was 
based on publications put out by the Committee on the Present Danger, and by writers 
such as Paul Nitze and Richard Pipes who were prominent in this committee. The answer 
to the problem of the Soviet threat was seen to lie in the deployment of space-based laser 
ABM defenses, and possibly also more conventional systems such as LoADS being 
developed by the Army. 
Jake Gam provides an interesting example of the diverse reasons that brought the various 
senators to align themselves with the 'laser lobby'. In Gam's case, although he 
undoubtedly shared the world view of the other members, it seems to have been largely in 
response to the strong opposition which arose in his state to the basing of the MX missile 
in the so-called race-track mode, the mode preferred by the Air Force.'' The Air Force's 
^ Jack F. Kemp, "Congressional Expectations of SALT II", Strategic 
Review, Winter 197 9, p. 19. 
2 Ibid.f pp. 19-21; Jack F. Kemp, "US Strategic Force Modernization: A 
New Role for Missile Defense?", Strategic Review, Summer, 1980, pp. 
12-13; Jake Garn, "The SALT II Verification Myth", Strategic Review, 
Summer, 1979, pp. 16-19; Henry M. Jackson, "A Post-Detente Strategy 
for the United States", Strategic Review, Spring 1980, pp. 11-15; Pete 
V. Domenici, "Toward a Decision on Ballistic Missile Defense", 
Strategic Review, Winter 1982, p. 23; Malcolm Wallop, "Soviet 
Violations of Arms Control Agreements: So What?", Strategic Review, 
Summer 1983, p. 12; 
3 Jack F. Kemp, "Congressional Expectations ...", o p . c i t . , pp. 22-23; 
Malcolm Wallop, "Soviet Violations ...", o p . c i t . , p. 18; Jake Garn, 
"The SALT II Verification Myth", op. cit., pp. 16-19. 
^ Race-Track involved a US$30 Billion construction programme to build 
4,600 barn sized concrete and steel missile shelters in 200 clusters 
of 23 each, scattered throughout the Great Basin Desert of Utah and 
Nevada. One MX missile would be located in each of these clusters and 
own environmental impact statements showed that the project would place a severe strain 
on already scarce water supplies, lead to a permanent increase in air pollution, destroy 
vast areas of vegetation, and encourage the spread of the noxious weed halogeton which 
was poisonous to sheep and cattle, and could contaminate the soil for up to 50 years. In 
addition the project was to be built on land considered sacred by the Duckwater Shoshone 
Indian tribe. Not surprisingly, this particular MX basing mode met strong opposition 
from local activist groups - environmental groups, the Shoshone Indians, and groups of 
cattlemen and ranchers - and national environmental groups, especially in Utah, which 
was also feeling the effects of a huge energy project to extract oil from tar sands and oil 
shale, and to mine coal and uranium.^ 
The opposition of the environmental movement was joined on 5th May 1981 by a strong 
moral sanction from the Mormon Church. Church President Spencer Kimball came out 
strongly against the MX missile, arguing that it was a "denial of the very essence" of the 
church's gospel of "peace to the peoples of the earth". They argued not only to keep the 
missiles out of Utah and Nevada, but to find and altemative plan altogether: "With the 
most serious concern over the pressing moral question of possible nuclear conflict", the 
church elders said, "we plead with our national leaders to marshal the genius of the nation 
to find viable alternatives which will secure ... protection from possible enemy 
aggression, which is our common concern". The message was wired to the Utah and 
Nevada Congressional delegations and to President Reagan whose Administration was, at 
the time, reviewing options on how to deploy the MX.2 
The public impact of the statement by the Mormon leader was significant. In a survey 
commissioned in Salt Lake City in June 1981, shortly after the release of the statement, 
76% of those questioned were opposed to the basing of the MX in Utah, whereas only a 
few months earlier it had been about 50%.^ Initially the Congressional delegation in Utah, 
shuttled between the shelters by gigantic 26-wheeled mobile 
transports. 
^ Joann Omang, "A Uneasy Utah Is Awaiting Massive Energy, MX Projects", 
Washington Post, 30 November 1980, p. 1; Walter S. Mossberg, "MX 
Missile Plan Could Be a Heavy Blow to Utah and Nevada, Air Force 
Concludes", Wall Street Journal, December 17 1980, p. 4; Mark 
Schapiro, "MX Foes are Strange Bedfellows", Washington Star, 22 
February, 1981, p. G-1. 
2 Bill Prochnau, "Mormon Church Joins Opposition to MX Program", 
Washington Post, May 6, 1981, p. 1; "Mormon Church Opposes Placing MX 
Missiles in Utah and Nevada", New York Times, May 6, 1981, p. 1. 
3 Many Mormons regard statements made by the President of the Church to 
be divine direction. Utah had a population of 1,460,000, with about 1 
million of these being Mormons. Nevada with a population of 80 0,000 
had about 5 6,000 Mormons. William E. Schmidt, "Public Mood in Utah and 
Nevada Turns Sharply Against MX Plan", New York Times, June 8, 1981, 
p. 1. 
all of whom were Republicans and active Mormons, reacted cautiously to the statement. 
Likewise the Nevada delegation. All supported the MX programme, but withheld 
judgement on the basing mode. Eventually, the weight of public opinion became too 
much, and Senators Jake Gam of Utah and Paul Laxalt of Nevada, both hawks with 
direct access to the White House, came out strongly against the MX deployment plan.^ 
On June 25th, 1981, Gam and Laxalt publicly rejected the Air Force's MX plan and 
presented an altemative plan to Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, who passed it 
on to the President. Prominent in their list of several altemative basing modes was a plan 
to deploy 200 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and protect them with BMD, and 
to accelerate ABM research so that a full-scale ABM system could be deployed by the mid 
1980's.2 This proposal seems to have been in accord with the Reagan Administration's 
own thinking at the time.^ 
Senator Harrison Schmitt, a former astronaut, and Senator William Roth (R-Delware) 
were attracted to the notion of BMD for economic reasons. In June 1981, they came out 
strongly against the MX race-track basing mode, arguing that it was an "ill-considered 
scheme of monstrous economic and societal proportions and of questionable economic 
and technical validity". What was required was a strategic defence system that would 
"make weapons of mass destmction obsolete". Allocating US$40 to $50 billion to the 
race-track scheme would be a waste of money, they argued, and would direct funds away 
from the development of ballistic missile defence.'^ Senator Pete Domenici, a member of 
the 'laser lobby' who seems to have become active in early 1982, took a very much 
similar position to Schmitt and Roth. By this time, the Reagan Administration had 
abandoned the race-track basing mode, and had identified three altemative basing modes 
for the MX missile: (1) stationing them in deep underground silos; (2) basing them on 
continuous airbome patrol; and, (3) protecting them with ballistic missile defences. 
Domenici was Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, and was an advocate of BMD 
1 Paul Laxalt was considered to be President Reagan's closest friend 
and adviser in the Senate. 
2 Laxalt and Garn, amongst other Senators had introduced an amendment 
to the 1981 Defense Department authorization bill guaranteeing that 
only half of the planned shelters could be sited in their states. 
"Moinnon Church Opposes Placing MX Missiles in Utah and Nevada", o p . 
c i t . ; William E. Schmidt, "Public Mood o p . c i t . ; "Not in My 
State", The Nation, June 1, 1981, p. 15; Henry S. Bradsher, "Laxalt, 
Garn Reject MX in Home States", Washington Star, June 26, 1981, p. 3. 
3 When first in office, members of Reagan's Defense Transition Team 
were reported to be concerned that the Utah-Nevada basing plan would 
take so long to complete that most US land-based ICBM's would remain 
vulnerable until the 1990's. They favoured a plan in which more 
underground silos were built and the missiles shuffled between these. 
(Walter S. Mossberg, "MX Missile Plan ...", o p . c i t . ) 
4 Harrison H. Schmitt & William V. Roth, "A Better Way to Defend 
ourselves", Washington Star, June 18, 1981, p. 15. 
as it promised to be the most cost-effective way to protect the MX missile against the 
threat of Soviet attack.^ In 1980 Domenici had requested the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory to conduct a study of the advances that had been made in BMD technology 
since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972. The study concluded that the "future of 
ballistic missile defense is dominated by the potential for directed-energy weapons to 
intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase".^ 
Even though they suffered set-backs, the 'laser lobby' led by Wallop and backed up by 
groups such as the 'Madison Group' kept pushing their concept, with some success. 
They argued that it may be possible to create a "laser umbrella" much more cheaply that 
previously imagined^, some supporters such as Senator Harrison Schmitt going so far as 
to claim that "a really fool proof system, possibly using satellite-borne laser weapons, 
would end the nuclear-arms race once and for all".^ The 'laser lobby' now had much 
more support, as a dozen of the senators who had voted against Wallop's 1980 proposal 
had now been replaced.^ In 1981, Wallop's group proposed that an extra US$250 million 
be spent on laser weapon research in 1982, in addition to the US$136 million the 
Administration was proposing. In early May 1981, Wallop sent a "dear colleague" letter 
to other senators indicating that he would introduce an amendment to the Armed Services 
Authorization Bill to add US$152.5 Million to DARPA's budget for its laser triad 
programme and US$97.5 million to the Air Force budget to "expedite the building of a 
space laser weapon". According to Wallop: "Laser battie stations [were] not something 
out of 'Star Wars'", but that "Actual physical pieces of the system exist". Only the money 
and the political will to build them was missing. Wallop estimated that such a system 
could be developed by 1985 and in orbit the following year, for a cost of US$2-3 
billion.^ 
When introduced. Wallop's amendment was supported by about 10 other Senators, and 
the chances of the bill passing looked quite promising.'' But the 'laser lobby' ran into 
^ Pete V. Domenici, "Toward a Decision o p . c i t . , pp. 23-24; 
Charles W. Corddry, "N.M. Senator backs missile defense system", 
Baltimore Sun, February 16, 1982, p. 7. 
2 "Technology Eyed to Defend ICBMs, Spacecraft", op. c i t . , p. 34. 
3 Everet Clark, "Laser Weapons: An Omen ...", op. c i t . , p. 43. 
^ John Quirt, "Washington's New Push for Anti-Missiles", Fortune, Oct 
19, 1981, pp. 142-144. 
5 Henry S. Bradsher, "Pentagon, Contractors at Odds...", op. c i t . , p. 
5. 
6 Ibid.; John Quirt, "Washington's New Push ...",op. c i t . , p. 144; Jack 
Manno, op. c i t . , p. 167; Clarence Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology 
Expanding", AWST, May 25, 1981, p. 42. 
Supporting Wallop's amendment were: Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), 
John East (R-North Carolina), Steve Symms (R-Idaho) , Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada), Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) , William 
Armstrong (R-Colorado), Robert Dole (R-Kansas), S. Hayakawa (R-
problems with the Pentagon. A briefing on space-based lasers prepared by DARPA was 
held up in the Pentagon, which seems to have stopped the White House adding its 
approval to the amendment, and a report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) was not 
favourable on the near-term prospects of space-based lasers. The DSB report did 
recommend that US$50 milHon be added to the budget for research in this area. Wallop's 
original proposal was rejected in favour of a US$50 million add on - US$20 million for 
DARPA and US$30 million for the Air Force - for laser system integration and the 
establishment of a space-laser program office within the Air Force, passing in the Senate 
by a margin of 91 to 3. This compromise amendment was put by Harrison Schmitt and 
Malcolm Wallop. ̂  
The following year the group ran into major problems in its quest to promote space-based 
chemical lasers, the so-called 'laser-wars' erupting on Capitol Hill. The 'laser-wars' took 
place between factions in the Senate and House Armed Services Committees who were 
advocating lasers of different wavelengths for use in space-based BMD. The House 
committee fired the first shot when it said that the Administration's US$156 million 
programme for fiscal 1983 for the development of space-based lasers might well result in 
a technical fiasco. The report on the Defense Authorization Act from the House committee 
released in April 1982 argued that "emphasis is being focussed on the wrong laser 
technology", as short wavelength lasers were more lethal.^ They were joined in their 
opposition to chemical lasers by the Defense Science Board. The laser programme that the 
House was objecting to was DARPA's Space Laser Triad based on a 5-megawatt infrared 
chemical laser. They argued that the shorter the wavelength of the laser, the more lethal 
the beam would be as the beam would be more concentrated and could deliver more 
energy to the missile. Chemical infrared lasers would be easy to defeat by using ablative 
coatings on the missile, or by polishing the surface of the missile to reflect the beam, it 
was argued. 2 
In its April report the House Armed Services Committee called for a cut of US$121 
million from the Administration's request, including the termination of the Alpha and 
Lode projects and US$41 million that had been allocated to the Air Force for research on 
California), and Daniel lonouye (D-Hawaii). (Partick Tyler, "How 
Edward Teller learned op. cit.) 
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins of Star Wars", Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, October 1987, 1987, p. 20; Angelo Codevilla, "The 
Void in U.S. Space Strategy", Strategic Review, Winter 1982, p. 70; 
William J. Broad, "A Fatal Flaw in the Concept of Space War", Science, 
March 12 1982, p. 1372; Clarence Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology 
Expanding", op. cit., p. 42. 
2 William J. Broad, "Laser Wars on Capitol Hill", Science, Vol 216, 
June 4, 1982, pp. 1082-1083. 
3 Ibid. 
space-based laser weapons. In place of these the committee called for a US$50 million 
programme to explore short wavelength lasers, in particular free-electron lasers, and the 
addition of US$2 million to the Advanced Test Accelerator at Lawrence Livermore 
laboratory, so that it could be modified for free-electron laser experiments. Malcolm 
Wallop, who was now advocating a 10-megawatt laser with a 10 meter mirror, and who 
had managed to insert an amendment in the original Senate legislation calling for the 
testing of DARPA's space laser triad in space, led the fight against the House. Wallop 
asked from the Senate floor whether we should we wait "to build the infra-red lasers we 
know how to build, and instead put our money on the short wavelength lasers we do not 
yet know how to build? ... We are faced with two sharply contrasting sets of claims in 
this field. The bureaucracy's claims which are reflected in the [House] Armed Services 
Committee's report, and my claims, backed by the only source of facts in the field: the 
aerospace industry".^ DARPA Director Robert Cooper told the Senate Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee that the House action would end the deployment of space-
based laser weaponry for the time being and would push deployment back to the mid to 
late 1990's. Eventually a compromise was reached between the two committees whereby 
the funding for the Alpha and Lode projects was restored, but US$40 million for the Air 
Force and US$2 million for the Advanced Test Accelerator was left out of the budget. 
These funds were divided between a US$20 million study of laser "vulnerability and 
lethality" and a US$20 million addition to short wavelength laser research by DARPA. 
The joint committee also deleted language inserted by Senator Wallop which directed 
DARPA to test the Alpha, Lode and Talon Gold projects in space rather than on land.^ 
Members of the Senate claimed that the joint Senate-House meeting was called in the 
wake of lobbying efforts by George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, and 
Robert Cooper, both of whom were said to be in favour of increasing development of 
short-wavelength lasers at the expense of chemical lasers.^ 
Once the Reagan Administration was in power, the arguments of the 'laser lobby' no 
longer fell on deaf and unsympathetic ears. The administration was reported as early as 
1981 to be studying the potential of ballistic missile defence as a way of making 
"weapons of mass destruction practically obsolete by neutralizing them".^ Both Senators 
John Tower and Harrison Schmitt discussed the possibilities of the new defensive 
1 Ibid. 
2 "House Senate Compromise", Lasers and Applications, Vol 1, No. 3, 
1982, p. 20; Jeff Hecht, Beam Weapons, Plenum Press, New York, 1984, 
pp. 223, 229-230; William J. Broad, "Laser Battle Stations: Back to 
the Drawing Board", Science, September 10, 1982, p. 1017. 
3 "House, Senate Units Seek Laser Effort Agreement", ANST, June 14, 
1982, p. 26. 
4 John Quirt, "Washington's New Push ...", o p . e x t . , p. 148. 
technologies with President Reagan early in his first term.^ Schmitt met with Reagan on 
12 December 1980, and after the meeting said that Reagan had voiced concern that the 
policy of MAD held "tens of millions of people hostage to annihilation in order to 
maintain a deterrent". He had, according to Schmitt asked about the technological 
possibility of altering that policy towards one of protection rather than mutually assured 
destruction. Schmitt told the then president-elect that alternative weapons could indeed be 
developed if it became national policy.^ According to Schmitt, Reagan "expressed a 
strong interest in the possibility of developing a laser defense against ballistic missile 
attack". The president-elect's Defense Transition Team was reported to have told key 
congressional Republicans that one of its top priorities was to increase spending on a laser 
weapon to shoot down ballistic missiles in their boost phase.^ Schmitt is also reported to 
have discussed with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger the need for space-based 
ballistic missile defence.'̂  
Malcolm Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla also lobbied the President and his advisers 
on the need for a space-based ballistic missile defence. In late 1980, Wallop spoke of the 
"vigorous attempts" that had been made to gain the support of Reagan, then President-
elect. Wallop was keenly aware that Congress would "support an Executive Branch 
decision to move into this new area, but without presidential support, it will be difficult to 
get support in Congress".^ In mid 1981 Wallop discussed with Weinberger the prospects 
for space-based laser systems, and Weinberger was reported to be "open-minded", but 
not so sure that it could be accomplished within the next decade and was worried about 
the cost.^ 
In October 1981, Dr. George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, told an 
audience of two hundred aerospace executives that he had spent most of his time trying to 
head off the public pressure for building space weapons. In mid-November 1981, 
Wallop and Codevilla sent a letter to White House Chief of Staff James Baker urging that 
Keyworth be reprimanded for opposing space-based lasers and for professing to be 
1 Ibid.; Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, op. c i t . , p. 69. 
2 Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "Reagan tells Schmitt he wants to develop ABM 
for Mutual Protection", Baltimore Sun, December 13, 1980, p. 8. 
^ Thomas 0'Toole, "Reagan Interested in Speeding Development of Space-
Based Laser", Washington Post, December 26, 1980, p. 3; Senator 
Malcolm Wallop, "Space Lasers", Human Events, January 17, 1981, p. 23. 
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^ Clarence Robinson, "Space-Based Laser Battle Stations Seen", AWST, 
December 8, 1980, p. 37. 
6 "Space Laser Spurs Timing Question", AWST, July 20, 1981, p. 19. 
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"fundamentally frightened" at the idea of developing laser ballistic missile defenses. The 
duo also urged the administration to make clear its position on strategic defense.^ 
Wallop and Codevilla met with Weinberger again in early September 1982. Also present 
at the meeting were Richard DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Alan Pike, the Acting 
Director of DARPA's Directed Energy Office. After the meeting Wallop said that he was 
impressed with Weinberger's position on strategic defence. It was claimed that 
Weinberger had endorsed a US space-based ballistic missile defence system and that he 
had directed the Defense Department to pursue this technology as rapidly as possible.^ 
2.3 HIGH FRONTIER AND THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
Lt. General Daniel Graham, US Army (Ret.), was one of the earliest, and remains one of 
the strongest proponents of strategic defence. Graham's interest in the need for strategic 
defence arose while he was Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where he 
began to be concerned that the strategy of Mutual Assured Destmction (MAD) was not 
working because the Soviets were taking advantage of the United States, particularly in 
respect of the ABM Treaty. In a study undertaken by Graham shortly before he left the 
DIA in 1976 he argued that:^ 
... everything I can see with regard to Soviet activities in the strategic defense field 
indicates that they are preparing to break out of the ABM Treaty. I indicated that I 
couldn't make the case for whether they think we are going to give up on the idea of 
no defense or whether the Soviets themselves will simply break out of the treaty ... 
that was not evident to me. But it was evident from their defense activities which 
already violated the ABM treaty, particularly using SAM radar sets against ballistic 
missiles that the Soviets didn't believe that the ABM treaty ... was going to hold up. 
Graham pursued this theme in a number of books he wrote after retiring from the army, 
the first called New Strategy for the West written for the right-wing Heritage 
Foundation, and the second, in 1979, Shall America Be Defended? In this latter book 
Graham did not make a case for any specific type of strategic defence, but argued that "the 
strategy of deterrence based strictly on offensive forces was wrong, and that strategic 
defenses were required".^ 
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins op. ext., pp. 20-21. 
2 Clarence Robinson, "Defense Dept. Backs Space-Based Missile Defense", 
AWST, September 21, 1982, p. 14. 
3 Transcript of interview with Lt. General Daniel 0. Graham by Lt. Col. 
Baucom, 7 July 1987, pp. 1-2. (Interview supplied by the High Frontier 
organization.) 
^ Ibid., p. 2. Graham, in the interview with Baucom, claims that Shall 
America Be Defended? was co-authored with Angelo Codevilla of 'laser-
lobby' fame. The actual book does not mention Codevilla at all. The 
In 1979 General Graham began to focus more on the possibility of space-based defence 
systems, setting up, with Brigadier General Robert Richardson, USAF (Ret), a small 
group to look at the space aspects of strategic defence. This group also included the Hon. 
John Morse, who had been Assistant Secretary in ISA during the Nixon Administration, 
and later expanded to include Dr. Peter Glaser of Arthur D. Little Company, Arnold 
Kramish, who had been a physicist on the Manhattan Project, and Fred "Bud" Redding 
Jr. of Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Intemational.^ Bud Redding, who was interested 
in pushing the concept of a small space vehicle, was to play an important part in the early 
shaping of what was to become the High Frontier project. "It was from his work", said 
Graham, "that the idea for these litde space "garages" that housed the litde rockets that 
would serve as kinetic kill vehicles [came]".^ 
By the end of 1979 this informal discussion group of six had reached two conclusions, 
one technical and the other political. Firstiy, they concluded that a combination of ground-
and space-based systems would provide an adequate approach to missile defence; 
secondly, that "the MAD strategy could be changed", and further, that "the technology to 
make this change was not way off in the future, but relatively close in".^ It was this 
initial study group that eventually led to the setting up of the High Frontier study group, 
which arose out of a disagreement between members of President Reagan's Transition 
Team after his 1980 election.^ 
Daniel Graham was one of the first to make contact with Ronald Reagan to discuss his 
ideas about strategic defence. Shortly after retiring from the Army, Graham received a call 
from Edwin Meese asking him to be an adviser on military matters in Reagan's 1976 
aim of the book was to "lay to rest the widespread notion that no 
defense is possible against nuclear weapons". This was "possible 
because technology has given our[US] superior economy the wherewithal 
to do it", and was desirable "because unless we can plan to come out 
of a war less damaged than the Soviet Union, we will not be able to 
escape such a war - except by surrender". This would be an 
inconceivable horror, according to Graham: "The ordeals of slavery and 
slow death that have been visited upon Russia, China, Vietnam ... by 
conquering communists are not figments of anyone's imagination", he 
claimed. At this stage, the form of BMD that Graham was advocating was 
the LOADS and homing overlay systems being developed by the US Army. 
(Daniel O. Graham, Shall America Be Defended?, Arlington House, New 
York, 1979, pp. 13-14, 124, 247.) 
1 Transcript of Graham interview, July 7, 1987, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Ibid.; Robert M. Bowman, Star Wars: Defense or Death Star?, Institute 
for Space and Security Studies, 1985, p. 51. (Dr. Bowman was involved 
in the informal discussions of the High Frontier group during the 
transition period.) 
campaign to win the Republican nomination. Graham claims that even at this time Reagan 
had doubts about the efficacy of MAD: "He said it didn't make any sense to him. It was 
like two men with cocked pistols pointed at each others head; if either man even flinched, 
then you blew each other's brains out".^ In the lead up to Ronald Reagan's 1980 
Presidential campaign Graham was again asked to be an adviser.^ It was during this time, 
in February 1980 in Nashua, New Hampshire, that Graham first briefed Reagan on the 
ideas about space-based strategic defence that had been developed by his informal study 
group. Before a debate between Reagan and George Bush, Graham broached the idea of 
strategic defence with the future President. Reagan was, according to Graham, very 
interested, taking out his cards and writing notes to himself on the subject.^ 
Although Reagan may have been interested in Graham's ideas about strategic defence, 
other members of Reagan's advisory team were quite hostile. Early in the campaign 
Graham was among those arguing that the only viable approach to cope with growing 
Soviet superiority was to implement a basic change in US strategy and make a 
"technological end-run on the Soviets". According to Graham, all of Reagan's advisers 
agreed with this initially, "in principle" at least. But as time passed they began to 
concentrate on the amounts of money needed to resurrect old and revitalize on-going 
Pentagon programs, and on the "quick fixes" necessary if the United States were to hold 
its own within the doctrine of MAD. New offensive weapons programs were 
recommended to "plug as quickly as possible the strategic gaps between the U.S. and 
Soviet capabilities which [were] known collectively as 'the window of vulnerability'.'"^ 
According to Graham, a certain level of coolness developed in the Reagan camp between 
his school and the one led by Paul Nitze and William Van Cleave. Graham's school was 
advocating the use of space based strategic defence as a vehicle to implement a change of 
strategy away from MAD, whereas the other school was advocating a more conventional 
strategy, the strengthening of deterrence through a massive build-up in conventional and 
nuclear weapons. Both schools saw their strategies as ways of regaining American 
military superiority.^ Graham argued that this latter strategy would just lead to 
bankruptcy, and would not be supported in Congress. Further, it was futile, accelerating 
1 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July 1987, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
2 Graham met with Reagan and Paul Laxalt and a few others toward the 
end of 1979, and Reagan asked him to be an adviser. (Ibid.) 
3 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
^ Daniel O. Graham, The Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, 1982, p. vi; See 
also Lt. Gen Daniel 0. Graham, "bold strokes, for a Strategic Nuclear 
Balance", Signal, May/June, 1981, p. 57. 
5 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July, 1987, op. cit. p. 5; "Selling 
the High Frontier Defense Strategy", Interview with Lt. General Daniel 
O. Graham by David Atlee Phillips, Defense Electronics, October 1982, 
p'. 169. 
an arms race in offensive weapons that the US could not win "because the Soviets [were] 
already producing weaponry like sausages".^ 
Throughout the campaign, and in the transition period after Reagan's election, Daniel 
Graham continued to press his case, an endeavour that would place him outside the circle 
of Reagan's close advisers. Graham, in a letter to General Edward Meyer, Chief of Staff, 
US Army, tells Meyer that he "continued to insist that such an end-run was both vital and 
feasible and got myself and others who agreed with me cut out of the pattem" in about 
mid-1980.2 After this, in early 1981, Graham discussed his ideas with Representative 
Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), who shared Graham's conviction that large increases in the 
military budget would not negate the Soviet threat and would not receive public support, 
and who was working in conjunction with Representative Ken Kramer (R-Colorado) to 
establish a Consolidated Space Command within the Air Force. They argued for a new 
strategic approach and a technological end-run on the Soviets to meet the President's 
commitment to a "margin of safety".^ 
After the Reagan campaign was over, Graham was determined to "flesh out" the idea of 
space-based strategic defence by bringing together some scientists and engineers who 
knew more about the subject than his initial 'gang-of-six'. Graham attended a meeting at 
the White House with President Reagan and his advisers in February 1981 and told the 
President that he thought he had found an answer to the issue of strategic defence, and 
sought a meeting with Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger to brief him on this. The 
meeting was arranged by James Baker, and according to Graham Weinberger's response 
was:"That is very interesting and I would like to hear more about it as you develop the 
concept".^ 
Even in these early stages, before the High Frontier study proper was set up, Graham and 
his colleagues seem to have had the proposal fairly well fleshed out, although the exact 
technologies that would be used was still in some doubt. Graham, in 1981, then Co-
Chairman of the hawkish Coalition for Peace Through Strength, was arguing that if 
pursued vigorously the United States could "create space-bome capabilities which would 
neutralize the Soviet strategic nuclear threat" by the mid-1980's. This was part of a "Peace 
Through Strength" strategy, which required that Mutual Assured Destruction be rejected. 
1 Ibid. 
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strategic defence reemphasized, the notion of strategic balance be deemed unacceptable, 
and a technological end-run be launched on the Soviet Union.^ According to Graham 
superiority was a perfectly reasonable objective for the United States to pursue. "One 
day", he said, "one nation or ... a consortium on nations is going to establish the same 
kind of domination out there that the British once had over the high seas".2 
In terms of technology, Graham was advocating a fleet of unmanned space vehicles 
("cruisers") which would destroy large numbers of Soviet missiles in their boost phase. 
Early in 1981, Graham thought that these would use high-energy laser weapons to 
destroy ICBMs^, but by mid-1981 he thought that they would use heat-seeking missiles 
or missiles that fired a cloud of ball bearings, and then change over to laser weapons 
when these became available. Such a system would require a fleet of some 200 to 300 
orbiting space cruisers as well as a manned space vehicle to control and maintain them.'̂  
As well as these space-based battie stations Graham thought that it would be prudent to 
deploy, as quickly as possible, some of the least expensive ground-based BMDs being 
developed by the Army, and also had notions of placing large solar power panels in 
space, using them to sell power to third-world countries in return for their "raw materials 
and their good behaviour, for that matter".^ He thought that the American public would 
find this proposal most attractive: "Some public support would be based on a well-
founded displeasure with a business-as-usual approach to defense and an understanding 
of the technological possibilities. But much would be based on the general interest in 
space and a partly romantic inclination enhanced by enormously popular fictional space 
adventure stories such as Star Trek, Star Wars, etc."^ 
Shortly after the meeting with Weinberger, Graham made a speech at Frank Bamett's 
National Strategy Information Center. In the Audience was Karl Bendetsen, Chairman of 
the Board of Champion International Corporation. Bendetsen was impressed, and praised 
1 Lt. Gen Daniel O. Graham, "bold strokes...", op. ext., pp. 57-58. 
2 Stephen Webbe, "Station US ABM's in orbit, former military 
intelligence officer urges". Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1981, 
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Expanding", op. cit., p. 40.) 
5 Stephen Webbe, "Station US ABM's in orbit...", op. cit., p. 12. 
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Graham after the speech, telling him that it was a marvellous idea that really had to be 
pushed. Graham told Bendetsen that he needed to raise money, so that he could bring in 
specialists to develop his concept further, and Bendetsen agreed to help.^ However, even 
with Bendetsen's help Graham seemed to be having trouble getting his study group off 
the ground. He approached Edwin Meese to give him a hand to collect money, and also 
tried to set the project up under the auspices of the American Security Council. In the 
latter case, Graham ran into trouble and was eventually taken off the ASC pay-roll by 
John Fisher who "wasn't very keen on this idea". Finally, the Heritage Foundation came 
to the rescue: Ed Feulner, the Heritage Foundation's President, agreed to let Graham have 
the cheques for the study made out to the Heritage Foundation so that donors could 
receive a tax deduction, and also provided office space. On September 1, 1981 the study 
which would eventually be published as High Frontier in March 1982, got underway.^ 
By the summer of 1981 Graham began to contact technical people to become involved in 
his study.3 The team that Graham was able to assemble with the help of Karl Bendetsen 
included some hangovers from his previous study group: Brigadier General Robert 
Richardson, formerly of the Air Force Systems Command, who advised on the problems 
of acquisition; Dr. Arnold Kramish, who was chief scientist for the study; Bud Redding 
of SRI, who was advocating the orbiting space trucks and space cruiser; and. Dr. Peter 
Glaser of Arthur D. Litde, who was the architect of the solar powered satellite system and 
was High Frontier's expert on civil space systems. Other members of the technical study 
group included Dr. Edward Teller, (and possibly Dr. Lowell Wood), from Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory; Major General Stewart Meyer, formerly commander of 
the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Command in Huntsville, Alabama, and High 
Frontier's expert on point defence; Cresson Kearney, a civil defence consultant who was 
High Frontier's expert on civil defence; Dr. Mose Harvey, editor of The Soviet World 
Outlook, who was High Frontier's analyst on the Soviet reaction; and, Dr. Jim 
Daugherty of the University of Virginia who predicted the probable European reaction to 
the High Frontier proposal. ̂  
^ Transcript of Graham interview, July 1, 1987, op. cit., p. 7. Karl 
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High Frontier study are Orlando Johnson, Dr. Ralph Nansen and Frank 
Olsen, engineers from Boeing Aerospace in Seattle. Johnson was, 
apparently, so enthusiastic about the idea that he took two months 
leave from Boeing to work for Graham. (Transcript of Graham interview, 
July 7, 1987, op. cit., p. 17); Robert Squire of Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, and Professor Paul Zinner of the Dept. of 
As well as gathering together technical experts for his study, a "panel of people with 
political clout" was gathered together, Karl Bendetsen volunteering to do this job. This 
panel was set up to take a look at what Graham's experts were coming up with a piece at a 
time. It included, as well as Bendetsen and Graham: Joseph Coors the beer brewing 
executive, William Wilson a rancher and oilman, Jacqueline Hume an industrialist and a 
former Under-Secretary of the Army^, Ed Fuelner of the Heritage Foundation, Frank 
Bamett from the National Security Information Center ,̂ and possibly also Justin Dart, a 
wealthy businessman.^ 
No sooner had the study started, than it began to run into trouble. At the centre of this 
was a difference between Daniel Graham and Edward Teller over the form that a space-
based BMD should take on, a difference that would remain a running sore, eventually 
causing the group to split into two. Graham had been wary of Teller right from the start, 
and would rather have not had him on the study team, as he though that Teller's interest 
was not so much in strategic defence, as in promoting his x-ray laser. Graham's 
objections notwithstanding, Teller stayed on the study team, attending the meetings held 
about every three weeks or so during the six months that the study was in progress. He 
became a growing source of tension.'̂  
Political Science, University of California, Davis, also worked on the 
possible European reaction to the High Frontier proposal. (Letter to 
Arnold Kramish from Robert Squire, 23 Feb., 1982.); Others mentioned 
as contributing to the report are: Dr. Jeffery Barlow, John Bosma, 
phillip Clarke, John Coakley, Dr. Miles Costick, Dr. Jacquelin Davis, 
Col. Sam Dickens USAF(Ret), William Gill, Lawrence Hafstad, Frank 
Hoeber, Brig. Gen. Albion Knight USA(Ret), Cleaveland Lane, Ed 
Milauckas, Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., Dr Jerry Pornelle, John Rather, 
Dr. Peter Vajk, and James Wilson. (Daniel Graham, The Non-Nuclear 
Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. vi.) Gregg Fossedal is also listed on 
a July 29, 1982 letter from High Frontier as being part of the project 
staff for Public Information. 
^ Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July, 1987, op. cit., p. 14; Gregg 
Herken, "The earthly origins ...", op. cit., p. 21; George W. Ball, 
"The War for Star Wars", New York Review Of Books, April 11, 1985. 
Reprinted by Council for a Livable World, Education Fund, p. 3; E.P. 
Thompson & Ben Thompson, Star Wars: Self-Destruct Incorporated, Merlin 
Press, London, 1985, p. 8. 
2 Transcript of Graham interview, July 1, 1987, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
3 E.P. Thompson & Ben Thompson, (1985), op. cit., p. 8; George W. Ball, 
op. cit., p. 3. 
^ According to Graham: "If Bendetsen had asked me, I would have asked 
him if he really thought it was a good idea because I had already 
bounced the basic idea of a defensive system off Teller and had gotten 
what essentially was a negative response. I know how powerful a 
personality Ed is, and wondered if it was a good idea to put him on 
our panel". (Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July, 1987, op. cit., 
p . 8.) Karl Bendetsen was an old friend of Edward Teller, and it had 
been Bendetsen who recruited Teller for the High Frontier project. 
Both also worked for the "ferociously Cold War" Hoover Institute on 
War, Revolution and Peace, Bendetsen being the Director, and Teller a 
Early in the study it was Teller's idea that a strategic defence system should be based on 
an x-ray laser weapon aboard a satellite. This, according to Graham: "we sort of 
laughingly called ... the space borne sea urchin because of all the rods that would be 
moving around to get a bead on the warheads". Graham argued that even if the x-ray laser 
was technically feasible, it did not make military sense because it was a defensive satellite 
"that would have to destroy itself to protect itself if it were attacked". If just one 
interceptor missile were fired at the satellite it would need to decide whether to self-
destruct, or hang on just in case the missile missed.^ Responding to Graham's criticisms, 
at the next meeting Edward Teller and Lowell Wood suggested that instead of the x-ray 
lasers being based on an orbiting satellite that they be based on the ground, and popped-
up into space in the event of an attack. Graham found fault with this proposal too: "they 
had to admit that the aiming problem, which was severe enough for an orbiting system, 
was even more severe in the case of a pop-up system, since you now had two accelerating 
bodies ~ the pop-up system and the approaching warhead ~ instead of one. This system 
would probably be able to make only one intercept for each pop-up device".2 
Graham had, as well, a number of political objections to the x-ray laser proposal. Firstly, 
because this proposal was based on relatively immature technologies and would have to 
be extensively researched before being deployed, he was worried that the High Frontier 
study would become "just another bunch of words and just placed on the shelf to gather 
dust with a bunch of other dry strategic studies". The way to get around this, he felt, was 
to base the proposal on off-the-shelf technologies that could be deployed now; that is, 
based on the more conventional kinetic energy technology. According to Graham: "This is 
where Ed Teller and I split company because every time we put non-nuclear in a draft, he 
would scratch it out".^ Graham's main objection was the political problems that would be 
posed by placing nuclear weapons in space: "Obviously a non-nuclear defensive system 
would have much more appeal to the public". Graham thought that you would have to be 
"politically naive not to understand that non-nuclear systems in space would have a lot 
more support than nuclear systems in space".Graham's disagreements with Teller 
eventually led to a falling-out with both Teller and Bendetsen, and the splitting up of the 
High-Frontier study into two groups, one led by Graham, and the other led by Karl 
senior researcher. (E.P. Thompson & Ben Thompson, (1985), op. cit., p . 
8.) 
1 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July 1987, op. cit., p . 8. 
2 Ibid., p p . 9-10. 
^ Ibid., p . 1 0 . Graham argued that his proposal could be deployed 
almost immediately, and that it needed only engineers, not theoretical 
physicists "to start bending tin". (Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins 
..., op. cit., p . 21). 
4 Transcript of Graham interview, July 7, 1987, op. cit., p . 10. 
Bendetsen and Edward Teller, and including William Wilson and Joseph Coors. This 
group dismissed the idea of killer battle stations in space as being impractical, even 
"nonsense", that could be easily countered.^ 
Although the technical differences were a source of tension, the final split seems to have 
been precipitated by a meeting that Karl Bendetsen arranged for his group with the 
President, but excluding Daniel Graham, and not informing him about it until some time 
later. Bendetsen, Edward Teller, William Wilson, and Joseph Coors met with President 
Reagan in the Roosevelt Room after a cabinet meeting on January 8, 1982. At this 
meeting, they recommended that Reagan instigate a new Manhattan Project to develop 
high technology weapons able to neutralize Soviet ballistic missiles.^ When he learned 
about this meeting, Graham was most upset:^ 
The main reason I was upset was that I found out later that they had about an hour 
with the President, but they spent about twenty-five minutes just describing how 
awful the threat was and another twenty-five minutes about how to reorganize 
government and only about ten minutes on what the solution to the threat was. The 
actual results of our study were covered only very briefly. 
Graham was also upset because Karl Bendetsen had told him that the White House did 
not want the study group to go public with their ideas about strategic defence. Graham 
disagreed: "I told him that I had already gone public", he said, "the document was going 
to be on the streets".^ Graham, based on his years of experience in the military and 
civilian bureaucracies, thought that if he did not go public the idea would be killed off by 
the bureaucracy. It was, argued Graham, "an idea involving too many distressing changes 
for a bureaucracy to accept since it would require a fundamental shift of strategy. Unless 
there is outside pressure, no such change can be accomplished". The project would cause 
mistrust among project managers all over the Pentagon, argued Graham, "from R&D all 
the way up through the missile builders or 'hole diggers'. I knew that it ran smack in the 
face of MX Dense Pack and MX Race Track. These ideas would be on a collision course 
with any strategic defense system. There was no way that this concept, turned over to the 
bureaucracy would survive. So, I insisted on going public".^ 
And so public Graham finally went, releasing his High Frontier study on March 4 1982, 
and claiming that it led away from the "bankrupt and basically immoral" strategy of 
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
2 Ibid., p. 21. 
3 Graham claimed that Bendetsen didn't include him because "he said it 
was going to be just the President, a couple of people, and ex-
"kitchen cabinet" folk ... In fact, this small group turned out to be 
thirty or forty people in a room ... all sorts of aides etc". 
Transcript of Graham interview, July 7, 1987, op. cit., pp. 10, 14. 
^ According to Graham: "He did insist that I not go public, but I said 
no, no, I am going public", {Ibid., pp. 10-11.) 
5 Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
Mutual Assured Destruction. ̂  In military terms, the High Frontier proposal contained five 
main elements, most of which could be met with off-the-shelf technology it was claimed: 
(1) a point defence for US ICBM silos which would be deployed within two or three 
years; (2) a first generation space-based BMD system, deployed within 5 or 6 years and 
comprising orbiting satellites which fired conventional missiles at ICBMs in their boost-
phase; (3) a second generation space-based BMD, which would be deployed within 10 to 
12 years, and which would be capable of attacking ICBMs in their boost and mid-course 
phases using laser weapons; (4) a manned military space control vehicle, which would be 
deployed within 6 to 8 years at a cost of less than US$500 million, and would be capable 
of inspection, in-orbit maintenance and space tug missions; and, (5) a civil defence 
program. 2 In addition to these military programmes, the High Frontier proposal contained 
a civilian element, making it, in Graham's eyes, a true "national strategy". The centre-
piece of this civilian effort was the deployment in space of high power solar energy 
collectors, which could be used to power industrial activities in space and to beam back 
electrical energy to any spot on earth. ̂  The total cost of the system would be around 
US$24 billion over the next 5 or 6 years, stretching to about US$40 billion through to 
1990.4 
The point defence system that was preferred by High Frontier was known as "swarmjet". 
It consisted of three elements: (1) a set of two radars located at 10,000 feet and 20,000 
feet in front of a missile silo to detect, track and calculate the intercept point for the 
incoming warhead; (2) a blast-hardened launcher system which could aim and launch a 
"swarm" of small rockets at the intercept point; and, (3) a swarm of about 10,000 ballistic 
1 Michael Getler, "Use of Weapons on Space Satellites To Kill Incoming 
Missiles Suggested", Washington Post, March 5, 1982, p. 8. 
2 The civil defence programme was based on programme "D" developed 
during the Carter Administration to implement the policies of 
Presidential Decision 41. The civil defence section of the High 
Frontier report seems to have been written largely by Cresson Kearney. 
(Cresson Kearney, letter to Daniel Graham, October 2, 1981; Cresson 
Kearney, "Creating A Strategically Significant American Civil Defense 
System, A Fuller Exposition, Citing References".) 
3 Daniel Graham, The Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 7. 
This proposal was due to Dr. Peter Glaser, Vice-President of Arthur D. 
Little Inc, who seemed to have been obsessed with the potential of 
space. Glaser believed that "space, by enabling [the US] to tap not 
only the present information resources ... [i.e. satellites] ... but 
in addition, ... will be able to find new ways to process materials. 
We also certainly believe it is feasible to consider, once and for 
all, taking care of energy problems which, although they are presently 
somewhat subdued will come back to haunt us in a few years". Glaser 
argued that "energy from space for use on earth is one of our major 
options to supply the world with energy for as long as civilization 
exists". (David S. Coker, "'High Frontier': Bold New Strategy ...", 
op. cit., p. 15.) 
4 Ibid., p. 9. 
rockets which would fly to the intercept point at around 5,000 feet per second and kill the 
incoming warhead by impact. A partially tested system was supposed to already exist. ̂  
The first generation space-borne defence was known as the Global Ballistic Missile 
Defense (GBMD) system, and was exactly the proposal put forward by Bud Redding of 
SRL2 The system comprised a network of 432 satellites in orbits inclined at 65 degrees 
with the equator at an altitude of 300 nautical miles. These "space trucks" would contain 
40-50 self-propelled carrier vehicles which could travel at a velocity of 3,000 feet per 
second with respect to the satellite and propel a miniature vehicle into the missile for a 
kinetic kill. The interceptors were to be similar to those planned for the Air Force's 
antisatellite miniature homing vehicle, and the Army's homing intercept programmes. It 
could be built, argued the High Frontier report, with off-the-shelf-technology, and could 
be fully deployed within five or six years at a cost of some US$10-15 billion.^ 
The second generation space based defence (GBMD H) was to be a product improvement 
upon GBMD 1. With the addition of advanced infrared sensors the first generation system 
would be able to attack warheads in their midcourse as well as boost-phase. It might even 
be possible, argued the report, to use laser weapons on the orbiting space trucks, or pop 
them up from installations on the ground. The GBMD II system could be ready for 
deployment in 1990 at a cost of around US$5 billion on top of the GBMD I's cost, and 
advanced laser defenses would require the expenditure of about US$100 milHon per year, 
for research and development. ̂  
Underlying the High Frontier study was an ideology that was very much similar to that 
espoused by the members of the 'laser lobby'. Graham and his colleagues who prepared 
the study were opposed to both detente and the SALT arms treaties, arguing that the 
Soviets played the game of Mutual Assured Destruction differently than the United States 
and had a different regard for human life. "The Communist elite couldn't care less about 
losing 50 million people in war", argued Gregory Possédai, a member of the High 
^ Ibid., pp. 7-8; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense That 
Defends, op. cit., pp. 48-51. 
2 See Capt. Melanson/SASC/50547/ch/16 Oct. 81, "Point Paper on Global 
g^llistic Missile Defense"; "Memorandum For the Record - Comments on 
Global Ballistic Missile Defense", SASC 23 Sept. 1981; F. W. Redding, 
"Global Ballistic Missile Defense", Concept Paper - partial draft, 5 
October, 1981. These documents give a summary of Redding/SRI's GBMD 
proposal. The satellites would be in 24 orbital planes with 18 trucks 
per plane. Each satellite would contain 50 carrier vehicles(CV) and 
each CV had a miniature vehicle(MV). 
3 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., pp. 8, 101-
108; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense that Defends, op. 
cit., pp. 51-56. 
4 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 8. 
Frontier staff, valuing only their factories and military installations, and their own lives.^ 
The Americans were supposed to play fairly under MAD, laying their own homeland 
vulnerable to an attack by the Soviets, and seeking to negotiate limits on offensive 
weapons. However, the Soviets viewed arms negotiations as a way of limiting the United 
States' offensive weapons while they engaged in a massive build-up, and did not consider 
that vulnerability should be mutual, pouring "more resources into strategic defenses, 
active and civil" than the United States had invested in its offensive weapons.^ 
Under the SALT treaties, the Soviets were held to have built a massive offensive force of 
their own, between the signing of SALT I and 1978 having tripled their own counterforce 
and throw weight capacity, while the United States had stood still, or even unilaterally 
disarmed, canceling or slowing down many weapons programmes, hoping that through 
SALT, detente, and diplomacy the Soviets could be persuaded to halt their developments 
at the "parity" level as required by MAD.^ The Soviets had now surpassed the strategic 
capability of the US by a substantial margin and there was no evidence that they were 
about to stop. Because the Soviet military had most of their strategic nuclear weapons 
based on land, and the US military held only about one third of its strategic nuclear 
arsenal as land-based ICBMs, Graham argued that the Soviet military were deploying a 
first strike arsenal, while the US military only had a second-strike one. Thus, the Soviets 
had a "dangerous advantage" in pre-emptive first strike capability, and the United States 
faced a "window of vulnerability". Graham argued that so long as the Soviet leaders 
thought that they could take advantage of this situation, without too much risk for 
themselves, then there was a strong possibility that they would do so.'̂  
To get around this problem of the "window of vulnerability", Graham saw that there were 
two fundamentally different approaches, one the "incremental approach" and the other , 
the one he advocated, the "bold approach", both aimed at reasserting the superiority of the 
United States. Under the "incremental approach" MAD would remain the cornerstone of 
US nuclear strategy and force structure, but an attempt would be made to increase and 
modify the offensive nuclear forces to attain strategic superiority; strategic and civil 
defences would not be pursued; arms control would still be on the agenda, but the US 
would get tougher with the Soviets at the bargaining table; and finally, the concept of 
"parity" would be retained, the US spending billions of dollars to close the gaps between 
the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Graham's "bold strategy" on the other hand 
1 Gregory Fossedal, quoted in Harpers Forum, Harpers, June 1985, p. 40. 
2 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. c i t . , pp. 86-87. 
3 I b i d . , p. 92; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense that 
Defends, op. c i t , pp. 34-35. 
^ Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. c i t . , pp. 65,69,92. 
would replace MAD with mutually assured survival through the deployment of space-
based BMD and the setting up of a civil defence programme. The problem with the 
incremental approach was that by entering an arms race with the Soviets in current 
technology, the US was doomed to lose because the "Soviets [were] already producing 
these items at a very high rate, far surpassing current production rates of the US and its 
allies". Further, such a programme could not rely on public support indefinitely. It might, 
create "the grave danger of a severe backlash against current proponents of increased 
defense expenditures if four years hence there is no perceptible favorable change in the 
U.S.-Soviet military balance".^ 
Time was of the essence in the commitment to Graham's High Frontier project. If the 
United States could not reverse the adverse trends in the military balance quickly, it might 
be too late. High Frontier, argued Graham, held out the promise of closing the 'window 
of vulnerability' in two or three years and of negating the "brooding menace" of Mutual 
Assured Destruction in five or six years.^ 
That Graham did not opt for the exotic beam weapon technologies advocated by the 'laser 
lobby' or the x-ray laser advocated by Teller had much to do with this perceived need for 
rapid deployment. Graham argued that while these two technologies had demonstrated 
significant capabilities in the laboratory and may have become a reality in the future, "their 
deployment in global defensive systems is too far in the future to meet the urgencies of the 
High Frontier study". The 'window of vulnerability' couldn't be left open for this long.^ 
According to Graham and Fossedal, it was hard to over-stress this point. A viable 
strategic defence system need not wait for these exotic technologies, they argued, and 
indeed it would not be prudent to base the security of the United States on the prospect 
that such weapons would become available in the near future.^ There were as well 
technical objections to these beam weapons. They all required massive amounts of energy 
to power them and such energy sources had not yet been obtained on the ground. Particle 
beams in particular would require huge energy sources. Laser beams were vulnerable to 
both inclement weather and dust.^ With respect to x-ray lasers, Graham's main objection 
1 Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
2 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
3 Ibid., p. 113. 
^ Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense That Defends, op. cit., 
pp. 56-57. 
5 Ibid., p. 58; Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., 
pp. 113,119. Angelo Codevilla, of 'laser lobby' fame, thought that 
these criticisms of space-based lasers were misleading, but agreed 
with Graham's time frame for deployment. Codevilla thought that the 
GBMD idea was sound, but that the missiles would be required to attain 
higher velocities,and that the cost estimates were "severely flawed". 
(Angelo Codevilla, review of "High Frontier: A New National Strategy", 
Strategic Review, Summer, 1982, p. 60. ) . 
was that such a laser would have to destroy itself to defend against a single missile. Even 
if it was possible to design an x-ray laser that could generate multiple beams, Graham 
argued that this would require years of engineering development, and would not be ready 
for near term deployment. ̂  
Graham's High Frontier proposal met a mixed reaction when released. There were some 
supporters for the proposal, from companies such as Boeing, Rockwell, Tracor, LTV, 
Vought, Northrop, and McDonnell Douglas, companies who stood to benefit from 
contracts if such a proposal went ahead; also there was some congressional support, 
Graham citing Senators William Armstrong, Jesse Helms, Steven Symms and William 
Roth, and a group known as the Congressional Space Caucus.^ The proposal ran into 
stiff opposition from the Pentagon, and the arms-controllers, but Graham expected this. 
Graham was fully aware of the problems that he would run into trying to sell his proposal 
to the Pentagon. For a start, because his proposal put the future of strategic defence in 
space. High Frontier "was causing a real problem for the United States Army ... which 
has since the end of the war been charged with ballistic missile defense. Because the 
Army would not have the responsibility for running a space-based [BMD] they don't 
want to give up that mission." What made it even worse was that the Air Force, the 
service that would be charged with the responsibility for the space-based defence mission, 
had "never been very much interested in strategic defense", and looked at High Frontier 
as a competitor to the offensive systems that they would prefer, quite rightly as far as 
Graham was concerned. ̂  To get around this, Graham realized that to override the 
objections of these turf-protecting defence bureaucrats it would be necessary to have the 
presidential sanction. "If the President said 'do it', and make sure the technology works, 
it would succeed", contended Graham.'̂  
To get around the arms controllers, Graham thought, might not actually be all that 
difficult, as the High Frontier proposal, with a little clever foot work, could be sold as 
being the ultimate arms control measure. One of the underlying aims of the High Frontier 
proposal seems to have been as a cleyer way to circumvent the freeze movement, and 
herein lay some if its appeal for the hawks, and Graham hoped, the Reagan 
Administration. As Gregory Fossedal, one of the consultants to High Frontier, put it, it 
1 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 118. 
2 "High Frontier: Defense Strategy to Save the US", interview with 
Daniel Graham by Joseph W. DeBolt, Human Events, January 29, 1982 p. 
174; "Selling the High Frontier Defense Strategy", op. cit., p. 175. 
3 "'High Frontier': Defense Strategy to Save the US", op. cit., p. 10. 
4 "Selling the High Frontier Strategy", op. cit., p. 174. 
would provide "an opportunity ... to fast-thaw the nuclear freeze movement".^ No 
attempt is made to hide this same theme in the High Frontier report itself:^ 
The High Frontier concept would even convert or confuse some of the conventional opponents of defense efforts. ... It is harder to oppose non-nuclear defensive systems than nuclear offensive systems. It is impossible to argue effectively for a perpetual balance of terror if it can be negated by new policies. It is hard to make environmentalist cases against space systems. 
Even those "naysayers" who wanted disarmament, would be hard pressed to make a case 
against High Frontier. As well as countering the peace movement at home, it could be 
used to provide a strong counter-effect to the "highly disruptive", "anti-nuclear", or 
"peace" movements in Europe, and to boost the morale of pro-US elements.^ 
The potential for High Frontier to undercut the freeze movement was used as one of its 
strongest selling points to the Reagan Administration, as is evidenced by an endless 
stream of letters that Daniel Graham sent to Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger^, and 
was welcomed by right-wingers for this reason. For example, David Coker, writing in 
Human Events, argued that the non-nuclear defence was important in political terms 
because it "undercut the argument of leftist nuclear freeze proponents who claim it is 
impossible for the United States ... to protect itself in the event of a nuclear war".^ 
A discussion paper written in April 1984 by John Bosma for High Frontier, considering 
ways in which ballistic missile defence could be sold politically, addressed this problem 
^ Gregory Fossedal, quoted in Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, op. cit., 
p. 72. 
2 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 10. 
^ Ibid., p. 11. See also Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense 
That Defends, op. cit., p. 11. In response to a question as to whether 
High Frontier was the answer to the Catholic Bishops and the freeze 
proponents, Graham replied: "I certainly think so, because instead of 
arguing about getting rid of nuclear weapons and so forth, and about 
the morality of the punitive nature of our deterrent, they can support 
a purely defensive option." It provided an option between the "false 
dilemma" of freeze and burn, which had been created by the freeze 
movement, which was "essentially led by unilateral spokesmen". ("High 
Frontier: Defense Strategy to Save the U.S.", op. cit., p. 10.) 
^ Daniel Graham to Casper Weinberger, March 17, 1982: "The fact that 
our military systems require no nuclear weapons makes it at least 
conceivable that the anti-nuclear crowd would seize on High Frontier 
as a vehicle for their purposes"; Graham to Weinberger, March 31, 
1982: "In light of the current country-wide press for "nuclear 
freeze", I wish to bring to your attention the value of the High 
Frontier concept as an effective counter. High Frontier would also 
dampen the urge to add nuclear weapons, but unlike the "nuclear 
freeze" notion would not require highly improbable Soviet cooperation 
and good faith".; Graham to Weinberger, April 13, 1982:"These concepts 
constitute the best available riposte to the new surge toward "nuclear 
freeze" and related proposals". 
5 David S. Coker, "High Frontier: Bold New Strategy", op. cit., p. 117. 
explicitly. The primary objective, was to make it politically risky for proponents of arms 
control to argue against BMD. Bosma argued that:^ 
In fact, the project should unambiguously seek to recapture the term "arms control" 
and all the idealistic images and language attached to it. This can be done by 
showing that BMD is very supportive of classical and contemporary arms control 
objectives (eg. limits on war, protection of civilians, "just war" conduct, ... etc), 
and that early BMD deployment on a major scale are critical to the realization of 
such highly lauded initiatives as a nuclear freeze, a nuclear build down, and 
permanent disarmament. To the extent that it is possible, BMD proponents should 
stress nuclear disarmament as their new goal..." 
Bosma argued that proponents of BMD systems such as High Frontier, should seek to 
argue that SALT and other arms control regimes that fit within the doctrine of MAD "are 
built around war-crimes strategies", and thus "war crimes behaviours and intentions" 
could be imputed to the signatories of treaties such as the 1972 ABM treaty. BMD on the 
other hand could be sold as a way of getting away from these war-crimes strategies. ̂  
Because Graham realized that he would run into problems trying to sell the High Frontier 
concept to the armed services, his efforts were aimed at trying to seU it to President 
Reagan, or at least those close to the President. As we have seen Graham met with 
Reagan twice - in February 1980 and February 1981 - before losing his direct access to 
the President. In addition to these meetings with Reagan, Graham also met with senior 
officials in the Administration - Caspar Weinberger, Edwin Meese, Richard Allen (the 
President's National Security Adviser), George Keyworth (the President's Science 
Adviser), and Martin Anderson. Graham and his offsider Robert Richardson also sent 
letters to General Edward Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, and General Charles Gabriel, 
the Air Force Chief of Staff. Graham claims to have personally delivered a copy of the 
High Frontier report to General John Vessey shortly before he became Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and said that Vessey was "pretty positive" about the proposal.^ 
1 John Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms 
C o n t r o l ( F i n a l ) N S R #46 High Frontier, Heritage Foundation, Section 
1.1; Parts of this also reprinted in "The Selling of Star Wars", 
Harpers, Vol. 270, No. 1621, June 1985, pp. 22-24. 
2 Ibid., Section 1.2.1; In another part of the Report Bosma summarizes 
his strategy thus: "a radical approach that seeks to disarm BMD 
opponents either by stealing their language and cause(arms control), 
or by putting them into a tough political corner through their 
explicit or de jfacto advocacy of classical anti-population war 
crimes", {Ibid., Section 2.0); Bosma later parted company with Graham 
and High Frontier, as he "became quite concerned about his[Graham's] 
orientation with the crazy right". Bosma charged that Graham had 
received early funding for the High Frontier project from Rev. Sun 
Myung Moon's Unification Church, an allegation that Graham denies. 
(John J. Fiolka, "Combative General Is A Political Godfather of 'Star 
Wars' Plan", Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1985.) 
3 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July, 1987, op. cit., pp. 7, 18; 
Letter, Daniel Graham to Gen. Edward Meyer, July 14, 1981; Letter, 
2.4 EDWARD TELLER AND THE X-RAY LASER 
Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, had been a long time space-hawk. He 
had testified before Congress in favour of building a military base on the moon; had been 
an energetic opponent of every arms control agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, including the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 
which banned nuclear weapons in earth orbit; and, had with General Bernard Schriever 
(USAF), served on the 1960 panel on the Air Force's future in space, that recommended 
the development of "the Dyna-Soar as an aerospace bomber, anti-satellite weapons, a 
manned military space station, a reusable shuttle, and a space-based ABM system".^ 
As well as favouring the militarization of space. Teller had also been a long-time advocate 
of strategic defence: "It would be wonderful", he wrote in his 1962 book The Legacy of 
Hiroshima f "if we could shoot down approaching missiles before they could destroy a 
target in the United States". Teller argued that although US technology was not up to the 
task at this time, that the United States should work on such technologies to stay ahead of 
the Russians, because if they gained the lead, they would use it to achieve world 
domination: "If the Communists should become certain that their defenses are reliable and 
at the same time know that ours are insufficient", he wrote, "Soviet conquest of the world 
would be inevitable".2 
Two decades later, encouraged by the development of an x-ray laser at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, Teller began publicly promoting the same theme. In a 
1980 article, Teller argued that:^ 
It is strongly recommended that the United States place emphasis on this type of active defense [ABM systems]... pro^ams along these lines would be crucial. The strength of our electronics industry raises the hope that ABM's could become truly effective. A vigorous research program on ABM's would not be too cosdy, since research is generally cheap compared to deployment. 
The reason that Teller was again pushing ballistic missile defence was that the Soviets 
were now ahead of the United States "quantitatively", and had, according to Teller, "won 
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the arms race". If they were now to develop a "good and practical ballistic missile 
defense", it was, in Teller's opinion, "a foregone conclusion that they would use it". He 
urged that the United States pursue the "military secret technology" that was being 
developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the application of electronics 
to defence, as this was the one industrial field in which the US had "not yet lost 
leadership to the Russians".^ 
By 1982, Teller was arguing that the "Balance of terror is not a nice idea", but that it had 
become the "keystone of our defense policy for two decades", and, he suspected, was 
"one of the strong but not obvious reasons behind the nuclear-freeze movement". To get 
out of this 'MAD-trap', one which had allowed the Soviets to attain nuclear superiority 
whilst the US in effect disarmed, Teller argued that an ABM system based on nuclear 
weapons was needed: "The answer is true defense in the most literal sense of the word. 
We need weapons - not against people, not against industries, not even against missiles in 
their silos to be fired, but against explosives that have been fired and that, within minutes 
would reach their targets and kill. The sword has been invented; now we must work on 
the shield". Teller, at this time, could only give very general details about this shield. The 
possibility of a very effective defence came, he said, from the prospect of using small 
nuclear explosions to disable missiles, so small that they would not effect civilians on the 
ground. But, he warned, "The 'salvation' offered by the freeze advocates will prevent the 
development and deployment of such protective defense systems".^ 
1 Clarence Robinson, "Ballistic Missile Emphasis Urged", AWST, October 
13, 1980, pp. 18-19. 
2 Edward Teller, "Teller: Defensive Weapons a Must", Pitsburgh Press, 
13 October, 1982, p. B4. Teller expounded a similar theme in a number 
of other forums at about this time. For example, at the 30th birthday 
of the Livermore Labs in September 1982, Teller spoke against the 
Freeze Movement, and in favour of the construction of a third 
generation of nuclear weapons, which he described as "the kind of bomb 
that uses the nuclear explosion only as a starting point to accomplish 
something else". He went on: "what this laboratory can accomplish now 
is more important than what we ever have accomplished before. The 
third-generation efforts give us every expectation of an effective 
nuclear defense. ... And if defense by nuclear weapons is possible, we 
must have it." (Teller, quoted in Robert Scheer, "Flaws Peril Pivotal 
'Star Wars' Laser", Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1985.) In a 1982 
article in Reader's Digest, Teller argued: "Furthermore, extremely 
important research is being conducted on systems to defend against 
incoming nuclear missiles. For example, exploding a very small nuclear 
bomb near an attack missile as it enters the upper-to-middle 
atmosphere over our nation would have no effects on the ground and 
negligible effects on the atmosphere, but could totally disarm the 
incoming missile without detonating it. Such a system, used to protect 
vulnerable missile silos, could be an important first step in 
improving both our current retaliatory position and directing our 
policy towards defense". (Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths About 
Nuclear Arms", Reader's Digest, November, 1982, p. 140.) 
What Teller was alluding to in his speeches was the x-ray laser which was being 
developed at Lawrence National Livermore Laboratory. The x-ray laser project, dubbed 
"Excalibur" was conceived at Livermore in the 1960's^. The search had picked up in the 
1970's, when two young researchers Lowell Wood and George Chapline teamed up to 
pursue it. Chapline, in particular, had a vision of building an x-ray laser which could be 
pumped with a very powerful energy source - a nuclear bomb - and in 1977 he devised a 
novel way to build such a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser. Chapline's idea so impressed 
officials at the laboratory, that an experiment to test his concept was "piggybacked" onto 
an underground test at the Nevada Test Site being run by the Defense Nuclear Agency to 
study the effects of nuclear radiation on the MX missile warhead. The test, code-named 
'Diablo Hawk', took place on September 13,1978, but due to a failure of the sensors to 
measure the output of the x-ray laser, it was impossible to tell whether the test had been a 
success.2 
Soon after the Diablo Hawk test, Chapline obtained funding for a dedicated test of his 
concept, the test being scheduled for 1980. In the lead up to the test a series of meetings 
were held at the lab at which those interested in the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser would 
gather to discuss the coming test. At a meeting held in the summer of 1979, one of the 
young physicists present, Peter Hagelstein, suggested a new way that an x-ray laser could 
be made. Lowell Wood, who had also been present at the meeting, pushed Hagelstein's 
idea, and in the end it was decided that the test of Chapline's nuclear x-ray laser should be 
modified to include Hagelstein's idea as well, one bomb being used to pump the two 
competing sets of hardware, to see which one worked best. The underground test in 
question, code-named 'Dauphin', occurred at the Nevada test site on November 14, 
1980. The test was a success for both x-ray lasers, and it was the one proposed by 
Hagelstein for which the test results were superior.^ News of the test was leaked in 
Aviation Week and Space Technology in February 1981. The article claimed that the 
supposedly secret tests at Nevada had led to a breakthrough that "has the potential to blunt 
a Soviet nuclear weapons attack". A projected application was a nuclear warhead 
surrounded by a ring of fifty or so laser rods, each of which could be pointed at a target 
missile and the bomb detonated. Such a device, it was claimed, could easily be carried 
aloft by the space shuttle. It was claimed that 20 or 30 x-ray laser battie station in space 
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Hyde had designed a "nuclear explosive-driven orbital laser ballistic 
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could handle a ballistic missile attack on the United States.^ Hagelstein's x-ray laser 
became known as "Excaliber", and a separate bureaucracy known as R Program was set 
up around it at the Livermore labs. Depending on whether or not a test was about to be 
conducted, the size of the R Program staff could swell into the hundreds.^ 
The allure of the x-ray laser, and indeed all of the so-called third generation nuclear 
weapons for the researchers at Livermore, seems to have been that these weapons 
represented the scientific and technical challenge of the future. The second generation 
nuclear weapons no longer represented a challenge for these scientists. ̂  As Lowell Wood 
told William Broad, "Frankly, the offensive game, in addition to its somewhat dubious 
intent, is awfully easy. There just isn't much challenge there. Success consists of 
shrinking off an inch here and a pound there or moving the center of gravity half an inch 
forward. It's distincdy an engineering problem". On the other hand, the "intriguing thing 
about defensive weapons is that they have a real, semifundamental challenge to them - to 
making them work, work effectively, robustly, and to work at very high cost efficiency, a 
high cost-exchange ratio against the offence".^ 
Underlying Teller's belief in the need for strategic defences was a worid view which saw 
the Soviets as being hell-bent on world domination. According to Teller, the US was now 
the inferior partner of the two superpowers, the Soviets having gained superiority in the 
"throw weight" with which they could rain down nuclear destruction upon the United 
States. Between 1966 and 1981, argued Teller, "the total megatonnage of the American 
nuclear arsenal was reduced to less than one-half of its former size". The Soviet arsenal, 
on the other hand, "has rapidly increased in yield, accuracy and diversity during the same 
period and currently includes a total nuclear explosive power in excess of what the United 
States ever had". Teller argued that the throw weight of the Soviet military was five times 
that of the US, and warned that "the ration could increase to tenfold without our noticing 
it".5 
To make matters worse, not only was it the case that the strength of the Soviet nuclear 
forces were being underestimated, but the Soviets were playing a completely different 
nuclear ball-game, pursuing a strategy that would allow them to initiate and win a nuclear 
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war, whilst the US clung doggedly to the doctrine of MAD, naively laying its population 
bare to nuclear annihilation by the Soviets. According to Teller, official Soviet policy 
claimed that they would win a nuclear exchange with the US, the Soviets never having 
agreed to the ideas upon which MAD is based. This was evidenced by the fact that the 
Soviets placed great emphasis on civil defence - the evacuation of cities and the building 
of fallout shelters and food storage - instead of laying their population bare to destruction, 
as was required by the MAD doctrine.^ As well as their civil defence program, Teller 
argued that the Soviets had forged ahead on strategic defences against ballistic missiles. 
Although the United States had begun to deploy such a system in the early 1970's, under 
the SALT I treaty the US had been limited to two, subsequently one ABM site, which it 
had abandoned, as well as research on more effective, and less expensive technologies for 
ballistic missile defence. The Soviet Union on the other hand had maintained the ABM 
system that it was allowed under SALT I, and pressed ahead with research on more 
effective technologies.^ 
Because of these civil and ABM defences. Teller argued that the Soviets might be able to 
simply blackmail the US into submission. "Our country may find itself in the situation". 
Teller claimed, "where it has to give in to Russian demands or face the end of the United 
States".3 Teller argued that the Soviets "could land an attack feeling secure against 
ravages from retaliatory bombings". The United States on the other hand had done 
virtually nothing towards protecting its population.^ This civil defence program may well 
allow them to lose fewer people in a nuclear war than the 20 million or so casualties that 
the Soviet Union suffered during Worid War 11.̂  
The advent of the freeze movement, totally misguided in Teller's eyes, meant that the 
Soviets might get away with their evil ploy: "Do the advocates of the freeze know that in 
the last 16 years the explosive power of nuclear bombs in the US arsenal has decreased to 
half its earlier value? Do they know that today the Soviet arsenal is more than three times 
ours in destructive power?" Teller asked. ̂  According to Teller the freeze movement 
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granted acceptability to the Soviets' "extraordinarily destructive" weapons, when they 
should actually be opposing them. Also it would end further work in the United States on 
what could well be the best defence systems. Teller's third-generation nuclear weapons. 
"The Soviets have akeady deployed an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow", 
Teller claimed. "We have the right to deploy a similar system but have not done so".^ 
According to Teller, the "balance of terror" no longer worked, MAD was bankrupt and 
detente was self delusion.2 But the freeze was not the answer. The answer was to build a 
nuclear defence system based on the x-ray laser. 
Apart from his public stance on the need for a ballistic missile defence based on nuclear 
weapons, Edward Teller was actively lobbying the Reagan administration and Congress. 
As early as February 1981, days after Reagan was installed as president. Teller and his 
colleague at Livermore, Lowell Wood, are reported to have begun briefing leaders of the 
House and the Senate on the promise of, and need for, third generation nuclear weapons 
for ballistic missile defence.^ In October 1981 Teller sent a classified letter to Congress 
that reportedly recommended the stepping up of x-ray laser research.^ Teller had known 
Reagan for quite some time, their first meeting taking place in 1967, shortly after Reagan 
had been elected Governor of California. Reagan was the first Governor to visit the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in Livermore, California, with Teller acting as 
his guide. Here Reagan learned first-hand some of the new ideas for defence against a 
missile attack from Teller.^ Teller recounted this visit in an interview with Michael 
Charlton: "He listened carefully; not to a highly technical presentation, but to one that 
must have contained a host of completely novel ideas. He asked maybe ten or twelve 
questions which clearly showed that he followed - that he comprehended".^ 
Teller also became involved in the High Frontier study through his long time friend Karl 
Bendetsen, but soon broke away form Daniel Graham's group to join up with Bendetsen 
and a group of his colleagues, including Joseph Coors, William Wilson, and Jacqueline 
Hume. All were influential supporters of Reagan - often being referred to as Reagan's 
'kitchen cabinet' - and also of Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, 
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Revolution and Peace, one of America's premier conservative think tanks.̂  Teller was 
also one of the Hoover Institution's senior scholars. In 1981 Teller is reported to have 
approached George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, who also seems to have 
been involved in Bendetsen's group, and said that he "wanted to offer his technical 
expertise to the President's well-meaning friends".̂  
Guided by Teller, Bendetsen and the other members of President Reagan's so-called 
'kitchen cabinet' eventually split from Daniel Graham and the High Frontier. It was, 
reportedly, Teller's vision of the new generation of "speed-of-light" nuclear weapons that 
captured tiie attention of Bendetsen's group. Briefed by Teller, they became convinced 
that the third-generation nuclear weapons could revolutionize "the art of defense as much 
as the atomic bomb had revolutionized the art of war".̂  They dismissed the idea of 
General Graham's killer battie stations in space, and the 'laser lobby's' idea of chemical-
laser battle stations as impractical and unrealistic. "Edward was of the opinion that that 
type of approach could be too easily countered", said one of his colleagues.'̂  
Bendetsen and Teller's group had some five or so meetings with President Reagan to 
discuss the subject of strategic defence - according to William Broad, three meetings 
before and two meetings after the so-call 'Star Wars' speech^ - the first occurring on 
January 8, 1982. In addition to this Teller met with Reagan once alone. At the January 8 
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meeting, Teller, Bendetsen, Coors and Wilson discussed with Reagan the technological 
advances which made a defence against ballistic missiles a real possibility.^ The meeting, 
scheduled to last only 15 minutes, went for an hour. According to sources present at the 
meeting, there was much talk of lasers, which might be used to destroy aircraft as well as 
missiles. However, they pointed out that such lasers "might have only a limited capacity 
because their wavelength was too long". The shorter the wavelength of the laser, the more 
destructive its beam would be. The shortest wavelength could be obtained using an x-ray 
laser. Rather than trying to create a ballistic missile defence using "off-the-shelf" 
technologies, Bendetsen's group argued for a stepped up program of research on 
advanced technologies. ̂  
Reagan is reported to have shown "great interest" in the idea^, though he wondered 
whether such a system should be designed to protect missile silos only, or the whole 
population. Karl Bendetsen argued that the system his group was proposing could, 
eventually, do both, however that to protect the whole population would be much more 
expensive and take longer. Whatever the case, argued Bendetsen, he thought that they 
should start now. He wanted Reagan to announce the start of a national quest, similar in 
scope to the 1942 Manhattan Project, to develop an ABM system based on directed 
energy weapons. Reagan is reported to have agreed.̂  The question of how to deal with 
the ABM Treaty and other treaties that were relevant to outer space was also raised by the 
President. Bendetsen is reported to have told him to let others worry about this. The 
message was get on with it.̂  Not only was ballistic missile defence a real possibility but 
in the opinion of Bendetsen's group, one that the public would definitely welcome.^ 
Anotiier meeting with the President occurred on September 14, 1982, this time Edward 
Teller being alone. Teller had repeatedly appealed for a private meeting with the President 
to discuss his ideas, but had been repeatedly rebuffed by Reagan's aides. It was not until 
Teller appeared on national television - the "Firing Line" programme hosted by William 
Buckley (seen by Reagan at his Santa Barbara ranch) - and complained that he had been 
denied Presidential access, that he was given a meeting. "May I tell you a little secret 
which is not classified?", Teller asked on the programme. "From the time that President 
Reagan has been nominated I had not a single occasion to talk to him". Teller had some 
new and promising ideas about defence which he wished to discuss with the President. 
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthy origins ...",op. cit., p. 22. 
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An invitation was duly issued to Teller for a meeting at the Oval Office on September 14, 
1982, the meeting scheduled to last for half an hour. At this meeting, Teller is reported to 
have warned the President that the Soviet Union was developing an x-ray laser weapon 
similar to "Excaliber" which was being developed at Livermore, and that the Soviets 
would soon be in a position to blackmail the United States. He appealed to Reagan to 
dramatically increase funding for his "Excaliber" project. Before he could progress too far 
with his wild claims however, the meeting was cut short by Reagan's aides, and ended in 
disappointment for Teller.^ 
Leading up to Reagan's 'Star Wars' speech, Edward Teller, and Bendetsen's group 
continued to press their case. Starting in October 1982 and continuing through to the 
following January, Teller met repeatedly with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
senior civilian officials in the Defense Department to brief them on Livermore's progress 
toward the development of x-ray lasers.^ Bendetsen's group, including Teller met with 
the President again in the early months of 1983.^ 
2.5 THE HUDSON INSTITUTE AND STAR WARS 
At the level of strategy, one of the strongest advocates of ballistic missile defence, 
particularly in conjunction with the MX missile has been a group of strategists at the 
Hudson Institute. This group includes Herm^ Kahn, Research Director at the Hudson 
Institute until his death in the early 1980's, Donnald Brennan who was active in the 
'ABM Debate' at the end of the 1960's and Director of national security studies at the 
Institute in the late 1970's, and most recently Colin Gray and Keith Payne both members 
of the professional staff of the Institute concemed with national security studies.^ As far 
back as the early 1960's, Kahn had emphasized the relationship between the capability to 
minimize damage to the United States in a nuclear war and the capability to extend 
deterrent coverage to distant allies. According to Kahn, in his 1961 book On 
Thermonuclear War^ the Soviets did not take the American deterrent seriously, because 
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the US "had made negligible preparations to ward off, survive, and recover from even a 
"small" Soviet retaliatory strike".^ A 1972 Hudson Institute study in which both Kahn 
and Brennan were involved, argued that the effective deterrence of the Soviet Union by 
the United States required that the US secure an advantage in 'relative war outcomes' by 
adopting a damage-limitation strategy which could be provided by either offensive 
counterforce weapons, or by antiballistic missile defences. Brennan in the late 1970's had 
argued that even a fairly ineffective ABM system could be useful, as it would create a 
measure of uncertainty, while more effective systems were being developed.^ 
Gray and Payne speak with fairly much the one voice, often collaborating on papers as 
joint authors, or if writing papers under their own names drawing heavily on the other's 
advice. In their writmgs on ballistic missile defence they seem to have been the intellectual 
heirs of Herman Kahn and Donnald Brennan. Gray and Payne were strong critics of the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that had taken place during the late 1960's and the 
1970's, and of the SALT I and SALT n treaties and the ABM Treaty which resulted from 
these talks. Colin Gray, in particular had been a long term critic of both the SALT I and n 
treaties:^ 
It is important to recognize that SALT I and prospectively SALT II were (and are) poor agreements that reflect both a near-parody of "how a nation should negotiate" and the absence of a credible bargaining chip on the U.S. side. The problems of clearly predictable impending inferiority and instabilities cannot be solved through SALT diplomacy - one point, at least, on which all shades of opinion would seem to be agreed. 
Gray charged, in 1976, that what had then been six years of arms negotiations with the 
Soviets had, on the one hand, led to the termination of work on active missile defences 
(one of the more promising approaches to maintaining the invulnerability of ICBM silos), 
while on the other hand allowing the Soviets to indulge in a massive nuclear arms build-
up, leaving the threat to the ICBM silos unconstrained. Thus, the double-headed monster 
of SALT was progressively increasing the vulnerability of United State's strategic nuclear 
weapons.^ 
SALT I had been signed by the US, Gray claimed, for two main reasons: on the political 
level it was largely to secure the reelection of Richard Nixon by acting as a symbol for 
superpower detente; and secondly, on the strategic level it was supposed to be an 
arrangement whereby the US surrendered a "greatly superior" ABM system for the 
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defence of ICBM silos, for the "severe arresting of the Soviet threat" to these ICBM silos. 
Unfortunately, this was illusion. The Soviets had only agreed to the ABM treaty to 
"maintain unimpeded targeting access to U.S. ICBMs and NCA facilities and to counter 
the U.S. BMD technological advantage". Furthermore, although the agreement might 
have frozen the construction of ICBM launchers, it did nothing to constrain qualitative 
improvements. And, if this wasn't bad enough, the Soviets cheated. Gray citing fifteen or 
so possible cases of violation. ̂  
So much so did the Soviets cheat, argued Gray, that it called into question "the very 
notion that the superpowers retain enough common interest in arms control to warrant 
continuing negotiations".^ Of particular concem was that the Soviets were cheating on 
the ABM Treaty and were in the process of constructing a nationwide ballistic missile 
defence system, giving them a "superior breakout potential" from this treaty. Gray 
claimed that the Soviets had tested air defence radars in the ABM mode, had modified 
their air defence system so that late model SA-10 and SA-X-12 interceptor missiles would 
have some ABM capability, and were constmcting radar infrastructure, including phased-
array radars capable of predicting impact points and handling targets for ABM battle 
management which, "when linked will represent a firm foundation for a nationwide 
ballistic missile defense". Although this still might not provide the Soviets with a 
comprehensive defence, it would complicate US retaliatory planning.^ 
The prospects for the future looked even more bleak, SALT II only adding insult to 
injury, representing yet another sell-out on the part of the United States. As a 
consequence of the SALT I and 11 and the ABM treaties, Gray argued that a 'window of 
vulnerability' would open on the United States in the early to mid 1980's. In 1976, Gray 
argued that the window was just beginning to open: "the U.S. in the 1980's will be on the 
unhealthy end of a hard target counterforce gap that could well endure for four or five 
years''.^ In 1978 he argued that: "By the early to mid 1980's, the United States will be 
unable to [retain] confidence in the ability of all save a small fraction of its silo-housed 
^ Ibid., p. 15. See also Keith B. Payne, "Introduction and Overview of 
Policy Issues", in K. Payne(Ed) , Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and 
Doctrine, 1983, p. 9; Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad: End 
of the Road?", Foreign A f f a i r s , Vol. 56, No. 4, July 1978, p. 771. 
2 Colin S. Gray, "Moscow is Cheating", Foreign Policy, No. 5 6, Fall, 
1984, p. 141. 
3 Gray cites the construction of new Pushkino and Pechora-class BMD 
radars, production of the Flat Twin tracking and Pawn Shop missile 
guidance radars for the SH-04 and SH-08 interceptor missiles which 
were also in production, and the development of a network of C3 
systems, air defence and BMD radars and battle management radars. 
( I b i d / , pp. 143, 149-150, 216-217); See also Keith B. Payne, 
"Strategic Defense and Stability", Orbis, Summer, 1984, p. 216. 
4 Colin S. Gray, "SALT: Time to Quit", op. c i t . , p. 16. 
missile force to ride out a Soviet first nuclear strike.... An entire leg [land based ICBMs] 
of this triad is approaching mass obsolescence - as currendy deployed in fixed hardened 
sites''.^ By 1981 it had become a reality: "Everyone, so it seems, accepts the proposition 
that a 'window' of Western military vulnerability has opened, and that it will likely endure 
until perhaps 1987-88".2 The Soviets were now ahead on megatons, "equivalent 
megatonnage", missile throw weight and the numbers of strategic launch vehicles, and 
were catching up rapidly on missile accuracy and numbers of nuclear warheads. Gray 
claimed. This meant that they could forcibly disarm the land-based leg of the US strategic 
triad and, while doing so, hold their own casualties down to less than that suffered during 
the second world war, "even if the United States should proceed all the way up the 
escalation ladder".^ 
That the 'window of vulnerability' was now open did not mean that a Russian first strike 
attack was imminent argued Gray. What it did mean was that the USSR would be likely 
to seek to coerce the United States while the 'window' remained open. While in fact the 
United States was likely to emerge unscathed from the window of military vulnerability. 
Gray argued that it would not be prudent to rely on such hope, that US defence planners 
should plan for the worse. "As with Germany in the 1929 case". Gray warned, "the 
Soviet Union in the 1980's may well not recognize a firm Westem line when it appears. 
Each side will expect the other to back down, but neither will do so. The result will be 
war by miscalculation".^ 
Underlying their analysis of the 'window of vulnerability' and the Soviet threat, was a 
particular strategic viewpoint, which entailed a critique of the doctrine of MAD, a theory 
about how the Soviets viewed the doctrine of MAD, and a belief in the idea of a strategic 
posture which Gray and Payne called 'denial of victory', 'extended deterrence', or 
'credible deterrence'. From this perspective nuclear weapons were not so much about 
fighting nuclear wars, as they were an element of day-to-day foreign policy, the strategic 
nuclear balance playing a central role in maintaining US dominance in the world, 
especially its freedom to act outside its borders. According to Gray: "American's 
perceptions of their country's relative standing, perceptions by others, and the American 
1 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", op. cit., p. 771. 
2 Colin S. Gray, "Thinking About the Unthinkable War", Washington Star, 
15 March, 1981, p. G1. 
3 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", op. cit., p. 778; See 
also Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Defense, and the Freeze", in Keith 
B. Payne & Colin S. Gray, The Nuclear Freeze Controversy, University 
Press of America, Abt Books, 1984, p. 18. 
4 Colin S. Gray, "Thinking About the Unthinkable War", op. cit.; See 
also Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Defense, and the Freeze", op. cit., 
p. 18. 
sense of what risks are involved in particular possible enterprises - all rest, in part, though 
in ways that are incalculable upon assessments of the state of the strategic balance".^ 
With the declining strategic balance, the United States might well conciliate in the event 
of a crisis, rather than engage in competitive escalation with a stronger and more 
determined foe.^ The Soviets, who now held the upper hand in the strategic nuclear 
balance were however not constrained by domestic opinion, and they were expansionist, 
"not accepting the political status quo in regions vital to the West". They might therefore 
be willing to use military force to obtain a favourable outcome for themselves.^ 
The United States must be perceived to be willing to engage in the escalation of a nuclear 
conflict, rather than suffer a defeat in one of its areas of interest, they argued. Such 
willingness would not exist however, if there was an expectation that the United States 
could not survive a central nuclear war if a conflict escalated to this level. Mutual 
deterrence, the policy of MAD, was unacceptable as the focus of US strategic doctrine, 
they argued. Only if the US was in a position to "wage and survive a central war" was it 
plausible that it would prefer a policy of strategic use to regional defeat.^ Such a "denial 
of victory" deterrent strategy, would signal to the Soviet leadership that they could not 
gain a military advantage by launching a first strike, or a political advantage by threatening 
such a strike, and would, in effect, be bringing about "Soviet disarmament without 
military benefit". This is because the United States would be likely to be more willing "to 
turn an impending theatre defeat into a central war than conciliate, and capable of denying 
the Soviet Union victory at whatever level of escalation that war attained".^ Whilst the 
doctrine of MAD might provide a logical basis for the deterrence of a very large scale 
attack on the American homeland, the threat of US retaliation in this instance being 
credible, it would not act as a hedge against Soviet expansionism (of political influence or 
territory), even in times of political calm.^ The doctrine of'extended deterrence' would 
require that the Soviet leaders considered "that it was not incredible that the United States 
would take the strategic initiative on behalf of distant allies"."̂  
1 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", o p . c i t . , p. 775; 
Colin S. Gray & Keith B. Payne, "Victory is Possible", Foreign Policy^ 
Vol. 39, Suinmer 1980, p. 20. 
2 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine", 
op. cit., p. 750. As examples of this, Payne cites Soviet actions in 
Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan in the 1970's. 
3 Ibid., p. 751. 
4 Ihid., p. 752. 
5 Ibid., p. 759. 
6 Ibid., p. 753. 
7 Ibid , pp. 768-769; Colin S. Gray & Keith B. Payne, "Victory is 
Possible", op. cit., pp. 16-17. Similarly, Gray argued that area BMD 
was required because: (i) it would "usefully reduce American self-
deterrence and so enhance the credibility of the extended deterrent"; 
(ii) it might discourage the Soviets from pressing ahead with the 
development of new offensive systems. Also, the Soviets did not adhere 
This would require a serious commitment to strategic defence (civil defence, air defence 
and ballistic missile defence (BMD)), and strategic force survivability, (perhaps BMD, 
mobility, and/or concealment), and a policy of offensive counterforce targeting. Strategic 
defence was particularly important, because even if the US was confident in the disarming 
potential of its offensive strategic forces, strategic defence would be necessary because 
the United States could never be certain that it would be the side to strike first, or that the 
Soviet Union would not launch "on warning" in the event of a first strike attack by the 
United States.^ 
Furthermore, the notion of parity between US and Soviet strategic arsenals was out, 
especially in the area of strategic defence, as this would be "inconsistent with American 
deterrence responsibilities".^ The strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union was at variance 
with that of the United States, Gray claimed, in that the Soviets held that a good defence, 
because it could limit damage in the event of war, was a good deterrent. Rather than 
seeking to deter war, Soviet doctrine was about achieving war-fighting prowess.^ Not 
only did the Soviets have a different strategic posture, but their leaders had a different 
"hierarchy of values" to American leaders, who valued most the American people and 
urban-industrial assets. The Soviet leaders valued most their "instmments of military and 
political control and power"; they believed that Soviet society had value not in itself, but 
rather as a vehicle for state purposes.^ Gray, for example argued that:^ 
Whereas a U.S. president would view the loss of 5 to 20 million Americans as a 
national tragedy of unprecedented proportions, a Soviet leader would probably view 
such a loss as a regrettable necessity to avoid defeat and ensure the possibility of 
victory. 
to MAD, providing defence for their population, and there was no 
reason why the US should not also do this; (iii) a competition in 
defensive weapons would take "roubles" away from offensive weapons; 
(iv) in the event that deterrence failed, population defences would 
be vital; (v) defence had always been part of Soviet strategy (Colin 
S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence", op. cit., pp. 
67-68) 
1 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine", 
op. cit.r pp. 755-757, 766. 
2 Ibid., p. 759. 
3 Colin S. Gray, "SALT: Time to Quit", op. cit., p. 17; Colin S. Gray, 
"A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence", Survival, March/April 
1981, p. 64. 
^ Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and Stability", op. cit., p. 221; 
Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear-Freeze Debate", op. cit., 
p. 148. 
^ Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear-Freeze Debate", op. cit., 
p. 148. (Gray's arguments were based on the analysis of Soviet 
intentions conducted by Richard Pipes) 
These Soviet assets were more easily defended that those which the US leaders valued 
most, so consequently, "an equivalent level of imperfect defense capability could provide 
protection of the highest Soviet values, but not the highest American values". Therefore, 
parity in offensive and defensive weapons could be extremely disadvantageous for the 
United States because of these supposed differences in values between the two nations' 
leaders. Thus, the United States must at least achieve a "functionally equivalent 
capability" to protect its own highest values and to threaten the highest values of the 
Soviet leadership - "recognizing that such a functional equality may well require superior 
capabilities given the differences in the target sets to be threatened".^ 
The centre-piece of the 'extended deterrence' strategy was seen to be the MX missile 
programme. It was the programme "which could right a strategic balance which would 
otherwise tilt in favour of the Soviet Union to a politically and militarily significant 
degree".2 Gray argued that the MX "should be thought of as a weapon program that is 
essential for the support of forward-placed allies, in that supportive limited first-strike 
options could be threatened credibly, secure in the knowledge that the United States had a 
residual ICBM force that could deter attack upon itself. He went so far as to argue that 
the MX should be welcomed by supporters of arms control, because it could be used to 
provide leverage in the SALT negotiations, by showing the Soviets that a "hard-target 
counterforce race cannot be won". It would however need to be deployed, and would 
have to be survivable before the Soviets would be persuaded that the US was serious.^ 
To get around the problem of MX silo vulnerability, a number of different possibilities 
were envisioned: the US could adopt a launch on warning policy; it could choose to phase 
out the land-based ICBM leg of its strategic triad which had become vulnerable, and rely 
instead on a dyad of SLBMs and manned bombers/cruise missiles; could seek to preserve 
the strategic triad by means of mobile deployment; or, it could defend its silos. In 1978 
Gray tiiought that BMD would not be the best solution to the MX silo vulnerability 
problem, partiy because it had few advocates at that time. There were, moreover, many 
technical problems to be solved, and the ABM Treaty of 1972 would have to be 
abrogated. (Gray argued that if this was so, then the Soviets would be in a much better 
position to deploy a BMD system.) Gray argued that if the United States were to put the 
same resources into developing BMD as it was putting into the development of the MX, 
1 Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and Stability", op. cit., p. 221. 
2 Colin S. Gray, "The MX Debate", Survival, Vol XX, No. 3, May/June 
1978, p. 105. 
3 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", op. cit., p. 78 6. 
then a limited system may be possible by the late 1980's and 1990's. Towards the end of 
the century, even space-based lasers might be a possibility. ̂  
By 1981, Gray thought that because of certain technical advances the use of BMD to 
make MX silos survivable was a definite option. The arguments dating from 1970 to the 
effect that BMD did not work no longer applied to these new technologies, he argued. ̂  
The US now had a "low-risk BMD technology", in the form of the US Army's Low 
Altitude Defense System (LoADs), which was designed to protect missile silos by 
intercepting nuclear warheads within the atmosphere. Although Gray felt that at the 
moment the deceptive basing mode for the Minuteman/MX was the most cost-effective 
solution to the problem of ICBM survivability, he though that BMD would provide a 
useful complement to this at some stage. The LoADS system had, after all, actually been 
designed to defend a deceptively based ICBM system.^ The LoADS technology would 
not suffer from the same shortcomings as the Safeguard system.^ It was, at that time, 
scheduled for initial operational readiness by 1988. As LoADS comprised 'stare-of-the-
art' technology. Gray felt that there was no good reason why it could not be deployed 
with the MX missile around 1985.^ 
1 Ibid.r P- 779-80; Colin S. Gray, "The MX Debate", op. cit., p. 109. 
2 Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense", Survival, 
March/April 1981, p. 60. In 1969-70 it was argued that the Safeguard 
BMD system would not work because" (i) The radar systems could be 
"blacked out" by the nuclear explosion of an incoming missile or from 
defensive missile; (ii) the computer systems were not sophisticated 
enough to handle the volume of information, assessments and battle 
management that was required. In addition it was argued that the 
Spartan ABM system would not work because the radars could^ not 
identify and discriminate real targets from decoys and chaff precisely 
enough to have confidence in the exoatmospheric intercept ability of 
the system. It was also argued that the system could be easily 
overcome if the Soviets chose to saturate the system, or to use such 
offensive ploys as 'salvage-fusing'. Also, the system was criticized 
because it would not be 100% effective. (Ibid.r p. 61-62.) 
3 The MX basing mode being envisaged at the time involved 200 MX 
missiles deployed one to each "linear track" with 23 horizontal 
shelters on each track. The missiles would be shuffled around between 
the shelters so that the Soviets would never quite know where they 
were The LoADS system would complicate things even more. If just one 
LOADS deployment were used per track, the soviets would have to send 
twice the number of missiles to be certain of success, as it may have 
been protecting any one of the 23 shelters. {Ibid., pp. 63-64; Keith 
B. Payne, "Detente, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine", op. cit., 
p. 761.) 
With the LOADS system the interceptor missile and radar would also be 
deceptively based, and was far smaller than the radar for the 
Safeguard system. Also, because it was a 'minimum altitude' intercept 
system it would be difficult to use spoofing tactics. (Colin S. Gray, 
"A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense",op. cit., p. 64) 
5 Ibid., p. 64-65. 
An even more advanced system was being developed by the US Army, an 
exoatmospheric 'overlay' BMD system, designed to intercept nuclear warheads above the 
atmosphere. Although based on a less mature technology than the LoADS system. Gray 
argued that when fully developed, it would represent a qualitative advance over the 
Spartan system through a revolution in optical discrimination. It would involve the 
launching of 'probe' missiles into the "threat corridor" of an incoming threat cloud to 
identify target warheads, from the decoys and chaff. This threat data would then be 
'handed over' to the "warhead 'buses' of long-range interceptors, which would then in 
turn 'handover' threat data to non-nuclear homing vehicles which could neutralize the 
targets through impact or fragmentation".^ If this homing overlay system received 
adequate funding, then, according to Gray, it could be operational by about 1990. 
Combined with LoADS to form a two-tiered BMD system, a tmly effective BMD system 
would be obtained.2 
Furthermore, Gray and Payne argued, future developments may allow the addition of a 
third layer to the BMD system based on exotic technologies which would be used to 
intercept ballistic missiles in their boost-phase. "Space-based high-energy laser systems, 
designed to destroy ICBM and SLBM in their boost phases, could easily mark a historical 
change in the relationship between the offence and the defense in favour of the latter". 
However, major practical problems remained to be solved.^ According to Gray: "Crises 
and wars are deterred or waged with actual weapons, not with strategic promissory notes; 
it is always possible to design a better weapon tomorrow than today. Space-based laser 
weapons for BMD may or may not prove technically feasible and strategically attractive, 
but their promise could deprive the U.S. of effective BMD weaponry to accomplish 
modestly defined missions in the near term". Further, "extravagant-sounding strategic 
vision deploys on paper weapons whose construction far exceeds the current state-of-the-
art and can damage the political prospects for more modest programs".^ 
Not surprisingly, both Gray and Payne strongly opposed the freeze movement. They 
argued that the nuclear freeze supporters misunderstood strategy, and would in fact 
produce results that were counter-productive in terms of promoting the objectives of arms 
control. "To minimize the probability of war the U.S. needs to act now to reduce the high 
degree of strategic force vulnerability that has resulted from the formidable build-up of 
1 Ibid., p. 65; Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US 
Strategic Doctrine", op. cit., p. 7 61. 
2 Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense", o p . c i t . , 
p 65; Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US Strategic 
Doctrine", o p . c i t . , pp. 760, 761-762. 
4 Colin S. Gray, American Military Space Policy, Abt Books, Cambridge 
MA, 1983, p. 3. 
Soviet counterforce potential", Payne argued.^ For the nuclear strategists the nuclear 
freeze was a nightmare which had them waking in an icy-cold sweat. It would only serve 
to freeze the 'window of vulnerability' in place and deny the US the opportunity of 
modernizing and building up its strategic weapons to regain the superiority which was 
required for 'extended deterrence'; it would also deny the US the option of deploying the 
MX ('Peacemaker'), and of modernizing the existing Minutemen ICBM force and 
deploying it in a more survivable mode. Further, it would deny the US the option of 
deploying BMD to protect its land-based ICBM force. "In short, the freeze would deny 
the United States the means of addressing the problem of ICBM vulnerability".^ 
Furthermore, they argued that the doctrine of MAD, and thus the nuclear freeze which 
attempted to preserve this, was immoral. "Instead of purposefully threatening Soviet 
cities, the United States directs its deterrent primarily against Soviet nuclear weapons, 
political-control facilities, and other military capabilities that threaten the United States and 
its allies.... This type of deterrence policy and planning is morally more acceptable than 
the "countercity" notions of freeze advocates, and is also based on a more effective 
deterrent because it threatens that which the Soviet leadership values most highly".^ Even 
worse that this, the nuclear freeze advocates were not paying due respect to tiie nuclear 
strategists, and might even make them obsolete: "In a spirit of 'back to basics', a nuclear 
freeze would sidestep tiie realm of strategic analysis and constimte an apparently effective 
answer to what is allegedly a simple problem - to halt, or at least arrest the nuclear-arms 
race before that race triggers a war that would be to the advantage of neither side"."̂  
Although Gray and Payne do not seem to have had direct access to the President they both 
worked as consultants for the Pentagon, and Colin Gray was on the General Advisory 
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, a body of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.^ Gray, in particular, seems to have done quite a deal of work on 
the MX missile for the Air Force, being granted a US$100,000 contract by the Air Force 
in January 1980 to head a two-year study on "Strategic Force Posture and Arms 
1 Keith B. Payne, "Laser Weapons in Space", o p . c i t . , p. 14. 
2 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Defence and the Freeze", o p . c i t . , p. 
18 Other'undesirable effects of the freeze cited by Payne included: 
(i) it would force the US to maintain its aging B-52s with only a 
small number of ALCMs operationally deployed, (ii) deny the US the 
opportunity of deploying a more survivable bomber such as the Bl-B or 
stealth bomber; (iii) allow the soviets to improve their air defences; 
(iv) allow the soviets to improve their anti-submarine capabilities 
but ban further US development of modernized nuclear missile carrying 
submarines. (Jjbid., pp. 26-28.) 
3 Ibid.r pp. 28-29. 
4 Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear Freeze Debate", op. c i t . , 
p. 149. 5 Colin S. Gray, "Moscow is Cheating", op. cit., p. 145. 
Control".^ Shortly after Reagan entered office Gray and Payne had completed a 
comprehensive study for James Wade, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, on the 
advantages of a new 'denial of victory' strategy. Strategic defences, as we have seen, 
would be essential for this strategy, to back up US commitment to initiate a nuclear war 
by limiting damage to the US home land. As Gray and Payne put it, "the U.S.... could 
with relative confidence in its political integrity engage in a war that while perhaps 
militarily unpromising in the short term, would envisage the eventual attainment of the 
desired political objective".̂  
Not surprisingly, both Colin Gray and Keith Payne welcomed the announcement by 
President Reagan of a programme to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. ̂  
However, they argued for a BMD system that was much more limited in scope, in the 
near term at least, and were sceptical of the claims that a "nuclear umbrella" could be 
achieved, and of the claims of the advocates of exotic space-based weapons. Under their 
theory of 'extended deterrence' such exotic weapons were not necessary. They 
recognized however that "the promise of a comprehensive defense of cities by exotic 
systems and the transcending of offensive-oriented deterrence is a goal that will capture 
the imagination and support of the American people". For them the more limited defence 
approach was not "inconsistent with a future exotic defense of cities" when this 
technology was at an adequate stage of development. Indeed, these limited defences 
would be required for a stable transition, they argued. Also, just because a defensive 
shield was being constructed, did not mean that offensive weapons need be done away 
with, as they too would be required to "safeguard stability during the initial phase of a 
defensive transition".̂  
2.6 COMMON THREADS AND DIFFERENCES 
All of the groups advocating the deployment of ballistic missile defences of some sort 
shared a common ideology and world view. All were ferociously anti-communist and 
held that the Soviets were bent on world domination, as they had always been. All were 
opponents of detente and the SALT I and II and ABM treaties that were a by-product of 
1 Joseph Voltz, "MX defender has defense contract". New York News, 
August 19, 1981, p. CIO. ^ . , ^ 
2 Colin Gray & Keith Payne, SALT: Deep Force Level Reductions, Hudson 
Institute, 1981. Quoted in Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, op. cit., 
pp. 64-65. 
3 Colin S. Gray, "Reagan's defense plan should be welcomed", Washington 
Times, April 18, 1983, p. IC. 
4 Keith B Payne & Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive 
Transition", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 4, Spring 1984, pp. 823-
824. 
this policy, and all argued that the Soviets played the game of Mutually Assured 
Destruction differently. Whereas the United States was content with a notion of "parity" 
and prepared to lay its homeland open to a Soviet nuclear attack (dismanding its only 
ABM system in the mid-1970's), the Soviets were held to reject the notion of "mutual 
vulnerability" as was evidenced by their large civil defence programme and their 
development work on ABM systems. Also, the Soviets were held to be engaged in a 
massive build-up of offensive nuclear weapons in an attempt to develop a war-winning 
capability. They all argued that the SALT treaties had constrained (if not unilaterally 
disarmed) the United States, but had allowed the Soviets to forge ahead unconstrained, so 
much so that they had attained strategic superiority, and the United States was facing a 
'window of vulnerability' in the first half of the 1980's through which the Soviets would 
be tempted to launch a first-strike attack, or which they might use to coerce the US to 
surrender without even launching an attack. 
All of the proponents of BMD were arguing that in some way their system would help to 
close this 'window of vulnerability', that is, to make US land-based missiles less 
vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike attack. They rejected the doctrine of Mutual Assured 
Destruction and argued that the deployment of ballistic missile defence would be a vehicle 
through which a new strategic doctrine - Mutual Assured Survival (MAS) - could be 
introduced. They argued that the doctrine of MAD was immoral as it meant laying the 
population of the United States open to nuclear annihilation. The doctrine of MAS was 
held to be morally superior, and it had the added advantage that it could be pursued in the 
absence of arms control agreements with the Soviets. All were strongly opposed to the 
freeze movement, arguing that it would freeze in place the 'window of vulnerability', and 
that as it operated within the framework of MAD, it was immoral. 
It was this common ideology which led the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' to be 
attracted to ballistic missile defence. Given that the Soviet Union was supposed to have 
attained strategic superiority over the United States and that it was futile negotiating arms 
agreements with the Soviets, there were two main ways in which the United States 
military could regain superiority. They could increase the quantity and improve the quality 
of their offensive nuclear weapons, or they could deploy strategic defence systems - civil 
defence and ballistic missile defence. A combination of offensive and defensive weapons 
could also be employed. All of the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' favoured the 
defensive option. They did so for several reasons. Firstiy, some thought that the Soviet 
Union had akeady won the arms race in offensive nuclear weapons but that through the 
United States' superiority in sophisticated technologies there was still a chance to win the 
arms race in defensive weapons. A slight variation on this theme was that defensive 
weapons could be used to open up a new area of the arms race as a form of economic 
warfare against the Soviets. Because the United States held the advantage in this area of 
technology it was felt that if the Soviets tried to compete their economy would collapse, 
perhaps leading to the overthrow of the communist system. Finally, it was thought that 
defensive weapons would be much easier to sell to the public than offensive weapons. 
This last reason became increasingly important with the rise of the peace movement. It 
would be much easier to justify an increase in expenditure on defensive weapons which 
protected Americans but "did not kill Russians" than for offensive weapons of mass 
destruction. Further, groups such as the 'laser lobby' and High Frontier emphasized the 
importance of having a non-nuclear defence. Such a system had the potential to steal the 
thunder of the peace movement. 
The need for a space-based ballistic missile defence system was also related to public 
appeal. Land-based ballistic missile defence systems had been discredited in the 'ABM 
Debate' in the late 1960's as they either didn't provide a perfect nuclear umbrella, or they 
were only there to protect missile silos and not people. Only a space-based ballistic 
missile defence could attack ICBMs in their boost phase, when they were most vuhierable 
and had not released their multiple warheads or decoys, and therefore held the potential to 
provide the perfect nuclear umbrella. There was a symbolic element to this also, as 
Graham fully realized. Not only were the space weapon technologies highly advanced and 
exotic, but space had the potential to capture people's imagination. This symbolic element 
was very important. For groups such as High Frontier and the 'laser lobby', the ballistic 
missile defence systems that they were proposing were a vehicle through which a new 
strategic doctrine - that of Mutual Assured Survival - could be implemented and publicly 
proclaimed. 
Although the different lobby groups shared a common view of the Soviet threat which led 
them to advocate ballistic missile defence as the solution, they pushed essentially different 
technologies to implement this ballistic missile defence system. This can be explained in 
terms of different "interests" that these groups brought to bear on the problem. Thus, 
while the broad nature of the BMD system was shaped by the ideology of the groups, the 
components of the system was shaped by the interests. The final 'shape' of the ballistic 
missile defence system that the different groups advocated reflected an interplay between 
the ideology and the interests of the groups. In some groups it seems to have been the 
ideology which was dominant in the shaping process, and in others the interests. 
The 'laser lobby' brought together representatives of the defence contractors who were 
working on the technologies for DARPA's space-laser triad, with a group of hawkish 
Senators and their aides. DARPA's laser triad aimed to develop on the ground a 5-
megawatt chemical laser for future use in space. Thus, the laser lobby' advocated space-
based chemical lasers as the form of BMD to provide the nuclear umbrella. That they did 
not opt for the shorter-wavelength lasers (which were supposed to be more effective) was 
congruent with the interests which were represented in the 'laser lobby' but was justified 
in terms of ideology. The lobby claimed that the need to deploy the system in the near 
future to shut the 'window of vulnerability' necessitated the chemical lasers as these were 
at a more advanced stage of development than the shorter-wavelength lasers. Even though 
all of the senators who were members of the 'laser lobby' shared the a common ideology 
and saw space-based laser battle stations as the answer to the problem of the Soviet threat, 
they had slightly different reasons for actually supporting space-based BMD: some 
because it would be a neat technical solution to a nightmarish MX basing plan that was 
politically unpopular in their home states, and others because they thought it represented a 
cheaper solution to the problem of MX basing. This shows how the shaping of a 
particular weapons system can be linked to the development of another weapon system, in 
this instance the MX, and how wider political and social factors can come into play. 
The High Frontier study brought together a collection of defence industry and military 
experts who were proposing an assortment of different BMD technologies, civil defence, 
and also some civilian space projects, the final proposal focusing on technologies which 
were supposedly 'off-the-shelf: the "swarmjet" system for the point defence of ICBM 
sites, and the GBMD system which had been proposed by Bud Redding of SRI 
International. In this case, although the interests which were represented in the High 
Frontier study can be seen to have shaped the eventual outcome of the BMD system that 
was proposed, these interests were, in the first place, enrolled into the project by Daniel 
Graham and Karl Bendetsen. In the High Frontier group it seems to have been the 
ideology which dominated over the interests, the High Frontier report emphasizing the 
technologies which were most compatible with the group's ideology. High Frontief s 
leader, Daniel Graham, was one of the most vocal supporters of the 'window of 
vulnerability' thesis, and his group's advocacy of off-the-shelf technologies over the 
more exotic beam weapon technologies had everything to do with his perception that it 
was important to close this 'window of vulnerability' as soon as possible. 
Edward Teller's group brought together some conservative industrialists with good access 
to the President, with a group of scientists who were working on thu-d generation nuclear 
weapons, including x-ray lasers. The advocacy of x-ray lasers by Teller's group seems to 
have been dictated by the allure of the third generation of nuclear weapons to the scientists 
at Livermore. Not only were the scientists at Livermore actively engaged in research 
programmes on these weapons but to these scientists offensive nuclear weapons had 
become mere engineering, no longer representing a challenge. Teller's group was pushing 
for large increases in the funds being devoted to research on third generation nuclear 
weapons, which were held to be more exciting and represent more of a challenge than the 
second generation nuclear weapons. They were not so intent as the other groups on 
actually deploying the system. It is in Teller's group which the interests seem to have 
dominated the ideology, although the ideology still seems to have played an important 
part. 
Colin Gray and Keith Payne were nuclear strategists who eamed their keep devising ways 
to deploy and employ offensive nuclear weapons. They had worked on contracts for the 
Air Force on the MX missile, and had invested a significant amount of their intellectual 
capital in devising ways to base the MX to ensure its survivability and on strategies for its 
use. It was the centre-piece of their theory of 'credible deterrence'. To the problem of 
ballistic missile defence Gray and Payne brought both their professional interest as 
nuclear strategists, and the interests of the Air Force and Army. That the 'window of 
vulnerability' be closed as quickly as possible to negate the Soviet threat was important to 
them also. Thus, Gray and Payne were advocating the early deployment of the LoADS 
and Homing Overlay systems that had been specifically designed for the defence of the 
MX missile. They argued that the more exotic systems would not be able to be deployed 
. early enough to solve the problem of MX vulnerability, and may well threaten the early 
deployment of the more conventional systems. They argued that the deployment of more 
accurate nuclear weapons and conventional ballistic missile defence was necessary to 
make a stable transition to the more exotic forms of ballistic missile defence some time in 
the distant future. 
There is an interesting "clash of interests" between the different lobby groups, even 
though they were all advocating BMD systems to solve the problem of the 'window of 
vulnerability'. This debate focused on the technical merits of the different systems, and on 
their timeframe for deployment. The most pressing need for all groups, except Teller's 
group advocating the x-ray laser, was that of early deployment. Each group attempted to 
show that their system was the most effective system that could be deployed by the 
middle of the 1980's, just in time to close the 'window of vulnerability'. It was in this 
debate that the interests which lay behind the different groups shine through most 
strongly, each attempting to assert their dominance over the claims of the others. By 
linking the technical claims made by the different groups to the ideology of the groups and 
to the interests represented in the groups, more sense can be made of the debates. These 
debates do not go into any great technical detail. Rather, the proponents of a particular 
BMD system focus on a particular feature of the system and use this to try and assert their 
claims. For example, shorter wavelength lasers were held to be more effective by 
advocates of x-ray and eximer lasers. 
Notwithstanding these clashes of interest between the groups there were a number of 
common threads in the approaches they took in attempting to sell their systems and in the 
response they received. Firstly, all of those groups who were proposing exotic BMD 
systems were opposed by the Pentagon, especially the Army and the Air Force who had 
their own, more conventional programmes. (Gray and Payne can be seen to be the 
exception here, as their interests seem to have been aligned with those of the Air Force 
and Army.) Interestingly enough, even those members of the lobby groups who came 
from the defence contractors often ran into opposition within their own companies, as 
their activities were putting at risk contracts that these firms currendy held with the Air 
Force and Army. Daniel Graham and Malcolm Wallop had a keen sense of the problems 
that they would run into from the Pentagon when pushing their schemes. This opposition 
would be expected from the model of the weapons development process oudined in 
section 1.2. The missions of the Army and the Air Force had become embodied in their 
more conventional programmes. The technologies being proposed by the 'laser lobby' 
were, in Kaldor's terms, 'revolutionary', and were destined to run into bureaucratic 
opposition. This aspect of the development of space-based BMD is dealt with more fully 
in Chapter 4. 
Kaldor has argued that the type of 'revolutionary' technologies that the members of the 
'space-weapons lobby' were advocating would have to be taken up by "maverick 
constituencies" within the armed forces. In the case of space-based BMD weapons such a 
maverick constituency does not seem to have existed, or at least was not powerful enough 
to have much influence. This left two options for the members of the 'space weapons 
lobby'. Firstly, they could try and work through Congress to pass legislation to impose 
space-weapons on the armed services. This was the approach taken by the 'laser lobby' 
but was fraught with problems. The armed services, particularly the Air Force, were a 
powerful lobbying force on Capitol Hill and seem to have intervened on several occasions 
to block the 'laser lobby'. The second option was to try and sell the programmes to the 
President directiy, or indirectiy by working on the President's advisers. Because of the 
opposition within the Pentagon, a^d within the defence contractors, the 'laser lobby'. 
High Frontier, and Teller's group realized that they needed to follow this path. Only this 
way could they override the bureaucratic opposition and turf guarding that was sure to 
arise. Obtaining Presidential sanction meant that not only would it be easier to seU space-
based ballistic missile defence to the public and to Congress, but also the President was 
the only one who could impose a decision on the armed services. This meant that those 
groups with good access to the President had a greater chance of success. It should be 
remembered that this access was also controlled by the President's close advisers. 
The case study of space-based ballistic missile defence has, so far, given some support to 
model of the weapons development process that has been developed, and also pointed to 
some modifications which may be required. A number of groups that were pushing 
different BMD systems have been identified, these groups providing the "impetus" for the 
weapons development process. The process of bureaucratic politics can be seen in 
operation, the proposals of the 'space-weapons lobby' running into opposition from the 
armed services, who had a vested interest in more conventional programmes, and were 
not yet ready for the exotic technologies being proposed. The importance of Congress, 
and congressional committees such as the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 
is evident. Groups such as the 'laser lobby' operated out of the Senate and tried to pass 
legislation to influence the development of space-based BMD. The lobbying efforts of the 
armed services, the Department of Defense, and the Executive Branch were also important 
in Congress. The armed services seem to have had various allies on Capitol Hill, and also 
had influence through input to congressional hearings. The importance of the Executive 
Branch, and in particular the President is evident. All of the groups pushing exotic space-
based weapons realized they would have to win over the President to get around the 
opposition from the armed services. The importance of the wider political context is 
evident. The fortunes of ballistic missile defence improved markedly when President 
Reagan entered the White House. Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan 
Administration was prepared to abrogate the ABM Treaty, and it was also looking for 
solutions to the 'window of vulnerability'. Further, the 'laser lobby' provides an example 
of how the issue of space-based BMD can come to be linked to wider political concerns. 
Finally, the role played by ideology is also evident. All of the groups advocating space-
based BMD shared a common ideology, and it was this ideology which led them to be 
attracted to BMD systems, and shaped the broad outlines of the system. 
Where modification to the model seems necessary is in the area of the forces that are 
driving the weapons development process. Kaldor has argued that the two main 
institutions which drive the weapons development process are the weapons laboratories 
and the defence contractors. This would seem to be too simplistic. Although two of the 
groups in the 'space-weapons lobby' had links with defence contractors and one of the 
groups had links with a weapons laboratory, the simation is more complex than this. For 
a start, it is too simplistic to treat defence contractors and weapons laboratories as single 
actors. There are different divisions and groups within the contractors working on 
different development projects. While it may be the case that the defence contractors have 
a need for follow-on programmes to remain profitable, it will not always be in the 
contractor's interest to push all of its projects at any given time. As was the case with 
Lockheed, they will not push projects which might lose them important contracts. A 
similar situation could be seen to exist for the weapons laboratories and other research 
instimtions. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that the laser wars' in 1982 
was a result of a power play within DARPA between groups working on competing laser 
projects. Thus, the different levels of bureaucratic complexity which have been applied to 
the armed services must also be applied to the defence contractors and weapons 
laboratories. A particular weapons systems must be placed within the institutional context 
of the defence contractor or weapons laboratory in which it is being developed. 
Secondly, it is too simplistic to attribute solely an economic interest to the defence 
contractors and a scientific/technical interest to the weapons laboratories. The ideology of 
the groups that are providing the impetus to the weapons development process is also an 
important factor shaping the weapons system. It may even be that a group is pushing a 
particular weapons system for almost entirely political resaons. A good examle of this 
would be the High Frontier organization. It seems to have been largely die ideology of the 
groups which comprised the 'space-weapons lobby' which has shaped the broad nature 
of the form of BMD system that they were advocating, and largely the interests 
represented in the groups which shaped the components of the system. The actual 
weapons system that was being proposed resulted from an interplay between the ideology 
and the interests. 
CH. 3: THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY AND 
THE C.P.D. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
That the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' shared a common ideology and view of 
the Soviet threat is not very surprising. This ideology was that of the Committee on the 
Present Danger (CPD), which formed in the middle of the 1970's and set as its mission 
the revival of concem about the Soviet threat, and the reassertion of American military 
superiority. In this chapter I trace the development of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, focusing on its major identities and the ideology that was espoused by this 
group. Finally, I explore the links between the CPD and the 'space-weapons lobby', in an 
attempt to explain the concurrence of their world views, and to provide a revealing 
perspective on the meaning and purpose of ballistic missile defence. 
3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CPD 
One of the antecedents of the Committee on the Present Danger was a group known as the 
Coalition For A Democratic Majority (CDM), a group of Democrats who had broken with 
George McGovem in 1972. Eugene Rostow, a member of this group, and Chair of the 
CDM's Foreign Policy Task Force, played a major role in the formation of the Committee 
on the Present Danger. All up, thirteen members of the Rostow's eighteen member Task 
Force became members of the CPD when it was formed. In the summer of 1974, the 
Task Force released a report, "The Quest for Detente", a scathing attack on the concept of 
detente, which, they argued, was a dangerous illusion which could lull the West into 
thinking that the Cold War had come to an end. It had not, the Soviets could not be 
trusted, and they were still bent on world domination.^ It was out of this Task Force 
experience that Rostow became convinced that there was a need to put together a broadly-
based committee to trumpet aloud the Soviet threat and to push for a return to 
unquestioned American superiority. ̂  
In June 1974, Paul Nitze, the 'white-haired hawk'. Who had held a national security post 
in every administration since Truman, resigned in disgust from the SALT delegation that 
^Rostow, former Undersecretary of State during the Johnson 
Administration is described by Jerry Sanders as being an 
"unreconstructed hawk on Vietnam". Other members of the Task Force 
were Richard Pipes, Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, Leon Keyserling, 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Kampelman, Richard Schifter and John Roach. 
(Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 150; Richard J. Barnet, Real 
Security, p. 42.) 
2 Jerry Sanders, op. clt., p. 151. 
was negotiating the SALT II Treaty, and went before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on June 20th telling them that Nixon and Kissinger were selling the "myth of 
detente". Nitze had come to pretty much the same conclusion as Rostow, and in the first 
year of the Ford Administration began to discuss with about half a dozen or so of his 
colleagues, including Rostow, the possibility of forming a high-powered group to 
continue his attack on detente and SALT, to awaken people to the Soviet threat, and to 
push for big increases in military spending. Others involved in these discussions were 
James Schlesinger, Nixon's hawkish Secretary of Defense, Charles Walker, former 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon Administration, David Packard, and Henry 
Fowler. 1 Finally, in late November 1975, after downing a few Bloody Marys before 
lunch, Rostow, according to his own recollection, decided that they had talked about it 
enough and sat down and fired of a memo to Walker and Nitze. "I said we'd had 
preliminary discussions long enough", Rostow recalled. "By God, why don't we just do 
it?".2 
In March 1976, over lunch at the Metropolitan Club in Washington, the Committee on the 
Present Danger was formed, Charles Tyroler II, who had been invited to attend by Nitze, 
becoming director. The name chosen for the committee was identical to that of a 
committee set up in 1950 by James Conant, president of Harvard, Will Clayton, Robert 
Lovett and other former national security officials with an identical purpose.^ Through 
the spring of 1976, the committee members worked on defining themselves as an 
organization, and devising strategies to communicate the Soviet threat, and it was not until 
early November 1976, that the group went public.'̂  Their founding statement Common 
Sense and the Common Danger, expounded Cold War themes that were familiar from the 
pages of NSC-68: "The principle threat to our nation, to World peace, and to the cause of 
human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military 
build-up". Furthermore, "The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world 
dominated from a single center - Moscow".^ 
1 Ibid., pp. 151-152; Richard J. Barnett, op. cit., p. 51. 
2 Robert Sherill, "Gene Rostow's Propaganda Club", The Nation, August 
11-18, 1979, p. 109; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 152. 
3 Jerry Sanders has made a comparison of these two committees with the 
identical name but separated in time by a quarter century. Some of 
those involved with the first, were also involved with the second CPD. 
Paul Nitze, who became a leading member of the 197 6 CPD, worked 
informally with the earlier CPD as a member of the State Department. 
And Charles Tyroler, director of the 197 6 CPD, as a young Pentagon 
official. 
^ Jerry Sanders, op. cit., pp. 153, 183. 
5 Ibid., p. 183. Paul Nitze was the author of NSC-68, otherwise known 
as "The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 'United 
State's Objectives and Programs for National Security'", April 7, 
1950. It reads: "... the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to 
hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own. 
Right from the start the CPD worked with other like-minded anti-Soviet groups. An 
example of these links, and an indication of the direction in which the group was heading 
is provided by correspondence between Frank Bamett, President of the National Strategy 
Information Center (NSIC), and Eugene Rostow of the newly formed CPD. Bamett 
wrote to Rostow on May 24, 1976, inviting him to join the Board of the NSIC, and 
advising him that the NSIC had "been granted [US]$1 million to "crank up" an all-out 
effort to meet the current and growing threat from the USSR - whether in military, 
ideological or economic warfare terms". He continued: "You are fully aware, of course, 
that in terms of the shifting military balance - and in our diplomatic credibility in much of 
the world - the U.S. today is about where Britain was in 1938, with the shadow of 
Hitier's Germany darkening all over Europe. The NSIC, to counter this threat was 
going to open a "full-scale" Washington office to:̂  
a)interact with policy echelons in the White House and Pentagon (where we still have many friends); b)"tutor" Congressional Staffs, and brief members; c)work with Trade Associations - with an interest in "defense" - which have Washington offices; d)generate more public information through friends in the Washington press corps who write about military and foreign affairs. 
Rostow, not surprisingly, replied to Bamett informing him that he would be "honoured to 
accept the invitation" to join the Board of the NSIC and that he was delighted that the 
NSIC would be conducting a "campaign of direct and large scale persuasion to Congress, 
the Executive Branch, Trade Associations and the press corps". Rostow advised Bamett 
that the CPD would be planning a somewhat more limited operation, but that he thought it 
would be possible to coordinate the activities of the two organizations. Furthermore, he 
fully agreed with Bamett's world outlook: "... with youi- estimate that we are living in a 
pre-war and not a post-war world, and that our posture today is comparable to that of 
Britain, France, and the United States during the Thirties. Whether we are at the 
Rhineland or the Munich watershed remains to be seen."^ 
A two-tier strategy was developing, which according to Sanders was "designed to 
squeeze an incoming president between a reassertion of hardline doctrine within the 
and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. 
Conflict has, therefore, become endemic ...". (Quoted in Richard J. 
Barnett, o p . c i t . , p. 43.) 
1 Letter from Frank R. Barnett to Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, May 24, 1976. 
Reproduced in, Robert Sherill, op. cit., p. 107. See also Jerry 
Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 196-197. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Letter from Eugene V. Rostow to Frank R. Barnett, June 1, 1976. 
Reprinted in Robert Sherill, op. cit., pp. 107-108; See also Jerry 
Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 196-197. 
national security bureaucracy and from the outside by means of pressure from an interest-
backed Cold War ideology led by hawkish Congressmen and groups associated with the 
military-industrial complex and the grass roots right wing''.^ Within four years of its 
inception, the CPD had brought this strategy to bear in three major batties with the pro-
detente, pro-SALT forces, and helped to change dramatically the American perception of 
the Soviet threat. The first of these was the Team B report, the second, the opposition to 
Paul Wamke in his confirmation hearings, and the third, opposition to the ratifying of the 
SALTnTreaty.2 
3.3 TEAM B AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT 
High-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet Strategic objectives over the next ten years ... was more sombre than any in more than a decade. A top level military intelligence officer who has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than sombre - it was very grim. It flatly states the judgement that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgement that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it. [ David Binder, "New C.LA. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms", New York Times, Dec. 26, 1976. ] ^ 
This was something new. From the 1950's, up until 1976, the CIA believed that the 
Soviet Union was only seeking parity with the United States, not superiority. Nor was it 
believed that the Soviet leaders expected to survive and win a nuclear war with the United 
States.^ Not all of those in the intelligence community viewed the Soviets in the same way 
though. The CIA had, over a number of years, been coming under attack from the likes of 
Air Force Major General George Keegan, and Army General Daniel Graham, as well as a 
number of civilians outside of the intelligence community, such as Paul Nitze and Richard 
Pipes, all of whom felt that the CIA were being soft on the Russians.^ General Graham, 
who had had a number of years experience in the CIA's Office of National Estimates, and 
had actually argued against the "missile gap" in the early 1960's, now argued that there 
1 Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , p. 197. 
2 Ibid.; Richard J. Barnett, op. c i t . , pp. 56-57. 
3 Quoted in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, Random House, NY, 1981, 
p. 151. 4 Ibid., p. 51. 
5 Both Graham and Keegan had been influenced by the writings of Dr. 
Albert Wohlstetter, then of the University of Chicago, who in his 
"legends of the Arms Race", published in 1974, (see "Legends of the 
Strategic Arms Race, Part 1: The Driving Engine", Strategic Review, 
Fall 1974), had examined the record of military estimates of Soviet 
strategic weapons system and argued that the intelligence community 
had, without exception, consistently underestimated the development 
and' deployment of Soviet Strategic forces. (Daniel Graham, "The 
Intelligence Mythology of Washington", Strategic Review, 1976, p. 60; 
"New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat", Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, March 28, 1977, p. 38.) 
were "more liberals per square foot in the CIA than any other part of government", and 
concluded that they were "anti-military".̂  
In 1974, George Keegan had dissented so strongly to the national intelligence estimates^ 
relating to the significance of the Soviet civil-defence programme and a new guided 
missile, that he was called to make his case before the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board. Keegan was able to convince the Board's chairman Leo Cheme and the 
Board of his case, and Cheme was able to persuade George Bush, then director of the 
CIA, of the need for a team of outsiders to reevaluate the raw intelligence data. In the lead 
up to the 1976 Presidential elections, Ronald Reagan had been making national security a 
major issue in the Republican primaries, and so finally President Ford granted permission 
to Bush to set up just this team, the so-called Team B, to appraise the CIA's estimates of 
Soviet capabilities and intentions.^ In a break with the agency's standards of secrecy, and 
without precedent, the Team B group was given access to the most sensitive intelligence 
data on the Soviet Union.^ 
In June 1976 Bush appointed a panel of seven outsiders to go over the same classified 
data that was available to the CIA and to develop their own judgement of Soviet 
1 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 198; In the early 1960's Daniel Graham, 
then a Major, had been assigned to the Estimates Office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, 
where it was his job to represent the Army intelligence in the process 
of coordinating the national intelligence estimates on Soviet 
strategic forces. Ironically, while the Air Force was advocating a 
"missile gap" at this time, Graham was arguing that no such missile 
gap existed. He now argued that the CIA analysts had a mind-set that 
was "basically liberal, humanist, antinationalistic and antimilitary". 
(Daniel Graham, "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington", op. cit., 
pp. 60-61, 64.) 
2 The importance of the national intelligence estimates is that they 
provide the guidance for the size and shape of the military budget, 
and the strategic posture the US will assume. Keegan was convinced 
that the Soviet Union had developed a massive civil defence programme 
in preparation for fighting a nuclear war. In a recent interview he 
claimed that photointerpreters working for him in the early 1970's had 
discovered that every apartment built in the Soviet Union since 1955 
had a • large civil defence shelter underneath, with tunnels 
interconnecting the shelters. "And in these tunnels, we found water, 
electric power conduits, and a vast storage of medical supplies: 
hospital-type facilities". Further, his team had found a ring of 75 
underground command posts around Moscow, and similar shelters around 
the other major cities. He claimed that these were 700 feet across, 
covered with 100 feet of reinforced concrete, and cost US$500 billion 
each to build! (William Burrows, Deep Black, Random House, New York, 
1986, pp. 1-11.) 
^ That the FIAB should suggest this is not very surprising. As Sanders 
points out, six of the 16-member Board later became members of the 
CPD; Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. cit, p. 59; Jerry 
Sanders, op. cit., p. 198. 
^ Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. cit., p. 51. 
capabilities and intentions. The group included Richard Pipes (as chairman), Paul Nitze, 
Fay Kohler, and William Van Cleave, all of whom were members of the CPD, and Daniel 
Graham who had just retired as Dkector of the DIA, Thomas Wolfe of the RAND 
Corporation, and John Vogt Jr., a retired Air Force General. As well, there were a 
number of analysts who held government positions at the time: Major General George 
Keegan, Air Force Brigadier General Joseph Welch, Paul Wolfowitz of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, and Seymour Weiss from the State Department.^ Right from 
the start die Team B exercise was far from impartial, the charge that the CIA was soft on 
the Russians being taken as given even before they inspected the data. Paul Nitze and 
William Van Cleave had been holding discussions for months with Eugene Rostow and 
others about the need to form the CPD.2 Fred Kaplan argues that the Ford Administration 
had "deliberately decided to bring in a collection of frankly right-wing Russo-phobes, 
headed by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, an expert on pre-revolutionary Russia, just to 
see if they could take CIA data and come to conclusions quite different from those reached 
by the in-house analysts".^ Pipes was unconcerned by this. As far as he was concerned 
there was "no point in another, what you might call, optimistic view". While the 
moderately optimistic view prevailed, the Soviet threat was being underestimated, and the 
US imposing limits upon itself in the hope that the Russians would slow down. "They 
haven't", argued Pipes.'® 
Once the Team B members had started on their reassessment, insider reports told of 
"absolutely bloody" discussions during which the Team B members accused the CIA 
analysts of dealing in faulty assumptions, faulty analysis, and faulty use of intelligence. 
The CIA analysts came under strong pressure to align their views with those of Team B. 
Daniel Graham was reported to have told tiie CIA analysts at one point :"I don't want to 
tell you guys you're going to lose your jobs if you don't get on board, but that's the way 
it is".^ The two teams came together for a final meeting on December 2 and 3, 1976 
before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to present their estimates. The 
Team B members were pleased with the outcome, George Keegan reportedly saying that 
he believed that the CIA analysts had shifted 180 degrees as a result of the Team B's 
analysis.^ 
1 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 199. 
2 Ibid. Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 
3 Fred Kaplan, Dubious Specter. A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear 
Threat, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, 1980, p. 13. 
4 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 199. In 1978, the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence reported that "The Composition of the B Team was so 
structured that the outcome of the exercise was predetermined. ... The 
intelligence agencies were cast inaccurately in the role of 'doves'. 
(Richard Barnett, op. cit., p. 57.) 
5 Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
6 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
The Team B analysis was leaked to the press at the end of December. Shortly after this, 
the now retired Major General George Keegan charged that the Soviet Union had already 
achieved military superiority over the United States and was preparing to fight and win a 
war with the United States. "I am unaware of a single important category in which the 
Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States", said Keegan. He 
charged that this condition was brought about by "a failure over the last 15 years to adjust 
American strategic thinking to Soviet strategy, and out of a failure of the leadership of the 
American intelligence community to 'perceive the reality' of the Soviet military build-
up This theme was reiterated by Graham and Van Cleave at a semmar for news 
reporters from the major US news agencies held in January 1977. Van Cleave, 
underscoring the Soviet superiority went on to claim that "I think it's getting to the point 
that if we can make a trade with the Soviet Union of defense establishments, I'd be 
heartily in favor of it". Graham backed Van Cleave up, deriding the lack of US strategy to 
meet the Soviet threat, and making it clear that he would settle for nothing less that 
American superiority. ̂  
George Keegan took this theme yet even further, by claiming that the Soviets were about 
to deploy beam weapons in space. Keegan, was former head of Air Force intelligence, a 
position he had resigned because the Pentagon had not accepted the assessment of his 
Foreign Technology Division regarding Soviet beam weapon development.^ On March 
28, 1977 Aviation Week and Space Technology reported a speech that Keegan had 
made to a group of Washington newsmen under the auspices of the American Security 
Council. Reiterating his claims that the intelligence community in the United States had 
consistendy underestimated the Soviet threat, Keegan claimed that: "If there is a Watergate 
in this country, and there has been, but ignored, it has been monumental incompetent 
judgemental process in this government regarding the nature, character and growth of the 
Soviet threat as it has evolved from year to year".^ One particular area about which 
Keegan was concerned was the supposed development by the Soviets of technologies 
which would "soon neutralize ballistic missile weapons as a threat to the Soviet Union". 
According to Keegan, the Soviets, "on the basis of what I have examined, have every 
expectation that well before 1980, if they don't blow themselves up - and they may - will 
perceive that they have technically and scientifically solved the problem of the ballistic 
missile threat".^ 
1 Ibid., p. 201. 2 Ibid., p. 202. 
3 "Doubts on Soviet Beam Work Dissolve", Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, July 28, 1980, p. 47. 
4 "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat", op. cit., pp. 38-39. 5 Ibid., p. 48. 
On May 2, again in Aviation Week, Keegan expanded upon this theme, outlining the 
weapons which the Soviets were supposed to be developing for BMD. They had, Keegan 
claimed, made a breakthrough in high-energy beam weapons which would soon give 
them the capability to neutralize the entire US ballistic missile force.^ Administration 
officials strongly disputed Keegan's claims. Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown 
said that in his view, and that of all technically qualified people he knew it was "without 
foundation, the evidence does not support the view that the Soviet's have made such a 
breakthrough or indeed that they are very far along in such a direction".^ In reply to a 
letter from Senator William Proxmire, Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, acting Director of the 
DIA, responded that there was "no basis in available evidence to ascribe to the Soviet 
Union success in development of such a weapon"; and that there was no evidence to 
support the claim that "a space borne hydrogen fluoride laser, to be used as a satellite 
killer, is under preparation for test".^ Unperturbed, Keegan continued to press his case, 
in public appearances, numerous newspaper and magazine articles, and on December 17, 
1978 in an appearance on the CBS television programme 60 Minutes. ^ 
The conclusions that Team B came up with were based on three assumptions: that the 
Soviet Union was engaged in a massive military build up; that the Soviets had a 
fundamentally different view of nuclear strategy to that of the United States; and, that the 
Soviet civil defence programme was evidence of their intention to wage and win a nuclear 
war.^ The assumption that the Soviets were engaged in a massive military build up was 
based upon "new evidence", the CIA's revised estimate of Soviet defence spending, 
which claimed to show that the Soviets had increased their military spending from 6-8 
percent to 11-13 percent of GNP.^ The claims made by Team B regarding the Soviet civil 
defence programme were a critical part of their argument. Daniel Graham, referring to 
previous national intelligence efforts, claimed that "the largest factor that caused us to en-
was putting U.S. concepts into Soviet Russian heads", especially the notion that the 
Soviets rejected nuclear war as an option of policy. Team B argued that the Soviets 
1 Morton Kondrake, "The General Goes Zap", The New RepubliCr July 2, 
1977, p. 20. 
2 Harold Brown, quoted in "Brown Comments on Beam Weapons", Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, May 30, 1977, p. 12. 
3 "Beam Weapon Hearings Due in Congress", Aviation Week and Space 
Technologyr May 30, 1977, pp. 17-18. 
4 Barry L. Thompson, "'Directed Energy' Weapons and the Strategic 
Balance", Orbis, Fall 1979, p. 703. 
5 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. c i t . , p. 57; Daniel Graham 
concurs with this view. See Arthur Macey Cox, "Why the U.S, Since 
1977, Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military Strength", The New York 
Times, October 20, 1980, p. 19. 
6 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. c i t . , p. 57. 
rejected the notion of mutual vulnerability, and were aiming for clear nuclear superiority 
so that they could wage and win a nuclear war. According to Graham, the main reason for 
the change in perception of Soviet intentions was, "the discovery of a very important 
[Soviet] civil defense effort - very strong and unmistakable evidence that a big effort is on 
to protect people, industry and to store food".^ 
The Team B interpretation of the data has not gone unchallenged. According to Arthur 
Macy Cox, an ex-CIA analyst. Team B's conclusion was based on a "misinterpretation of 
the facts". The notion that the Soviets had increased their defence spending was actually 
wrong, he argued. The CIA's own explanation for the change in the estimates of Soviet 
defence spending as a percentage of GNP was that: "The new estimate of the share of 
defence in the Soviet [gross national product] is almost twice as high as the 6 to 8 percent 
previously estimated. This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the 
Soviet economy has increased - only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. It 
also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed."^ 
Thus, there had actually been no doubling of the Soviet level of defence spending in 
absolute terms, it was just that the Soviets were being credited with a higher level of 
industrial efficiency than they actually possessed. A CIA report published in January 
1980 concluded that during the period 1970 to 1979, the Soviet defence spending, 
estimated in constant dollars, increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent, that is, at 
about the same rate as the United States.^ 
3.4 THE FIGHT AGAINST WARNKE AND SALT II 
Following on from the Team B report, the next main battie in which the CPD was 
involved was a personal attack against Paul Wamke, who President Carter had nominated 
to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a SALT negotiator. 
Wamke was charged with advocating unilateral disarmament for the United States.^ The 
fight against Wamke's appointment was led by an ad hoc organization known as the 
Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament (ECAUD), which was chaired by 
Daniel Graham. According to Sanders, this coalition "symbolized the growing alliance 
among Cold Warriors like Nitze and Henry Jackson, CDM idealogues like Rostow and 
Podhoretz, hardline dissenters in the intelligence community like Daniel Graham", and the 
1 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
2 Arthur Macey Cox, "Why the U.S. o p . c i t . , p. 19; Arthur Macey 
Cox, "Why the Soviets 'Doubled' Arms Spending", Washington Post, 
August 17, 1980, p.CI. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Richard Barnett, o p . c i t . , p. 59. 
New Right. ̂  With this "potent alliance" behind them, Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze 
teamed up in the Senate Armed Services Committee against Wamke, the objective of their 
campaign being, according to Jackson, to "weaken Wamke as an international negotiator 
to the point of uselessness by holding the vote in his favor to sixty or less", the number of 
votes required to ratify an arms treaty being sixty seven. The coalition's efforts were 
successful, Wamke being confirmed as a SALT negotiator by a vote of only fifty-eight to 
forty in the end.^ 
The third battle waged by the Committee on the Present Danger was the fight over the 
signing and ratification of the SALT 11 Treaty, the CPD joining forces with the Coalition 
for Peace Through Strength, an off-shoot of the American Security Council, to do so. 
(The American Security Council has been referred to by some as the "heart if not the soul 
of the military-industrial complex", being linked to some of the top defence contractors, 
such as Honeywell Corporation, General Electric, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas.) 
Together, they argued that the Soviets were already superior to the United States, that the 
effect of SALT n would be to further tie the hands of the United States, and that the 
SALT treaty represented a failure of nerve on the part of the ruling elite. In 1978, the 
Coalition for Peace Through Strength launched a US$2 million effort to defeat the SALT 
n Treaty. 3 
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength was, according to Sanders, an ad hoc lobby 
styled after the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, which was not 
surprising, as both originated in the American Security Council and the major arms of 
both were headed by Daniel Graham. The Coalition for Peace Through Strength was 
comprised of three different branches, the "congressional" and "private sector" branches, 
and the "auxiliary arm" which carried out the day-to-day lobbying activities. The 
congressional core included such New Right figures as Senator Jake Garn of Utah, 
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, and neoconservatives such as Representative 
Jack Kemp from New York. The "military-industrial" complex was represented by such 
congressional figures such as Richard Ichord (D-Missouri), Samuel Stratton (R-New 
York), and "the preponderance of Southem Rim congressmen who dominated the 
Coalition as representatives of the defense-laden Sun Belt".^ The "auxiliary arm", headed 
by Graham, with fellow Team B members George Keegan and William Van Cleave being 
1 Organizations represented in the coalition included the American 
Conservative Union, National Conservative Political Action Committee, 
Conservative Caucus, Committee For Survival of a Free Congress, Young 
Americans For Freedom, Young Republican National Federation and the 
American Security Council. (Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 208-209.) 
2 Ibid., pp. 208-209; Richard Barnett, op. cit., pp. 50-61. 
3 Richard Barnett, o p . c i t . , p. 60; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 223. 
4 Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 223, 226. 
Co-chairmen, also included fellow CPD members such as Karl Bendetsen, General L. 
Lemnitzer, Clare Booth Luce, Edward Teller and Charles Burton Marshall, and New 
Right figures such as Philip Crane, Phyllis Schlafly and Stefan Possony.^ 
The Committee on the Present Danger weighed into the fight as well, Paul Nitze, alleging 
in November 1977 that the terms of the SALT II agreement, then still under negotiation, 
would enable the Soviets to gain a decisive edge, and lock the United States into a 
"position of inherent inferiority". In support of these claims Nitze released classified 
information conceming the negotiations. Because of the prestigious membership of the 
committee these arguments carried weight, getting wide media exposure and attracting 
congressional attention. From early 1978 right through until the SALT 11 Treaty was 
signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979, the CPD kept up its campaign, churning out 
a barrage of policy papers and press releases and individual members making speeches. 
The message that they carried was that (i) the SALT negotiations and treaties had not 
stopped Soviet expansionism, or altered their goal of world domination; (ii) the SALT 
treaties had not stopped the Soviet drive for military superiority; (iii) as a consequence of 
these first two, by the early to mid-1980's the United States would be unable to deter the 
Soviet Union, as it would be vulnerable to a first strike attack.̂  
The resources that were poured into the campaign against the SALT n Treaty were 
massive. At the CPD's annual meeting in December 1979, Eugene Rostow outlined the 
group's activities in this campaign. This included appearances by CPD Executive and 
Board members on 17 occasions during the hearings on SALT 11 held before the Senate 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees - more than all of the other critics put 
together; a series of comprehensive papers on SALT II written by Paul Nitze; the 
participation of Executive and Board members in some 479 TV and radio programmes, 
press conferences, public forums, briefing conferences of citizen leaders, and major 
speeches; and the distribution of over 200,000 copies of the CPD's publications. The 
committee is reported to have spent some US$750,000 on this campaign, even before the 
treaty was signed.^ 
1 Ibid.r p. 22 6. 
2 Ibid.r pp. 254-257. 
3 The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is reported to have spent 
about US$2.5 million in 1979, the American Security Council some US$3 
million, the Conservative Caucus US$1 million and the American 
Conservative Union around US$1.8 million to defeat SALT II. The ASC is 
reported to have targeted 10 million people in its direct mail 
operation, the Conservative Caucus 5 million, and the American 
Conservative Union 500,000. The Coalition For Peace Through Strength, 
the American Security Council, and the American Conservative Union 
each produced anti-SALT films which received airplay on hundreds of TV 
stations . (Jjbid., pp. 264-265.) 
3.5 THE CPD WORLD VIEW 
The world view espoused by most members of the CPD and the other organizations with 
which the CPD was associated is based on several main premisses, starting from the 
premiss that the Soviet Union is bent on world domination. It goes on: (ii) The Soviets -
who can't be trusted and only sign arms agreements if they act in their favour, and then 
cheat on them anyway - were involved in a massive military build up under the SALT I 
and II treaties, and had forged ahead of the United States, so much so that they were now 
vastly superior, the United States being exposed to a "window of vulnerability", (iii) The 
Soviets, being students of Clausewitz, adhere to a different strategic doctrine than the 
United States, and do not espouse the theory of mutual vulnerability. This was evidenced 
by the fact that the United States exposed its homeland to nuclear devastation, while the 
Soviets had invested heavily in civil and ballistic missile defence, (iv) The United States, 
facing the Soviet threat found itself in very much the same position as Britain, facing the 
German threat at the end of the 1930's. Thus, to follow the course of the arms controllers 
would be tantamount to appeasement and would be taken advantage of by the Soviet 
menace. Instead, the US should move back to the policy of containment, by achieving 
military superiority, and thus needed to embark on a massive military build up. 
The CPD members remained firm in the conviction that the East and West were locked in 
implacable conflict, the Cold War going on ad infinitum . Paul Nitze, when asked in an 
interview how the world of the 1970's differed to that from the early years of the Cold 
War replied that the "basic intentions of the Soviet Union - the drive for expansion and 
global hegemony - remained unchanged".^ Richard Pipes had an explanation for this. He 
claimed that it was because the Russian Revolution had removed from power the Russian 
bourgeoisie and installed in their place the Russian peasant, or muzhik. "And", Pipes 
claimed, "the muzhik had been taught by long historical experience that cunning and 
coercion alone insured survival: one employed cunning when weak, coupled with 
coercion when strong".^ 
Under the policy of detente, and the SALT treaties, it was claimed that the United States 
had pretty much unilaterally disarmed, freezing its ICBM force at 1054 launchers and 
abandoning civil defence, defence against enemy bombers, and ballistic missile defence, 
and watching benignly as the Soviets moved first to parity and then to nuclear superiority 
over the United States. In every category of military power the Soviet Union was claimed 
1 Ibid., p. 161. 
2 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it could Fight and Win 
and Nuclear War", Commentary, p. 26; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 166. 
to have moved relentlessly forward, increasing both the quantity and quality of their 
nuclear weapons each year. During the entire decade of the 1970's the Soviets were 
claimed to have spent some three times as much as the US on defence. The SALT I treaty 
had in no way constrained the Soviets, and the same could be said for SALT 11. On the 
other hand, the SALT treaties had actually held the United States back. The readiness, 
even eagerness on the part of the United States to accept this decline in military power 
was due to the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of MAD, under which overly large 
offensive forces and defences against ICBMs were held to be destabilizing. Thus, a 
"window of vulnerability" had opened on the United States, through which the Soviets 
may well launch an attack. ̂  
It was claimed by the CPD that the Soviets had a different strategic posture to that of the 
United States. According to Nitze: "The Soviet leaders are careful students of Clausewitz 
and his successors and pay much attention to questions of doctrine, strategy and tactics". 
The Soviets were guided in their action by the "careful and continuously updated appraisal 
of what they call the correlation of forces. When the correlation of forces has evolved 
significandy in the Soviet's favor, their doctrine calls upon them to exploit that change to 
nail down permanent gains for their side". This approach was fundamentally different to 
that of the United States.^ According to Pipes, the Soviet approach held that even though 
nuclear war would be extremely destructive for both parties, "its outcome would not be 
mutual suicide: the country, better prepared for it and in possession of a superior strategy 
could win and emerge a viable society".^ The Soviets did not want deterrence but victory, 
not sufficiency in weapons but superiority, not retaliation but offensive action. Pipes 
claimed.^ 
According to Pipes, nothing better illustrated the fundamental difference between the two 
strategic doctrines than their attitudes to defence against nuclear attack. The US theory of 
mutual deterrence mitigated against civil defence programmes, against ballistic missile 
defences and against air defences. The Soviets, he claimed, had only agreed to limitations 
on ABM after they were "unable to solve the technical problems involved and feared the 
United States would forge ahead in this field". Basically it was to hold the United States 
back while the Soviets carried on developments. They had developed anti-aircraft 
defences, continued work on ABM systems, and were developing a serious program of 
civil defence. Pipes claimed. However, the Soviet civil defence program was not 
1 I b i d . , p. 36; Norman Podhoretz, "The Future Danger", Commentary^ 
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exclusively for the protection of ordinary citizens, its chief function being to protect the 
political and military leaders, industrial managers and skilled workers - those who could 
reestablish the Soviet system after the successful prosecution of nuclear war.^ 
The situation that the United States faced in the late 1970's was reminiscent of that faced 
by Britain in the 1930's, Rostow, and many of the other CPD members claimed. "The 
pressure of Soviet policy is increasing steadily, but the perception of the threat in the West 
has been diminishing. This strange psychological phenomenon is the heart of our foreign 
policy problem today", Rostow said.2 According to Podhoretz an "unhealthy pacifism" 
had entered the US since the Vietnam War, similar to that which characterized England of 
the 1920's and 1930's, and there was a danger that the US might surrender to the Soviet 
Union without a war even. (To think of Hitler with nuclear weapons, Podhoretz claimed, 
one need only think of the Russians.) Podhoretz took this theme to the ridiculous by 
arguing that the root cause of this erosion of will was homosexuality.^ Pipes argued that 
when this kind of thinking becomes prevalent, "a nation loses the freedom to act in self-
defense: psychologically, the white flag of surrender is up and sending unmistakable 
signals to the adversary". It would incite the Soviets to "keep on increasing their nuclear 
preponderance, given that the greater their theoretical capability too destroy the United 
States, the louder voices in the United States demanding that accommodation with the 
Soviet Union be made the 'paramount' objective of national policy", he claimed. 
Rather than surrender the members of the CPD counseled that the US should strive to 
reassert military superiority and to reimpose the doctrine of containment militarism. Daniel 
Graham, for one, reflected enthusiastically on the containment doctrine: "The containment 
strategy was the first and last strategy to be devised by the United States or Nato as a 
whole in the post-Worid War 11 period. It operated to the great advantage of the West until 
the late 1960's when it was replaced by a concept which came to be called detente".^ 
Graham didn't agree that "military superiority is not important... if you want to make that 
case, that it doesn't do any good then one has to make the case that it didn't do us any 
good at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and it certainly did us good. And I don't 
think there are many analysts who would believe that if the Cuban missile crisis should 
come off today that the end result would be the same, given today's strategic balance".^ 
1 Ibid.r PP- 33-34. 2 Ibid., p. 161. 
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The CPD called for military superiority at the conventional, tactical and strategic levels of 
warfare. They called for an increase of some US$260 billion in the first five years of the 
1980's to pay for the MX, the Trident 11 submarine, the B-1 Bomber, as well as 
modernization and improvements in the Minuteman system. Nitze argued for: "curing the 
inadequate survivability of our land-based ballistic missiles and enhancing the power of 
those that can be expected to survive, proceeding with the modernization of the 
submarine-based component of our strategic deterrent, replacing our aging B-52's, 
rebasing our bombers at greater distances from the coasts, equipping them with high 
performance cruise and self-defense missiles, and assuring the survivability and 
endurance of our command, control, communication and intelligence".^ 
3.6 LINKS BETWEEN THE CPD AND THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY. 
The ideology of the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' is just that of the Committee 
on the Present Danger. This is not very surprising, as some of the leading members of the 
'space-weapons lobby' were also leading members of the CPD and other closely aligned 
organizations. 
Several members of the 'laser lobby' at least were also members of the CPD or 
organizations which had the same outlook. Both Jake Gam and Jack Kemp were 
members of the Coalition For Peace Through Strength, and Henry Jackson of the 
Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, both of which were set up under 
the auspices of the American Security Council. A number of the members of the 'Madison 
Group' were also members of the CPD: Seymour Weiss, who had been a Team B 
member, Charles Kupperman, William Van Cleave and Richard Perie. Perhaps the 
clearest example of links to the CPD is provided by the High Frontier organization. Daniel 
Graham himself was almost 'Mr. CPD'. He was a member of Team B, was chairman of 
the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, and Co-Chairman of the 
Coalition For Peace Through Strength, as well as being on the Board of Directors of the 
CPD. Karl Bendetsen was also on the Board of Directors of the CPD, as were Frank 
Barnett (President of the National Strategy Information Center), and Edward Teller. 
Bendetsen and Teller were also members of the Coalition For Peace Through Strength. 
From the Hudson Institute, both Donnald Brennan and Colin Gray were on the Board of 
Directors of the CPD.2 
1 I b i d . , pp. 279-280; Paul Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 
1980's", op. clt.f pp. 94-95. 
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Not only was it the case that leading members of the 'space-weapons lobby' were closely 
aligned with the Committee on the Present Danger, but the Reagan Administration was as 
well, Reagan himself joining, and being appointed to its executive committee in January 
1979. All up, during the presidential campaign and the transition process, forty six 
members of the CPD served on Reagan's advisory task force. At the core of this task 
force with responsibility for foreign and military policy were CPD members Richard 
Allen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Van Cleave, Richard Pipes, Daniel Graham and 
Seymour Weiss. After Reagan had been elected, the CPD maintained its influence, with 
some 51 members of Reagan's Administration having served on the Board of Directors of 
the CPD.i 
Thus, it can be seen that the ideology of ballistic missile defense in space is that of the 
Committee on the Present Danger, it is the ideology of American nuclear superiority, the 
ideology of nuclear war fighting, of 'peace through strength' rather than that of peace 
through nuclear disarmament and diplomacy. In 'peace through strength', 'strength' was 
much more important than peace. In many ways, the 'space-weapons lobby' was the 
result of a dispute within the Committee on the Present Danger over just how this military 
superiority could be most effectively gained. On the one side were those like Rostow and 
Nitze who argued that the United States needed to indulge in a massive build-up of 
offensive nuclear weapons with counterforce capabilities. On the other side were the 
members of the 'space-weapons lobby', who argued that the short cut to nuclear 
superiority was to build a defensive shield to effectively disarm the Soviet Union, and to 
harden American resolve to actually use the nuclear weapons that they had. They argued 
that a massive build-up of offensive weapons would be too expensive and would 
eventually lose public support. 
1 Jerry Sanders, op. c i t . , p. 282; Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 
pp. 144-146. 
CH. 4: THE PENTAGON AND THE PUSH FOR BMD 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to the model of the way in which military technology is shaped in the United 
States developed in section 1.2, it would be expected that, given that the proposals being 
put forward by the 'space weapons lobby' were, in a sense revolutionary, the armed 
services would tend to act as a conservative force and attempt to oppose the development 
and deployment of exotic space-based ballistic missile defence systems, or at least to 
integrate these systems within their own frameworks. Certainly both Daniel Graham of 
High Frontier and Malcolm Wallop of the 'laser lobby' realized that they were likely to 
run into stiff opposition from those in the armed services who were intent on protecting 
their own turf. 
Also, with the development of new technologies, there is the potential that interservice 
rivalry will come into play, in this instance between the Army and the Air Force^ who had 
fought a number of bureaucratic battles in the 1950's over the air defence and ballistic 
missile defence missions. By the late 1970's the Army had a ballistic missile defence 
system for the point defence of missile silos based on "conventional" technologies in the 
advanced stage of development. Similarly, the Air Force was preparing to deploy an 
antisatellite system based on 'conventional' technologies. Both the Army and the Air 
Force were conducting research and development programmes on the more exotic beam 
technologies. The technologies used for these two missions were similar and the area of 
space-based defence against ballistic missiles was a potential area of conflict between the 
Army and the Air Force. 
In this chapter I shall consider the development of the antiballistic missile defence mission 
by the Army and the antisatellite mission by the Air Force. Also, I will consider the more 
exotic beam weapon programmes that were being conducted by both the Air Force and the 
Army, to place the development of space-based weapons within their institutional and 
historical context. I shall also consider a major point of overlap between the interests of 
the Air Force and the Army - the basing of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. As 
we have already seen, the MX was considered by most in the 'space weapons lobby' and 
most in the Committee on the Present Danger as being the key to American security. It 
tums out that the fortunes of ballistic missile defence were intimately connected with the 
1 The terms Army and Air Force are used here as a form of short hand. 
It is not meant to imply that they are single actors. The position 
that the Army say takes on a certain issue is the result of a 
bureaucratic struggle between units within the Army. 
basing mode that would eventually be chosen for the MX. Finally, I shall consider the 
way in which the Army and the Air Force reacted to the proposals that were put forward 
by the 'laser lobby' and by High Frontier. 
4.2 THE ARMY AND THE BMD MISSION 
The mission of ballistic missile defence (BMD) has belonged to the US Army from the 
late-1950's, and was a carryover from its air defence mission. Not only has BMD come 
to be considered peculiar to the Army, but it has also served to differentiate the Army 
from the Air Force in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. By the late 1970's the Army 
had established an organization that was responsible for the development of ballistic 
missile defence systems, and had quite a long history of such development. 
In 1945 the Army initiated Project Nike, awarding contracts to Bell Telephone 
Laboratories and Western Electric to develop a system to defend the United States against 
attack by enemy aircraft. This system involved a network of radars linked to computers 
which would track and identify the incoming aircraft and fire surface-to-air missiles which 
would detonate within a lethal radius of the aircraft. In the following decade, the Army 
deployed two such air defence systems, the Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules.^ The Army 
did not have the air defence mission all to itself at this stage though, as the other services 
had also developed air defence systems - the Air Force the Bormac, and the Navy the 
Talos systems. The Army did not take over all the air defence mission until November 
1956, when it was given control of the Navy Talos system and other point defence 
systems with ranges out to 100 nautical miles.^ 
In May 1946, a board of scientists recommended to the Army that it build an ABM 
system.^ However, it was not until about a decade later that the Army acted upon this 
advice. By 1953, the prospect of a Soviet missile force began to loom large and the Army 
asked Bell Telephone Labs to investigate the feasibility of a defence against ICBMs. By 
1956, Bell had concluded that a modified Nike-Hercules system would be able to perform 
this task, and in 1957 the Army established the Nike-Zeus project. The Nike-Zeus BMD 
system consisted of a battery of nuclear-armed interceptor missiles linked to a set of huge 
radars which were used to track the incoming warheads and to guide the interceptors. 
"From that time on", Allison and Morris argue, "the Army consistently advocated 
1 Graham T. Allison & Frederick A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: 
Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons", Daedalusf Vol. 10 4, 
1975, p. 114. 
2 Desmond Ball, "Strategic Defences: Concepts and Programs", Working 
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deployment of a large ABM system to defend the population against a major Soviet 
attack".! 
The Army's determination to push its ABM mission was derived from several factors. 
Firsdy, the ABM mission, embodied within the Nike-Zeus project, was a follow-on from 
the Army's air defence mission which was embodied within Nike-Hercules.^ Secondly, 
during the 1950's the Army had surrendered much of its share of the budget to the Air 
Force and Navy, and had lost out in the competition for control of strategic nuclear 
weapons, the Air Force and the Navy capturing the strategic offensive missions. In 1958, 
the Air Force was given operational control of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's 
Jupiter-C intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Army's hope for a piece of the 
strategic-nuclear action. The Army was limited to only tactical nuclear missiles but 
retained responsibility for ballistic missile defence, perhaps largely because the Air Force 
was not interested in this mission. For the Army ballistic missile defence seemed to be its 
last chance for a strategic nuclear role.^ 
Right from its early days the Army's BMD programme was plagued with trouble. In 1958 
the Pentagon's Reentry Body Identification Group (RBIG), a panel of scientists and 
engineers, concluded that Nike-Zeus simply would not work if confronted with a 
dedicated nuclear attack. If the Soviets were to build a missile fitted with several warheads 
then the ABM system would become "saturated" and would let a number of the warheads 
through. Also, they concluded that it could be defeated with decoys, and that the large 
radars were vulnerable to attack and could be blacked out by atmospheric nuclear blasts. 
Even worse, because the system itself relied on nuclear warheads, it would black itself 
out. These conclusions were reinforced in May 1959, when a panel appointed from 
Eisenhower's Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), prepared a secret report 
on the feasibility of ABM.^ 
The RBIG and the PSAC reports provided a setback to the Army, which was keen to 
move the Nike-Zeus project into production. But it was limited to research and 
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development only. When John Kennedy became President the Army made a "big push" 
for deployment of Nike-Zeus system consisting of seventy missile batteries (7,000 
missiles), to defend twenty-seven areas in the U.S. and Canada. This system was initially 
endorsed by Kennedy's Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, albeit on a smaller scale -
twelve batteries with 1,200 missiles defending six cities. It was thought that the system, 
even though not perfect, would deter the Soviets from launching an attack, and might 
protect the United States from an accidental nuclear attack by the Soviets, and from 
attacks by small nuclear powers such as China. Kennedy, who had been briefed by his 
Science adviser Jerome Wiesner, and by the Director of ARPA Jack Runia - respectively 
the chair of PSAC's 1959 ABM panel and a member of RBIG - had decided, by 
November 1961, against the deployment of Nike-Zeus.^ 
At the same time, the Army was working on a new ABM system called Nike-X, which 
incorporated a "phased-array" radar, and a dual missile system - a long-range missile that 
came to be called Spartan, which could intercept incoming warheads in space, and a 
short-range missile called Sprint, which would intercept warheads once they entered the 
atmosphere, thus making it easier to get around the decoy problem. However, the 
scientists pointed out that the fundamental problems with the system still remained.^ 
Robert McNamara had come to change his mind about the wisdom of ABMs, but there 
was still strong pressure from the Army, from the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff and from 
their powerful allies on Capitol Hill, such as Senators Richard Russell, John Stennis and 
Henry Jackson. Although McNamara found it politically impossible to kill the Nike-X 
project outright, he tried to buy off its advocates by spending up to half a billion dollars a 
year on research and development. By 1966, the Army had been given enough to develop 
an ABM system geared for widespread deployment, and had kept the pressure up, placing 
the President, now Lyndon Johnson in a political bind. Johnson was "torn between the 
arguments of his Secretary of Defense and the judgement of the entire military 
establishment". In mid-1967 he finally ordered McNamara to fund production of the 
Nike-X system. McNamara announced the decision to deploy a limited ABM system -
now called Sentinal - on September 18, 1967, claiming that it was largely to protect 
against the Chinese threat.^ 
McNamara's speech sparked a national debate over ABM, the first shot being fired by 
Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin in an article in the May 1968 edition of Scientific 
American. The article pointed to the problems which had been identified by the RBIG 
1 Ibid., p . 3 4 5 . 
2 Ibid. 
3 ibid.r p p . 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 . 
and PSAC committees, and argued that the offence could counter the defence at lower 
cost. By the summer of 1968, a group of Senators - including Edward Kennedy, William 
Fullbright, Albert Gore, George McGovem, Frank Church, Mark Hatfield and Stuart 
Symmington had teamed up with scientists such as Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, George 
Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Sidney Drell, Wolfgang Panofsky, Jack Runia, and 
George Rathjens (many of whom were members of the 1959 PSAC panel or of RBIG), 
to oppose the Sentinal system, and the prospects for deployment began to look grim.^ 
When Richard Nixon became President, in early 1969, he refocused the ABM debate by 
announcing that the Sentinal ABM system was scrapped, and that a new system called 
Safeguard would be deployed, not to protect cities, but to defend Minuteman silos, a less 
ambitious task. Safeguard was a two tiered layered defence system very much similar to 
the Sentinal system, which would use Sprint and Spartan missiles to intercept the 
incoming warheads.^ By 1971, the Nixon Administration was justifying the Safeguard 
system to Congress mainly for its value as a 'bargaining chip' in the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks that were then in progress with the Soviets. On May 24, 1972, the US 
and the USSR concluded the SALT I Agreement and signed the ABM Treaty, limiting 
each side to two ABM sites of no more than 100 missiles. In 1974 this was further limited 
to one ABM site, and in 1975 the US dismantled its single site altogether,^ 
Even though the deployment of ballistic missile defences had been limited by the 1972 
ABM Treaty, research and development continued throughout the 1970's, with an 
estimated US$250 million being spent per year to develop new systems.'̂  The two 
systems which had gained prominence by the end of the 1970's were known as the Low 
Altitude Defense System (LoADS) and the Homing Overlay system, both of which had 
grown out of the Safeguard system that had been abandoned in the mid 1970's. 
The starting point for the development of LoADS is the Site Defense system which was 
designed primarily for the defence of Minuteman silos and was itself an improvement 
upon the Safeguard system. It differed from Safeguard in that it used small 'multiple 
netted' radars, high-capacity commercial computers, a low-cost version of the Sprint 
endoatmospheric nuclear-armed interceptor, preferential defence firing doctrine and a 
sophisticated discrimination capability. Site Defense was strictly a R&D programme, as it 
was carried out largely after the signing of the ABM Treaty, and was oriented toward 
1 Ibid.r pp. 349-350. 
2 ibid.r p. 350. 
3 Ibid.r p. 354. 
^ Richard Burt, "After Almost a Decade, the ABM Dispute Resumes", New 
York Times, 30 August, 1980, p. 5. 
prototype demonstrations at the Kwajalein Missile Range until Congress terminated it in 
1975.1 The Terminal Defense System (TDS), was, in turn, an outgrowth of the Site 
Defense programme. It seems to have been very much similar to the Site Defense system, 
employing a General Electric phased-array radar linked to a Control Data Corp. 7700 
computer which ran complex software developed by TRW Systems. It was designed to 
intercept incoming warheads at an altitude of 200,000 feet and to have a detection to 
impact time of 15 seconds. Validation work on TDS was scheduled to be completed by 
the end of 1980.^ The LoADS system was an improvement upon the TDS system, 
designed to intercept warheads below 50,000 feet and to have a detection to impact time 
of less than 10 seconds. Its phased array radar is about one-fortieth the size of the TDS 
radar and it has a single stage interceptor half the size of the TDS interceptor.^ 
The LoADS system was designed to operate in conjunction with the Multiple Protective 
Shelter (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile. The system would employ a single-stage 
interceptor missile about 15 feet long armed with a nuclear warhead which, using an 
internal guidance system and a terminal homing sensor, would travel at hypersonic speeds 
to intercept nuclear warheads at altitudes below 50,000 feet. A small phased array radar in 
a capsule would be used in conjunction with the interceptor missile, and whenever the 
MX missiles were moved, the interceptor missiles and their accompanying radars would 
also be moved. ̂  Martin-Marietta, which had developed the Sprint interceptor for the 
Safeguard system was to design the smaller, single-stage interceptor for LoADS. 
McDonnell Douglas, which served as the Safeguard system integrator was to serve as the 
system integrator for LoADS as well.^ Beyond this system, the Army was also working 
on optics technology for terminal homing and non-nuclear warhead applications but, 
because of the speed of the interceptor within the atmosphere, the technology was, at the 
end of tiie 1970's, beyond tiie state of the art.^ 
In the early 1980's, the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command had plans to 
demonstrate a pre-prototype LoADS system by the mid-1980's. The House Armed 
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Services Committee, in a report released in early 1980, gave the LoADS plan a strong 
endorsement and urged the Army to expedite the programme. According to the House 
committee, the Department of Defense needed to structure a BMD programme that would 
"produce a demonstrated BMD capability that can be deployed in a time-frame responsive 
and reactive to the [Soviet] threat". In the committee's view, the length of time then 
needed to deploy an effective BMD system was excessive.^ The Army requested US$36 
million in FY 1981 with which to start the development of the technology for LoADS and 
projected that it would need about US$92 million for the program in FY 1982.2 
In the 1960's the Army, under the Homing Interceptor Technology (HIT) project, funded 
the Vought Corporation to develop a non-nuclear interceptor missile which was initially 
conceived as an antisatellite weapon. The Army's programme in the 1970's to develop a 
new exoatmospheric interceptor was based partly on this HIT programme, and partly on 
the Spartan interceptor which formed part of Safeguard.^ Safeguard's exoatmospheric 
system used ground-based radars and so it was not possible to discriminate effectively 
between the incoming nuclear warheads and its accompanying booster fragments and 
decoys. This required the Spartan missile to have a nuclear warhead. The new approach 
sought to overcome these limitations by substituting electro-optical sensors in space for 
the radar. This, in tum, meant that non-nuclear interceptors could be used.'̂  
The Homing Overlay programme was conducted by the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense 
Systems Command under the Systems Technology Program (STP), with Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Company acting as the prime contractor. The interceptor was to 
consist of the first two stages of a modified US AF/Boeing Minuteman booster and a third 
reaction-controlled homing and kill stage. The interceptor was to carry an infrared sensor 
made by Honeywell, on-board data processing, and a non-nuclear kill device made by 
Lockheed, that resembled a folded umbrella. An alternative non-nuclear kill interceptor, 
designed to eject metal pellets to produce concentric circles was also being developed by 
Honeywell.^ Before the Homing Overlay interceptor was launched an electro-optical 
sensing device would be launched into space to acquire and track the incoming warheads. 
This "ballistic trajectory probe vehicle" would be linked to a ground control centre which 
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would control the launch of the exoatmospheric interceptors. The technology for this 
probe was being developed by Boeing and Hughes Aircraft under the Designating Optical 
Tracker (DOT) programme.^ 
The Homing Overlay system was considered to have a greater degree of technical risk 
than the LoADS system, as it employed newer, yet-to-be-proved technology. It was being 
developed to complement the LoADS system, and could be deployed with LoADS in a 
two-tiered layered defence system. While LoADS was considered to be suitable for the 
defence of MX missiles, layered defence was considered to be suited to the defence of 
"softer" military targets, such as SAC bases.^ In addition to LoADS and Homing 
Overlay, the Army also had a programme known as "Quick Shot" which aimed to develop 
a small, relatively inexpensive hypervelocity missile for possible use in a "salvo-fired" 
very-low-altitude terminal defence system,^ 
The Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (BMDA) seems to have played a major role 
in pushing for the development and deployment of its LoADS and Homing Overlay BMD 
systems. Starting in 1978, the BMDA began conducting a series of seminars in 
Washington. These seminars were attended by officials from the Pentagon and State 
Department, consultants from a variety of defence think tanks and aides to key Senators 
and members of Congress. Not surprisingly, the seminars were described as having "a 
definite pro-ABM slant" by one of the congressional aides who attended. One of the 
BMDA seminars, held in the Madison Hotel in Washington on September 18-19, 1979, 
was tided "The Future of U.S. Land-Based Strategic Forces". The 60 or so participants 
were treated to a series of conservative defence speakers on the US and Soviet forces 
concluding with a presentation on "BMD's role in national survival, a first assessment".^ 
The Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Command was also involved in a number of 
research and development projects on particle-beams and high-energy laser weapons. 
These programmes were funded at a much lower level than LoADS and Homing Overlay, 
and their technologies were at a much less advanced stage of development. In 1981, the 
responsibility for the particle-beam projects was shifted from the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Agency (BMDA) to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), but the 
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BMDA remained as the agent for DARPA in contracting and maintaining particle beam 
technology work, and as a technical adviser.̂  
There were two particle-beam programmes which were transferred to DARPA. First, was 
an "autoresonant accelerator" designed to produce charged-particle beams of high-energy 
ions for use in the point defence of missile silos.2 Second, was the "White Horse" 
programme at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which aimed to produce a neutral 
hydrogen beam by accelerating a beam of negative hydrogen ions using a "radio 
frequency quadropole linear accelerator", and passing this beam through a charge-
exchange cell. Under the programme, a 5-MeV test stand accelerator was being 
constructed initially, followed by an advanced accelerator test stand operating between 50 
and 100-MeV. In 1981, it was being predicted that, if successful, this programme would 
enable scaling to 500-MeV and packaging of the accelerator for space-basing providing a 
"neutral-beam weapon for ballistic missile defense in the 1990's".^ Funding cuts in 1980 
delayed the construction of the "White Horse" test accelerator for about two years as 
DARPA had a commitment to the Triad chemical laser programme, and the Navy's "Chair 
Heritage" particle beam programme.̂  
The Army was also involved with three laser weapon programmes. First was a tin-oxide 
chemical laser, being developed by Bell Aerospace. Approximately US$250,000 per year 
was being devoted to this project with a demonstration planned for 1983. Second was an 
electric-discharge eximer laser being developed by Westinghouse, which used xenon-
fluoride gas as the lasing medium and an x-ray source to start the process. Some 
US$300,000 per year was being devoted to this project in the early 1980's. Third was a 
colspan vibrational electric transition laser device in which an electron beam was used to 
'pump' a gaseous mixture of nitrous oxide and a cyanogen to produce the laser beam. 
This project was being funded at approximately US$250,000 per year.̂  
4.3 THE MX MISSILE BASING DEBATE AND BMD 
The MX missile evolved from the Strat-X study begun in 1967 and was conceived as a 
mobile ICBM to supplement the fixed silo-based missiles. Development of the MX began 
in 1972 but over $120 million was spent prior to that time looking at various schemes for 
basing the mobile missile. By 1974, a wide spectrum of possible basing modes existed. 
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ranging from road and rail mobile basing, to basing in shelters and trenches, and 
extending to waterproof missile pods on the bottoms of ponds and reservoirs as well as 
missiles in blimps and dirigibles. The basing of MX missiles in large transport planes was 
also considered a viable option, a demonstration launch of a Minuteman missile taking 
place in 1974.i Most of these concepts were rejected before being subjected to detailed 
cost-effectiveness analysis. ̂  
By the late 1970's four basing modes for the MX remained as strong contenders - a 
buried trench system, an air mobile system, a system of vertical multiple protective 
structures (MPS), and a system of horizontal MPS.^ The Air Force was directed to make 
a detailed study of the buried trench concept in October 1976. In this basing mode, 300 
MX missiles would be deployed in concrete-enclosed trenches hardened to 200 psi and 
covered with five feet of earth - some 42 feet wide, 21 feet deep, and 10-12 mñes long -
along which the mdssile's Transporter/Launcher would travel at random. The Pentagon 
planned to construct these trenches in the Southwest United States where there is an 
abundance of desert area and where they expected less resistance from environmental 
groups.^ A cheaper version of this scheme was the hybrid trench in which there would be 
one main trench of minimum hardness from which 20-25 hardened spurs would break 
off. The missile would be based in one of these spurs.^ This scheme was dropped by the 
Air Force in November 1977 because it was considered that it would be too easy for the 
Soviets to destroy, it would be too expensive, and because test results had not been 
encouraging.^ 
The Pentagon began a new study, and in May of 1978 vertical shelters emerged as the 
favourite scheme, firstly known as Multiple Aim Point (MAP), but eventually known as 
Multiple Protective Structure (MPS). The Air Force Space and Missiles Systems 
Organization (SAMSO) and the MX Basing Ad Hoc Working Group of the Air Force 
Systems Command conducted studies in 1978 which concluded that 200 MX missiles 
could be deployed in some 4,500 vertical shelters each one hardened to 600 psi and 
spaced about 7,000 feet apart. The shelters would be sited in the Great Basin of Nevada 
and Utah, and the highlands of Arizona and New Mexico, at an estimated cost of US$30 
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billion. The Air Force recommended to the Secretary of Defense in December 1978 that 
such a system be built and be operational by 1986.̂  
In early 1979 the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) directed the Air 
Force to review a number of air-mobile concepts, as well as further refining the vertical 
MPS concept. The review study which the Air Force presented to the Secretary of 
Defense on 31 March 1979 involved the acquisition of between 210 and 290 wide-body 
jets or short-take-off-and-landing transports. Each of these aircraft, containing an MX 
missile, would be stationed at one of five principal Air Force bases. During a missile 
alert, the aircraft would become airbome or be shutded among some 4,500 small airports. 
This concept was pushed throughout the spring of 1979 by the President's Science 
Adviser and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, but was eventually rejected 
because it was more expensive than the ground mobile concepts and because of certain 
technical problems and operational risks. ̂  
The fourth system, the horizontal MPS system, although never as comprehensively 
analysed as the altematives, was the one eventually chosen on 5 September 1979, at a full 
meeting of the National Security Council presided over by President Carter. A decision 
was made to begin full engineering development of the system.^ The so-called 'race track' 
system consisted of 200 closed-loop roads (one for each missile) with each having 23 
spurs leading into horizontal shelters hardened to 600 psi and spaced approximately 7000 
feet apart. The MX missile would be carried horizontally in its launch canister (some 120 
feet long and 12 feet in diameter) on a transporter-erector-launch vehicle (TEL), a six-
axle, 24 wheeled vehicle which would weigh 670,000 pounds. In addition the TEL 
would carry a 140,000 pound 'modesty shield', designed to prevent satellite observation 
of the missile canister and its placement in any particular shelter. The missile loops were 
to be located in southem Utah and Nevada.^ 
The Air Force was not in favour of the horizontal MPS system arguing that it was less 
survivable than its preferred vertical MPS mode. The NSC opted in favour of the 
horizontal basing mode because, argues Ball, of two considerations. Firstly, the NSC 
staff wanted to ensure that there would be no infringement "of the principles regarding 
either ICBM mobility of national technical means of verification ... that had been 
negotiated in SALT". They were concerned that the Soviet reconnaissance satellites might 
1 Ibid., p. 59; R.C. Aldridge, op. c i t . , p. 107. 
2 R.C. Aldridge, op. c i t . , p. Ill; D. Ball, "The MX Basing Decision", 
op. c i t . , p. 59. 
3 D. Ball, "The MX Basing Decision", op. c i t . , p. 58. 
4 Ibid., p. 60; R.C. Aldridge, op. cit., p. 109. 
not be able to properly verify that an empty silo did not contain a missile. Secondly, the 
horizontal MPS system had greater mobility than the vertical system and would be less 
vulnerable. 1 Under the vertical shelter system, it would take one hour just to lower a 
missile into its silo, and about two days to relocate the entire MX force. Under the race 
track proposal, the missiles could be driven straight into their shelters, and the entire 
missile force could be relocated in 12 hours. In the event of a nuclear attack in which the 
shelter containing the MX missile was targeted, it would be possible with the race track 
system to 'dash' the MX missile to an untargeted shelter.^ 
Another possibility for MX basing was the use of ballistic missile defence to protect the 
MX missiles in their shelters. This option was considered by the Carter Administration, 
but it was not preferred because such a system would have abrogated the 1972 ABM 
Treaty. In a statement in February 1979, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, William Perry, indicated that: "Ballistic missile defense is limited by the 
ABM Treaty, which allows the use of only 100 interceptors. Abandonment of the ABM 
Treaty would introduce a number of new problems, even if it eased our concerns about 
ICBM vulnerability".^ Perry added that the US did maintain a "high technological level" 
in BMD capability which may, in future "provide an enhanced survivability posture for 
our ICBM force"bu t pointed out at a later date that BMD would only be an option that 
would be considered "in a virtually incredible all-out arms race".^ 
Right from the start. Carter's race track basing proposal ran into problems. As already 
mentioned, massive opposition to this basing mode arose in both Utah and Nevada. In 
March 1980, Governors Scott Matheson (Utah) and Robert List (Nevada) came out 
jointly against the deployment of MX in their states. They objected to the impact of the 
MX project on the "water supply, grazing and pasture land, and the area's fragile 
ecostructure, as well as the violation of the sacred lands of the Shoshone Indians and the 
inability of the area to absorb a large influx of people".® The Defense Department 
considered resiting the race track system in the southem high plains area of West Texas 
and New Mexico. However, this area was far less desirable because the land was made 
up "almost entirely of small, privately owned lots, a factor that would engage the 
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department in lengthy, and potentially costly, negotiations. The great basin of Utah and 
Nevada consists of public lands''.^ 
On May 6,1980, Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown, responding to the opposition 
to the MX basing plan, announced that the closed loop race track had been replaced by a 
linear race track system. There would still be the same number of missiles and shelters but 
the spurs to those shelters would now branch off of existing country roads. This would 
use less land and eliminate the need for additional road constmction. A new shelter design 
was also adopted - the so-called "loading dock" concept. Rather than having a complete 
TEL drive into the shelter, only the erector-launcher system containing the missile would 
be off-loaded. The transporter would also provide the necessary shielding, eliminating the 
need for a shield vehicle and making the shelters smaller since they did not have to 
accommodate the transporter.^ 
During 1980, yet another MX basing plan was being hatched, this time at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in New Mexico. Early in 1980 Senator Pete Domenici, Chair of the 
Budget Committee had asked the Los Alamos Lab to examine the prospects for BMD 
technology. The Los Alamos study, released in June 1980 is reported to have concluded 
that: "ballistic missile defenses could play a timely and vital role in national strategic 
policy". If the Army's LoADS system were combined with the homing overlay system , 
the study concluded, even a large-scale Soviet nuclear strike could be .neutralized.^ 
Donald Kerr, Director of Los Alamos, and Robert Kupperman, echoing the Los Alamos 
study team proposed that "MX launchers be built and placed in existing Minuteman silos; 
that a fraction of these launchers have nuclear payloads as their front ends; and that the 
remainder be outfitted with ... anti-ballistic missile payloads. The ICBM force could be 
further defended by a localized missile defense, known as LoADS, intended to destroy 
Soviet warheads which had leaked through the initial defense".'' This concept apparently 
appealed to Republican Senators such as Paul Laxalt (Nevada), who was very close to 
Reagan, and to Domenici.^ 
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In early 1981, the need for an ABM system to protect the MX missile in the MPS basing 
mode was being discussed in the Senate. This discussion focussed on three questions: the 
vulnerability of the MX missile; if vulnerable, whether or not the LoADS system should 
be added to protect the MX; whether the LoADS system could be used "to lessen the 
impact on Nevada and Utah" of the race track basing mode, "by providing defense of MX 
missiles in existing" Minuteman silos; and, whether or not the Senate was willing to forgo 
the ABMTreaty.i 
When the Reagan Administration came to power it inherited the MX basing debacle. This 
administration was opposed to President Carter's basing plan but had a very strong 
commitment to the MX missile and was desperate to find a solution to the basing 
problem. The Reagan Administration did not have the same commitment to arms control 
that the Carter Administration had, so ballistic missile defence became a more serious 
contender as a complement to any MX basing mode. At first the Reagan Administration 
gave only a lukewarm response to the use of LoADS to protect the MX missile. When 
Senator Proxmire wrote to Caspar Weinberger during his confirmation hearings asking 
about his plans to use HMD to protect the MX, Weinberger responded that he believed 
that "we must look very carefully at ABM technology. An effective ABM system may be 
needed in the event the Soviets increase substantially the number of their hard target-kill 
capable warheads. If we were to achieve a significant breakthrough in the ABM area, we 
might - after extensive study - be able to deploy MX in fixed silos protected by ABM".2 
When Reagan sent his revised defense budget to Capitol Hill in early March 1981 it 
included a US$129 million increase in spending for ABM development.^ 
In the early days of the Administration the Pentagon began pushing Weinberger to 
reactivate the abandoned ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Seymour Zeiberg, 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Space and Strategic Systems and a number of his 
fellow strategists, devised a plan to deploy 70 long range and 30 short range missiles to 
protect the Air Force warning radar at Concrete, North Dakota, They argued to 
Weinberger, and to some members of Congress in a secret briefing, that the radar at 
Concrete was so vital that it was worth protecting, and further that such a deployment 
would help to focus the Pentagon's currentiy diverse ABM research programme. This 
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could be done without abrogating the 1972 ABM treaty. Weinberger said at the time that 
he was "not leaning any way" on the proposal, but "certainly considering it".^ 
On July 1, 1981, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger appointed a 15-member "blue 
ribbon" panel. Chaired by University of California physicist Charles Townes, to study 
alternative basing modes for the MX missile.^ This panel examined many ideas for basing 
the MX, including the Carter plan, but came to the conclusion "that virtually every idea 
was flawed, because the Soviets could build warheads of sufficient power and in 
sufficient quantity to destroy almost any land-based target".^ The panel was in unanimous 
agreement that basing MX missiles aboard airplanes and basing them deep underground 
were the two most promising alternatives, but argued that an interim basing mode was 
necessary. The interim mode suggested was a variation on the Carter plan and resembled 
the plan put forward by the Los Alamos team in 1980.Supporters of this plan were 
concerned that the Air Force, who preferred a mobile land-based plan, should not be 
upset. The main idea was not to let the missile itself disappear while the new basing 
altematives were being examined.^ 
The Air Force pushed strongly to undermine the two alternative basing modes and thus 
improve the chances for its preferred basing mode, keeping the chances for the Army's 
BMD programme alive. The air basing idea consisted of placing the MX missiles aboard a 
huge aircraft - known as Big Bird - which was to be constructed largely of plastic 
reinforced with carbon fibres and powered by propeller engines. It was to get such good 
fuel economy that it could stay aloft for more than three days, even while carrying up to 
two missiles. The Townes panel sought independent confirmation of this proposal and 
asked for a study by the Department of Defense. Weinberger directed this study to 
DARPA, who had already rejected the idea once before. After less than a week the 
DARPA panel, basing its work on an analysis undertaken by the Air Force, concluded 
that Big Bird would weigh more than predicted, need a larger crew and would therefore 
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obtain poorer mileage. The Townes panel would not accept this conclusion and awarded a 
US$240,000 contract to Boeing to review the proposal. Not surprisingly, the Boeing 
study team came to the conclusion that Big Bird was both technically and economically 
feasible.^ 
The Air Force was far from pleased. Air Force commanders contacted senior Boeing 
officials and asked that the results of the Boeing study be checked. Boeing, which had an 
Air Force MX contract for US$1.5 billion, and stood to gain another US$8.5 billion in 
follow-up contracts, ordered that the conclusions of the study be "audited". The audit 
concluded that the performance of Big Bird was more uncertain than it seemed before. 
Also, the Air Force, in July 1981, directed the Air Force Science Advisory Board to 
review Big Bird. This panel found that Big Bird was not ready for engineering 
development.2 
Two forms of underground basing were proposed. Firstly, missiles would be placed in 
buoyant canisters, which were lowered into narrow holes 3000-5000 feet deep, and then 
covered with sand. After a nuclear attack, the sand would be saturated with water from a 
storage tank buried alongside, and the missile would, supposedly, rise to the surface by 
pushing its way up through the wet sand. The second concept - the "mesa/tunnel" plan -
was very much similar to the race track proposal except that everything would be hidden 
about 3000 feet underground in an enormous outcropping of rock somewhere in the 
West. In the event of a nuclear attack, the missile canisters would burrow their way to the 
surface, and release their missiles. The Air Force was strongly opposed to this plan as 
well. Deep underground systems in one form or another had been considered and rejected 
at least 9 times in 20 years, and there was little enthusiasm for another look.^ 
When the Townes Panel met with Weinberger they persuaded him that some short-term 
basing plan was necessary to keep the MX missile alive in Congress, otherwise it might 
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be canceled or deferred. Weinberger was reported to be intrigued by both the Big Bird 
and deep underground basing proposals. Even though many in the Reagan Administration 
were reported to favour the interim basing scheme proposed by the Townes panel, it did 
not find favour with Weinberger or Reagan, and Weinberger suggested instead that in the 
interim the MX be put aboard modified Air Force cargo planes. The Air Force and its 
allies on Capitol Hill lobbied against this proposal vigorously and it was soon dropped.^ 
While the Reagan Administration was grappling with how best to base the MX missile the 
Army's BMDA continued to push its case, and support for BMD seemed to be growing. 
Some in the Reagan Administration began to look at how the ABM Treaty might be 
modified to allow for BMD systems. In the first half of 1981 both the Pentagon and the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were reported to have studies under way on how 
they could modify the ABM Treaty. In March 1981, the BMDA awarded a US$224,000 
contract to Science Applications Inc., a Virginia-based think tank to conduct a "qualitative 
and quantitative analysis" on the ABM Treaty and to recommend options.^ 
In mid 1981, Weinberger seems to have started considering the BMD more seriously, 
directing one of three Defense Science Board (DSB) meetings in the summer of 1981 to 
conduct a study of "what kind of ABM we could have by the mid or late 1980's", looking 
specifically at the technologies developed by the Army's BMDA, and another approach 
being pushed in the Pentagon at the time to use a Navy Aegis early warning radar system 
with the Sprint ABM.^ When the DSB met with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, Richard DeLauer, on Friday 14th August, 1981 they 
recommended that the Reagan Administration go ahead with the land-based shelter 
scheme for deploying the MX missile, as strong opposition to the air-mobile idea had 
been expressed by the Air Force, and by key members of the Senate and House 
committees. Also, the DSB members were reported to have urged the development and 
ultimate deployment of a BMD system to protect the land-based MX missile. However, 
Weinberger and Reagan remained firm in their opposition to the race track scheme, in the 
face of the mounting resistance in Utah and Nevada against it, which had recentiy been 
joined by the Mormon Church.^ Although Reagan and Weinberger did not yet seem to be 
convinced of the need for BMD to protect the MX missile, Richard DeLauer was. He 
hinted in August 1981 that should Reagan decide to build a scaled-down MX missile in 
1 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reagan's Plan for MX op. cit., p. 151.; R. 
Jeffrey Smith, "Air Force Takes Aim op, cit., p. 270. 
2 Walter Pincus, "U.S. Eyeing ABM Pact for Changes to Allow Tests of 
Mobile System", op. cit., p. 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 "Key defense advisory panel said to back land basing of MX", 
Baltimore Sun, 16 August 1981, p. 3. 
Nevada it was highly likely that the Pentagon would step up the development of ABM 
interceptors.^ 
On October 2, 1981 President Reagan announced an new basing plan.^ As explained by 
Weinberger, Reagan's new basing scheme was twofold: The first 36 missiles would be 
placed in the silos vacated by Titan n missiles, and hardened to 5000 psi. Then by 1984 
decide among three options for deployment of the remaining 64 missiles in 1988-89. The 
primary options were: air-basing, deep-underground deployment, and an ABM defence of 
silo based missiles. Weinberger at this stage was still plugging for air-basing.^ The 
interim basing decision was one of expediency. As Richard DeLauer put it: "We had to 
put it somewhere or put it in a warehouse. There was no survivable basing scheme we 
could count on right now and so what we said was we'll put 'em in existing holes''.^ It 
soon became obvious however that this decision was "a product of substantial technical 
and political miscalculation". It was discovered that the geology near the Titan silos was 
unsuitable for superhardening to 5000 psi, and that the silo modifications would conflict 
with the unratified SALT II Treaty.^ The Department of Defense announced on 31 
December 1981 its decision to deploy the MX in Minuteman silos instead. This decision 
"gave approval to a USAF recommendation for the interim basing mode".^ 
The Department of Defense established an executive committee to oversee a coordinated 
USAF MX basing/ Army BMD programme. The new basing scheme required a slight 
change of plan: the LoADS endoatmospheric system was now being called underlay, and 
was redesigned to defend the MX in Minuteman silos. It drew heavily on the technology 
developed for LoADS but the interceptor missiles for the underlay plan were required to 
be larger to achieve an extended range and velocity."^ Even though it was now being 
considered publicly as an option for MX basing, the Reagan Administration was reported 
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to be unwilling to commit itself to BMD because of uncertainties over cost and 
effectiveness.^ 
Under pressure from Senator Tower and others in Congress who had publicly backed the 
Carter plan, the Pentagon, two months after Reagan's decision, said that MPS would be 
explored "as an option within the BMD program". The managers of the BMD programme 
were reported to be "busily hatching schemes" to shuffle the MX among a series of 
shelters. These schemes were supposed to be different from the Carter plan in that BMD 
was to be incorporated from the start rather than added on later and less land and fewer 
shelters would be used.^ In fact, even though the Administration was not publicly 
promoting BMD, that it was emerging as the frontrunner among the three choices was 
evident from the level of funding that it was attracting. Early in 1982 the Pentagon 
proposed doubling the annual budget for BMD research to just short of one billion 
dollars. The competing basing options such as Big Bird were to only receive one-tenth of 
this amount, even though they were at a much less mature stage of development. The 
BMD proposal had quite strong support. Firstiy, there was Senator Tower. Secondly, 
General David Jones, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had said after Reagan's 
announcement that he still thought the Carter plan "was both affordable and would be 
survivable". And thirdly, General Lewis Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff, who said 
"that Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger failed to grasp the merits of the Carter 
plan despite his ... concerted efforts to sell it to them".^ 
Reagan's new basing scheme ran into trouble in March 1982, when Senator John Tower, 
Chair of the SASC, announced that his committee would eliminate funds for the 
production of the MX missile for FY 1983 to save the Administration from an ineffective 
basing scheme, and thus to save the MX missile program from possible oblivion. A 
SASC subcommittee voted 9-0 to delete US$1.5 billion for production of nine MX's in 
FY 1983 and another US$200 million for work on temporarily basing MX in Minuteman 
silos. They voted to require the Pentagon to select by December 1, 1982 a permanent 
"survivable" basing plan that could be rushed to completion earlier than 1989.^ The 
Pentagon publicly expressed disappointment at the decision of Tower's committee and 
complained that it would not be able to come up with a new basing mode in time. 
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Privately Pentagon officials were reported to hold fears that the President's plan was in 
danger of defeat.^ 
With the collapse of the latest basing scheme, the Air Force began to study a new land-
basing scheme known as the MX Deceptive Dense Pack Basing Concept - Dense Pack for 
short - and BMD became even more likely to become an option. Under Dense Pack, the 
100 MX missiles would be based in Wyoming and deployed in silos - superhardened to 
15,000 psi - and spaced 1,800 feet apart in alternating rows of two and threes that would 
stretch in nearly 14 mile north-south columns. The missiles would be rotated among the 
silos and would be protected at the periphery by BMD interceptors. The aim of Dense 
Pack was to aggravate Soviet accuracy and timing by forcing such close targeting that 
incoming warheads would be destroyed or deflected by radiation blast waves and debris 
from prior exploding warheads, a phenomenon known as "fratricide". It was thought that 
Dense Pack would be easier to sell because the missile fields would take up a relatively 
small area and so could be sited in existing military bases.^ 
There was a possibility that this basing mode would be susceptible to a Soviet "pin down 
attack", whereby the Soviets would detonate nuclear warheads outside the earth's 
atmosphere to produce nuclear radiation and electromagnetic pulses that would prevent the 
launch of the MX missiles. It was argued that such an attack could be prevented using a 
BMD system which could intercept the warheads in space before they exploded. The 
Pentagon was reported to be considering the Homing Overlay system for this.^ 
Ballistic missile defence was starting to gain favour both in and outside the 
Administration. In August 1982, Senator Tower announced that he thought that "ballistic 
missile defense is going to be essential regardless of the basing system" for the MX, a 
view he said that was shared by most of the members of the SASC. He added that it 
would not bother him if the US had to scrap or modify the existing ABM treaty.^ 
Weinberger too seemed to be starting to favour BMD. He said, in October 1982, an ABM 
system "would enhance any system's survivability", and that if it came "down to a 
question of whether or not the most effective method of deploying MX requires some 
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kind of revision in the treaties or something of that sort, I would suppose that we would 
look at the way in which the treaties might be revised rather than give up the most 
effective way of deploying it".^ 
President Reagan announced his new MX basing scheme - Dense Pack, which involved 
100 MX missiles, spaced 1,800 feet apart over 20 square miles of Warren Air Force Base 
in Wyoming - in early December 1982. Before the end of the month this scheme too had 
be rejected. Reagan's treasured MX missile was in real trouble. Not only was the freeze 
movement gaining support in Congress, but also many members of Congress had come 
to believe that defence spending needed to be cut sharply to reduce the federal deficit - the 
MX, costing billions of dollars, would be a prime place to start. In January, Reagan set 
up yet another "blue ribbon" committee to try and find a solution to the MX basing 
problem, this one called the Strategic Weapons Commission and headed by Brent 
Scrowcroft, a retired Air Force general and former head of the NSC. In April 1983, this 
commission recommended basing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos in 
Wyoming. 2 
The issue of the basing mode for the MX missile serves to illustrate the complexity of the 
weapons development process. Space-based or land-based BMD systems cannot be 
viewed as a weapons system in isolation. The future of ballistic missile defence was 
linked to the basing mode chosen for the MX missile. Thus, the factors that were shaping 
the basing mode for the MX were, indirectiy, also shaping ballistic missile defence. One 
important factor here was the Air Force, which preferred a mobile land-basing mode for 
the MX. The Air Force seems to have formed an alliance with the Army over this, and 
together they actively worked through Congress to push MPS with LoADS and Homing 
Overlay as the preferred basing mode and to undermine the alternatives. They were helped 
in this endeavour with allies on Capitol Hill, such as Senator John Tower. Another 
important factor shaping the MX basing mode were environmental, Indian and farming 
groups, and the Morman Church in Utah and Nevada, who rose up in opposition to the 
race track basing mode in their state. These groups, linked to national environmental and 
groups, were able to apply so much pressure to the government that it was forced to 
modify the basing plan. Also important was the wider political context, particularly in the 
form of the Administration that was in power. The Carter Administration was in favour of 
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detente and arms control, and so did not consider BMD as a serious option for MX 
basing. The Reagan Administration had much less of a commitment to arms control and 
was prepared to abrogate the ABM Treaty if necessary. This meant that the chances for 
ballistic missile defence were much greater. 
4.4 THE A m FORCE AND BMD 
The Air Force programme to develop a direct ascent non-nuclear antisatellite (ASAT) 
missile had its origins in Project SPIKE which began in the early 1970's, and was itself 
based on research on non-nuclear kill mechanisms carried out in the 1960's. In April 
1971 the USAF's Air Defense Command proposed the development of an air-launched 
missile for use as an antisatellite weapon. The initial proposal was to use a modified 
AGM-78 anti-radar missile which would be launched from an F-106 fighter. The Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) conducted an assessment of 
this proposal, and, although favourable, the project only received low levels of funding. ̂  
In 1975 the Air Force was reported to be beginning a three-year project to develop a small 
ground- or air-launched ASAT weapon that would employ a Miniature Homing Vehicle 
(MHV) to home in on a target satellite using a long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) sensor 
and destroy it by direct impact. At this stage, three companies - Rockwell International, 
Vought, and General Dynamics - were competing in the development project organized by 
SAMSO. Rockwell seems to have been eliminated, leaving the competition to General 
Dynamics and a team of contractors led by Vought and including Boeing and Hughes.^ 
The designs by General Dynamics and Vought were reviewed by the Office of Defense 
Research and Engineering, and the Air Force Space Division, and Vought was finally 
awarded the prime contract, worth initially US$58.7 million, in September 1977. The 
design put forward by Vought drew heavily on earlier Army-sponsored work undertaken 
by them under Project 922 on a direct-ascent infrared guided honing vehicle for ballistic 
missile defence.3 
The Air Force did not setde on the development of an air-launched missile for the 
Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) until the end of 1978, the launching of MHVs from 
ground-based ICBMs, and launching from orbiting satellites also being considered as 
alternatives. These alternatives were considered to be less flexible than the air-launched 
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system, ground-based systems in particular suffering from weather and geographical 
constraints.^ As well as the MHV approach, work towards a space-based laser AS AT 
system was being undertaken at the USAF Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force 
Base, however it was not envisaged that such a system would be operational until well 
into the 1990's. At this stage it was considered that such a system would require technical 
advancements well beyond the state-of-the-art, especially in the areas of surveillance, and 
command and control systems. ̂  
By mid-1980, the Air Force's AS AT missile programme was being described as 
"essentially complete", and likely to be ready for operational deployment in the latter half 
of the 1980's. The system was developed by Vought, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas as 
associate prime contractors with Hughes and Honeywell as sub-contractors. It consisted 
of a three-stage ASAT missile that would be launched from a modified McDonnell 
Douglas F-15 aircraft. The missile consisted of three main stages: a modified Boeing 
short-range attack missile (SRAM); a modified Vought Altair III rocket booster; and the 
Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) developed by Vought, a small cylindrical object 12 
inches by 13 inches which consisted of a cluster of small rockets surrounding eight 
cryogenically cooled infrared telescopes, connected to a processor which enabled the 
vehicle to home in on its target. Overall, the ASAT missile was approximately 17 feet 
long, 18 inches in diameter, and weighed 2,600 pound.^ It was planned that the 
squadrons of F-15's for the ASAT mission would be based at Langley Air Force Base, 
Virginia, and McChord Air Force Base, Washington, these squadrons being capable of 
attacking Soviet satellites in low-earth orbit, such as their ocean surveillance satellite 
capable of targeting naval vessels and the Soviets killer satellite.^ 
In 1981, contracts totaling US$418.8 million were awarded to Vought (US$268 million) 
and Boeing Aerospace (US$150.8 million) by the USAFs Space Division for further 
research and development of the air-launched ASAT. In fiscal 1983, the Air Force 
requested US$212 million for the ASAT programme, about one third of the service's 
budget for strategic systems research, and announced plans to demonstrate the system in 
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the not too distant future, so that it would be operational by the mid- to late-1980's. The 
Space Defense Operations Center at the North American Aerospace Command's 
(NORAD) underground headquarter at Cheyenne Mountain, which was planned to be the 
focal point for command and control of the ASAT interceptors was reported in 1982 to be 
conducting computer simulations and other studies in readiness for operational 
deployment. The Air Force was obviously making a strong commitment to this form of 
ASAT weapon.1 
The Air Force's ASAT miniature homing weapon ran into trouble in early 1983 when the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a review of the antisatellite programme. 
According to an unclassified version of this report:^ 
[W]hen the Air Force selected the miniature vehicle technology as the p r i m ^ solution to the antisatellite mission, it was envisioned as a relatively cheap, quick way to get an antisatellite system that would meet the mission requirements. This is no longer the case. It will be a more complex and expensive task than originally envisioned, potentially costing tens of billions of dollars. 
The report went on to list four alternative technologies which deserved more careful 
attention, these being: ground-based missiles, ground-based lasers, airborne lasers, and 
space-based lasers.^ 
Some work on laser weapons for the ASAT mission had been conducted by the Air Force 
since the 1970's, under the Advanced Systems component of the Space Defense 
Program, this area receiving increased funding since about fiscal 1977. The funding 
received for this programme through the late 1970's and early 1980's was: FY 1977 -
US$2.6 million; FY 1978 - US$9.8 million; FY 1979 - US$14.5 million; FY 1980 -
US$0.5 million and FY 1981 - US$2.1 million. This level of funding was not 
comparable with that being spent on the MHV technology for the ASAT mission, this 
programme receiving US$20.9 million, US$44.8 million, US$63.0 million, and US 
$82.5 miUion in the years FY 1978 to FY 1981 inclusive.^ 
The USAF's Space Command seems to have responded to the gauntlet thrown down by 
the GAO, by drafting, in eariy 1983 a formal "statement of need" for developing 
antisatellite weapons using lasers. According to General James Hartinger, commander of 
1 "Antisatellite Weapon Contracts Awarded", ANST, February 2, 1981, p. 
15; Jeff Hecht, Beam Weapons, Plenum Press, New York, 1984, p. 249; 
Craig Covault, "Space Defense Organization ...", op. cit., p. 21. 
2 GAG, "U.S. Antisatellite Program Needs A Fresh Look", GAO/C-MA-SAD-
83-5, January 27, 1983. Quoted in Jeff Hecht, op. cit., p. 249. 
3 I b i d . , p. 250. 
4 p. B. Stares, op. c i t . , p. 209; Craig Covault, "U.S. Pushes 
Antisatellite Effort", AWST, July 17, 1978, p. 14. 
the Space Command, the laser weapons were "a technology that looks like it could 
possibly fulfill our requirements better than the air-craft-launched Asat we are developing 
now".i 
One question that can be asked is to what extent the Air Force, through its antisatellite 
weapons programme acted as a driving force for the development of space-based laser 
weapons. Ashton Carter argues that although, in some ways, the technologies used for 
the ASAT and BMD missions are similar, that in actual fact the two missions are quite 
different and thus the technological requirements are quite different. He points out that an 
ASAT system cannot be easily upgraded to a BMD system, but that a BMD system could 
quite easily, with some modifications, be applied to the ASAT mission, especially a 
space-based laser BMD.2 To get more of an idea of whether those in the Air Force who 
were working on laser technologies envisaged using these technologies for space-based 
BMD, I shall look more closely at the nature of this research programme, and the 
applications and time frames that were being proposed. 
Out of all the military services, and DARPA, in the late 1970's and early 1980's it was 
the Air Force who invested most heavily in research and development on laser weapons, 
the main programme for the Air Force being the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL), a 
programme to mount a high energy laser weapon on a KC-135 aircraft. This programme 
was being undertaken at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. ̂  
The Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland used a high-energy gas dynamic laser and an Air 
Force developed field test telescope to shoot down a drone target at the Sandia Optical 
Range at Kirtland in 1973. Since this successful test the Air Force has been working on 
the technology to place a laser weapon on board the KC-135 aircraft, (a military version 
of the Boeing 707), and shooting down an airbome target from the aircraft in flight. 
Specifically, the programme aimed to put a 400,000 watt gas dynamic carbon dioxide 
laser aboard the KC-135. The ALL was designed to test the feasibility of tactical Air 
1 Craig Covault, "Space Command Seeks Asat Laser", AWST, March 21, 
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Force lasers, and even if this mission could be accomplished, the ALL did "not have the 
beam-steering equipment" required for even antisatellite tests. ̂  
It was envisioned by the Air Force that other missions might be possible using such lasers 
at some time in the future. According to Ulsamer, in late 1977 the applications of air 
based laser weapons included: "bomber self-defense, air superiority, satellite destruction, 
and antisubmarine launched ballistic missile" missions. It was thought that the first of 
these applications might be feasible within the next decade.^ Others were more boosterish 
about the prospects for laser weapons. After a test conducted in January 1981 as part of 
the ALL programme, in which the KC-135 remained grounded and stationary, and no 
beam was actually propagated, the outgoing Air Force Secretary Hans Mark claimed that 
the programme had passed a "significant milestone". "We can now think about shooting 
down other fellows' missiles without using nuclear warheads", Mark claimed, it being 
possible to eventually mount these laser weapons on satellites to destroy the enemy 
missiles from outer space. Mark thought that such weapons would become an important 
part of the United State's strategic arsenal in the next decade of so.̂  
Mark's optimistic predictions seem to have been somewhat premature. After the 
successful test in January 1981, Air Force officials announced plans to use the Airborne 
Laser Laboratory to shoot down sidewinder air-to-air missiles from the airbome KC-135. 
Two such tests were conducted at the Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, Califomia in 
mid-1981, but the missiles were not destroyed. It was not until mid-1983 that the ALL 
actually did shoot down some sidewinder missiles. 
There were forces in the Senate which were pushing the Air Force towards the 
development of a space-based laser weapon capability, and perhaps some of the groups in 
the Air Force who were working on such weapons were lobbying also. In early 1981, 
Senators Malcolm Wallop and Harrison Schmitt put forward an amendment to the FY 
1982 Defense Authorization Bill which would have added US$152 million to the budget 
of DARPA, and US$97.5 million to the Air Force budget to expedite the building of a 
space-laser weapon. The outcome was that the Air Force was given and extra US$30 
million, and DARPA an extra $20 million, and the Secretary of the Air Force instructed to 
set up a special Program Management Office for space-based laser weapons, and to 
1 Jeff Hecht, op. cit., p. 256. 
2 Edgar Ulsamer, "Exotic Weapons op. cit., p. 129. 
3 Matt Mygatt, "'Star Wars' may become earth wars op. cit., p. 3. 
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conduct a "detailed system definition of the space-based laser weapons program, which 
shall include costs, schedule, and identification of risks''.^ 
In August 1982, the Air Force was reported to be preparing a major study to determine by 
1987 if it was feasible to launch laser battle stations into space. Air Force officials said 
that a series of 18 requests for proposal from industry had been prepared to study issues 
ranging from surveillance, to laser battle stations, servicing of the batde stations in orbit, 
laser tracking, launch vehicles, battle management for laser weapons and so on. These 
studies were to be under the management of the Air Force Space Systems Division in Los 
Angeles and the Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base.^ Yet another Air Force 
study which investigated the use of space-based laser weapons came to light in early 
1983. The secret report, entitled "Air Force 2000: Air Power Entering the 21st Century" 
was prepared at the direction of the then former Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew 
Allen, and completed in June 1982. This study urged the development of space-based 
antiballistic missile systems and argued that these weapons might enable the United States 
to win a nuclear war in the event of a "massive exchange" with the Soviets.^ 
In late 1982, the Air Force was rearranged slightly, creating a new command which 
centralized the Air Force's space activities. It might be expected that such a command 
would tend to push for a wider space role for the Air Force in terms of space-based 
ballistic missile defence. Robinson has pointed out that serious consideration was being 
given to this proposal in early 1981, the reason being, he claims, that "the Air Force and 
Navy are seeking to avoid space weaponry for defense and that any effort in this area 
takes away from total obligational authority for other planned strategic weapon systems". 
He further claims that there was "some concern over roles and missions between the 
Army and Air Force as to where the Army's ballistic missile defense mission stops and 
USAFs traditional space defense mission begins".^ 
The Air Force Space Command was formed on September 1,1982, with its headquarters 
at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The new command, led by General James Hartinger, 
took over the operations of the Aerospace Defense Center at NORAD, and it was planned 
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that it would operate military versions of the space shuttle, the "great variety of spy and 
other satellites" operated by the United State's and the antisatellite weapons which were 
now in the advanced stage of development. In addition, General Lew Allen, then Air 
Force Chief of Staff, said that the new command would be responsible for "planning and 
operating any future manned military space vehicles that may be developed by the Air 
Force ... and any orbiting laser weapons, if the U.S. decides to develop them". General 
Allen said that within a year the Space Command would become a "unified command", 
controlling the Navy and Army space activities as well, making the Space Command the 
equal of the most important US military headquarters (such as the European and Pacific 
commands), and putting space on an equal footing with the tactical and strategic air 
operations.^ In a separate, but related move, the Air Force also created a Space 
Technology Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, within the Air Force Systems Command.^ 
The formation of the Space Command was said to be in line with the thinking of the 
Reagan Administration, especially the Secretary of the Air Force Veme Orr's views that 
space was emerging as a fourth medium for military operations.^ The Defense Guidance 
Plan approved by the Reagan Administration in 1982 stated that the "United States forces 
should exploit opportunities through the use of space for increasing deterrence at all levels 
of conflict" and instructed the armed forces to proceed with prototypes of space-based 
laser weapons.'^ Representative Ken Kramer (R-Colorado), who had pushed for just this 
change predicted that the creation of Space Command would, in the long run, be regarded 
as the move "that turned national nuclear strategy away from mutual destruction to one 
that will give us the capability to defend ourselves against nuclear attack from space", 
using space-based laser weapons.^ 
4.5. PENTAGON'S RESPONSE TO THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY 
Although we have seen that there were some groups within the Air Force who supported 
the development of space-based lasers, either for antisatellite or BMD missions, in general 
the proposals being put forward by Malcolm Wallop's 'laser lobby' were opposed by 
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both the Army and the Air Force. The main objection to the proposals was that they were 
premature, the Army and Air Force being more interested, in the short term, in bringing 
their more conventional technologies to an operational capability, and content to consign 
the exotic technologies to slowly paced research and development programmes. 
When Maxwell Hunter's 'gang-of-four' produced the senate briefing for Malcolm Wallop 
in 1979 it was, reportedly, "widely denounced as being premature and unrealistic". Army 
and Department of Defense officials argued that countermeasures were available to outwit 
the system and that "state-of-the-art technology in sensors and the complex battle 
management necessary was not available to handle the high volume of ballistic missile 
targets in the short engagement times required". The main objection was the estimated 
time frame for the deployment of the system. The 'gang-of-four' had argued that a system 
of 18 laser battle stations could be placed in orbit by the mid- to late-1980's and this was 
felt to be unrealistic. Defense Department officials involved in the development of laser 
technology were reported to be so upset about the briefing, that they put pressure on 
"those companies funded under laser contracts to keep the members out of Washington".^ 
Another study conducted by the Department of Defense on high-energy laser weapons 
was reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology in February 1981. According to 
this smdy, the earliest estimated times for the deployment of space-based laser systems of 
various capabilities were as follows: ̂  
*Test of a 5-megawatt/4-meter diameter weapon - 9 years. 
^Development of a 10-megawatt/l 0-meter diameter weapon in a constellation of 10 
satellites for full antisatellite and air defense missions, and light ballistic missile 
defense -15 years. 
•Development of a 25-megawatt/15-meter diameter weapon in a constellation of 100 
satellites to provide full or robust BMD capability and for all other missions - 20 -
25 years. 
Even these times, much longer than those proposed by the 'laser lobby', were supposed 
to have assumed a "fast-moving, aggressively managed and committed program", but not 
a "panic or crash effort".^ 
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It is reported that in 1981 the Defense Department actively sought to sabotage the efforts 
of the laser lobby' in the Senate Armed Services Committee. This was occasioned by 
Malcolm Wallop's amendment, already mentioned, to the FY 1982 Defense Authorization 
Bill to add US$250 million to the budget to be spent on laser weapon research. A briefing 
on space-based lasers had been prepared by DARPA programme managers for the 
National Security Council in time for the White House to add its approval to the 
amendment before the floor vote on military authorizations. When DARPA's briefing was 
submdtted to the Defense Department for approval it was reported to have been held up by 
a Pentagon official from the Carter Administration, still in the Defense Department, who 
was opposed to laser weapons. Because of this, the NSC briefing could not take place 
and the White House could not add its approval in time.^ 
Further, a laser study panel convened by the Defense Science Board (DSB), headed by 
John Foster, failed to submit a congressionally directed report in time for "the mark up", 
providing only selected briefings in the Senate a day or so before the Wallop amendment 
was put. Foster's panel was reported to have only undertaken the laser weapons study 
after there was opposition within the Department of Defense to the study that was 
submitted by DARPA.2 The report of the DSB was made to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in the hearings that preceded the passage of an amendment to add US$30 
million to the Air Force and US$20 million to the DARPA budget in the FY 1982 
authorization bill for space-based lasers, a watered down version of Wallop's proposal. 
The DSB report, presented by Senator John Warner concluded that: "in the twenty first 
century directed energy weapons such as space-based lasers are almost inevitable, but 
achievement of an effective space-based ballistic missile defense system is far more 
expensive and difficult than the most extreme enthusiasts admit".^ 
The DSB found many problems with space-based lasers. Firsdy, they questioned the 
merits of assigning AS AT and air defence missions to space-based laser weapons as these 
could be performed more cheaply by technologies such as miniature homing vehicles and 
ground-based lasers. Secondly, the commitment to "Manhattan-type" projects necessitated 
a commitment to chemical lasers. Shorter wavelength lasers, such as eximer lasers were 
held to be more cost effective. Thirdly, even when the technical problems for space-based 
BMD lasers had been resolved there were tremendous systems and operational problems 
to overcome. Although pointing to these problems, and arguing that "it was too soon to 
attempt to accelerate space-based laser development toward... ballistic missile defense". 
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the DSB recommended that US$50 million be added to the defence budget to help with 
this work.^ 
Ulsamer, presumably reflecting the views of the Air Force, argued that the proposals for 
the rapid deployment of space-based lasers such as that put forward by the 'laser lobby' 
was a result of the "convergence of several political and 'public-relations' considerations -
rather than the realities of science and engineering". Such proposals had obvious media 
appeal.2 He claimed that in the view of many in the Air Force, and other Pentagon 
officials the "transient, mainly propagandistic advantages", of such proposals, would not 
compensate for the disadvantages. He estimated that it would take about US$10 billion 
just to build and "fly" a single prototype. "Premature investment of this magnitude in a 
technology that most experts consider not yet ready for full-scale exploitation might sound 
the death knell for the development of such weapons systems at a later time when their 
underlying technologies have reached maturity", Ulsamer argued. Further, the diversion 
of R&D funds for this purpose would slow down work on unrelated weapon 
programmes that were ready for fuU-scale development.^ 
Officials in the Defense Department seem to have been in agreement with the DSB report. 
High-level officials from the Pentagon were reported to have sought to persuade members 
of the Senate that the technology for space-based lasers, "especially battle management 
and pointing and tracking subsystems technology" was not available, and that "laser battle 
stations would not become a reality until the next century".^ Dr. Richard Airey, described 
as the Pentagon's chief specialist on space laser weapons, expressed confidence in the 
long-term prospects of space-based lasers but claimed that it was the "consensus of 
everybody in the community who is knowledgeable on the subject... that no matter how 
much money we throw at the problem, we can't have an anti-missile space-based laser in 
this decade".^ Even in late 1982 senior officials in the Defense Department who were in 
charge of research and development were maintaining this line. Richard DeLauer, 
Undersecretary for Research and Engineering told a meeting of the Air Force Association 
that the military was "not doing all we could in space laser developments, but we are 
doing all we should".® 
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It would appear that even those who were charged with the development and future 
operation of space-based laser systems were far from enthusiastic about their near-term 
prospects. According to Lt. General Richard Henry, commander of the USAF Space 
Division:^ 
Perhaps someday we will have the technology for an antiballistic missile system.... 
That could be done from space using beam weapons, in theory. The problem is we 
don't know how to build the beam weaponry. 
We probably could short-circuit the national treasury two or three times trying to do 
that, and so the concept is probably in the future. 
A report, described as a "unique stem-to-stem" analysis of the Air Force's changing role 
in space was prepared by Lt. General Kelly Burke (USAF), the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research, Development and Acquisition and his assistant Major General Jasper Welch, 
some time in 1982. Welch, who was described as being "intimately involved" with the 
USAF's laser program, argued that the United State's "should proceed with prudent and 
measured speed down the general path we are on, meaning a balanced program consisting 
of near-term efforts directed at more conventional AS AT vehicle to be launched from a 
high-speed fighter and longer term efforts on a range of other promising possibilities", 
pointing out that the Air Force was firmly committed to develop, test and deploy an air-
launched ASAT capability. The analysis by the two members of the Air Staff concluded 
that "we are making progress and our current funding levels are about right. We simply 
must not allow ourselves to be hurried as we enter the technology confirmation period 
confronting us".^ 
Most of the criticisms of the High Frontier proposal concentrated on the Global Ballistic 
Missile Defense (GBMD) proposal that had been put forward by Bud Redding of SRI 
Intemational, and which formed the centre-piece of the High Frontier study. As General 
Graham had predicted, the High Frontier study would stir up a hornets nest amongst 
those in the Defense Department who were trying to protect their own turf. What 
eventuated was perhaps even more vehement than Graham might have predicted. In a 
memo prepared for General Stilwell of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
(Policy), Herbert Reynolds, the author of the memo, launches a character assassination 
against Redding:^ 
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September, 1981, Memorandum for General Stilwell, through Mr Stivers, 
RADM Schmitt, SUBJECT: BMD Concept Proposed by Bud Redding SRI, by 
Herbet A. Reynolds. 
He seems to be very sincere in his attempts to uncover unique solutions to major defense problems. Unfortunately, his sincerity and enthusiasm are seldom tempered by practical engineering considerations. In fact he appears to be a master of self deception and is not adverse to stretching the truth well beyond the breaking point. As a result, his credibility within the defense community is very low. 
Reynolds goes on to describe Redding's GBMD concept as being shallow, "no more than 
one 'vu-graph' deep", and claims that Redding "continually modifies his concept as major 
problem areas are identified during the course of his briefings". Three main objections to 
the concept are identified. Firstly, Redding's "thoughts on defense strategy and 
international implications related to the deployment of such a system are shallow and 
naive". Secondly, the "cost and schedule estimates are so totally unrealistic as to be 
unworthy of comment". And thirdly, there are certain technical objections such as the 
technologies are not off-the-shelf, and that Redding has not considered the command, 
control and communications problems of a very complex system. Reynolds, in short, is 
unimpressed. He recommends that "we do nothing which might indicate to Redding that 
we intend to pursue the subject further. I further suggest that you indicate to General 
Graham, who is pursuing this concept at the highest levels of govemment, that perhaps 
he should seek some expert assistance to evaluate Mr. Redding's concept".^ 
Reynold's hard hitting memorandum seems to have been based on a less colourful 
technical critique of the GBMD concept prepared by a certain Captain Melanson for the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). This report identifies four major 
problems with Redding's proposal. Firstly, Redding had underestimated the number of 
spares required for the 432 proposed orbiting space trucks. Based on a figure of 2 spares 
to 1 operational satellite, Melanson estimated that the actual operational requirement would 
be 1350 space trucks and 67,500 CVs. Secondly, partly because of these underestimates, 
and partly because Redding had not used the "Air Force MV/dispenser unit cost planning 
factor", the SRI cost estimate of US$5.3 billion increased to over US$100 billion, and if 
the spares were included to over US$300 billion. Even these cost figures did not include 
constructing infrastructure or the operational costs of the system throughout its lifetime. 
Thirdly, the GBMD proposal had not taken into consideration command, control and 
communications, such as coordinating space truck station keeping, self defence, and 
battle management. Finally, major technical problems were associated with cryogen 
storage for the long wavelength infrared sensors, on-board data processing for target 
discrimination and battle management, the guidance of the miniature vehicles against 
accelerating targets, and system weight.^ 
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Further, it was argued that the GBMD would be an unwelcome complicating factor in the 
MX missüe basing debate. As GBMD was an alternative to the MPS basing mode for MX 
combined with terminal defence, it had the potential of introducing "additional 
uncertainty" into the MX decision process, Menlason felt. "It could also cause further 
delays in this program while we wait to assess GBMD feasibility and affordability. 
However, current GBMD conceptual immaturity argues against it being seriously 
considered in the context for the present. A more prudent view of GBMD is to consider it 
as a possible future complement to M-X and terminal ABM defense as part of a layered 
system".^ 
The Air Force Systems Command's (AFSC) Space Division hosted a joint Army/Air 
Force evaluation of the SRI GBMD proposal on 23-24 February 1982 with 
representatives from the Space Division, the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Office 
(BMDO), the Air Force Contract Management Division, SRI and Boeing Aerospace, 
amongst others, being in attendance. Several memos and summaries emerged from this 
meeting prepared by the Army and the Air Force which pointed to about six major 
objections to the GBMD proposal, (i) The proposed interceptor vehicle had insufficient 
divert velocity capability required to accomplish its mission. It required a divert velocity 
some 4 to 5 times larger, (ii) The technologies required were not off-the-shelf, and major 
modifications or new developments were needed in the areas of the miniature homing 
vehicle, surveillance technologies and in cryogenic cooling, (iii) The concept did not make 
reference to prior studies of similar concepts - BAMBI, SAI study. Aerospace review of 
BAMBI - and the problems identified by these studies, (iv) The proposal "grossly 
underestimated" the number of interceptor vehicles required. The requirement for a higher 
divert velocity coupled with the underestimation of the number of interceptor vehicles 
meant that the "life-cycle costs" had been significantly underestimated - approximately 
US$180 billion compared to US$5.3 Billion, (v) The MX did not have sufficient lift 
capability to lift the weight of the space truck and its payload of interceptors into orbit, 
and there were many logistical problems raising hundreds of space trucks into orbit using 
the space shuttle, (vi) There was inadequate consideration of mission utility or system 
effectiveness in the following areas: (1) survivability features; (2) susceptibility to 
countermeasures; (3) negative payoff margins; (4) coverage area deficiencies.^ 
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Even when "several extrapolations of the operational parameters associated with the 
proposed system were examined to determine if the proposal could be salvaged by 
modification", the analysis concluded that the system still would not work. All of the 
reports recommended that the proposal should be shelved: "This evaluation concluded that 
the proposal has no technical merit and should be rejected".^ "Based on the above 
considerations, it is our recommendation that the SRI unsolicited proposal not be funded 
as proposed, nor modified and funded".^ 
The overall High Frontier study fared no better than the GBMD proposal. According to an 
Air Force assessment of the study it had three main problems: "1) the technologies are not 
"off-the-shelf ... 2) schedules are extremely optimistic in light of experience, and 3) the 
cost estimates are very low".^ Regarding the silo point defence system proposed by ffigh 
Frontier, the Air Force contacted the Army's BMDO at Huntsville. The Army pointed out 
that they had been studying this technology since the 1960's and had always found such 
proposals to have three serious limitations: (i) if a warhead was actually destroyed by the 
system, it would detonate "destroying any capability to respond to a second" warhead; (ii) 
systems used trilaterated low frequency radars "which are ineffective against jammers and 
must be proliferated to avoid being targeted", and (iii) the systems had little range, which 
meant that supply systems would be liable to damage.'̂  
Regarding the space-based laser system, the Air Force thought that it would be 
"premature to commit to full scale development", and that the current level of research and 
development was adequate. The Space Laser Program was investigating seven major 
areas: vulnerability and hardening, utility, survivability, system definition, laser Triad, 
weapon feasibility technology, and growth technology. The Air Force assessment argued 
that when these "tasks" had been successfully completed the Department of Defense 
would be in a position to make an "informed decision whether to recommend proceeding 
with development and deployment of a space laser weapon system".^ The High Frontier 
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were not adequate, a service vehicle would be required to replace cryogens, mirrors and 
so forth, and the system could not be "developed and deployed in the period cited in the 
report nor is the funding which is proposed adequate".^ 
The Air Force concluded that the High Frontier study was "replete with proposed systems 
which use technology far beyond that which can be called 'off-the-shelf. This alone 
would preclude the schedule suggested, even allowing the implementation of streamlined 
management. The cost estimates are also highly dubious". Further, even though General 
Graham conceded that his strategy was more important than the actual technology he was 
proposing, the Air Force report argued that "it is difficult to divorce an evaluation of a 
proposed strategy from the realities of its implementation".^ 
4.6 WHY THE PENTAGON OPPOSED THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY 
Both the Army and the Air Force had made strong commitments to technology 
development programmes based on 'conventional' technologies, which tended to 
overshadow any research and development they were undertaking on the more exotic 
technologies. The Army, through its Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, had been working 
on the development of ballistic missile defence systems since the late 1950's, and from 
this time had actively lobbied for the deployment of a land-based BMD system using both 
endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptors. The Army had been continually 
frustrated in these efforts. Even when in the late 1960's it was able to force the Johnson 
Administration to go ahead with the deployment of its Sentinal system, the ABM Treaty 
was signed in 1972 limiting the deployment of ABM systems, and in 1975 the Army's 
BMD system, now called Safeguard, was dismantled. In its LoADS and Homing Overlay 
systems which the Army was developing in the late 1970's, and which were designed 
basically to protect the MX missile, the Army saw another chance to finally deploy an 
ABM system. The Air Force had been working on a direct-ascent antisatellite weapon 
since the early 1970's. The Air Force had made a strong commitment to its direct ascent 
antisatellite missile which would be launched from an F-15 fighter, and which was to 
become operational in the late 1980's. 
Both the Army and the Air Force were working on the more exotic technologies which 
had the potential for space-based (or land-based) BMD and AS AT missions, but these 
programmes were playing second fiddle to the more conventional programmes. They 
were at a less advanced stage of development, and less funds were being devoted to this 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid. 
area of research. Further, it was planned to use these exotic technologies mainly for 
tactical missions in the first instance. While it might have been the case that some in the 
Army, and more particularly some in the Air Force who were working on the exotic 
technologies, were lobbying for space-based ballistic missile defence, they were running 
against the tide in their particular branches of the armed services. There is some evidence 
that the newly created Space Command was manoeuvring to acquire the control of all 
space missions for itself, including ballistic missile defence, but Space Command arrived 
too late on the scene to have much influence on this early development of space-based 
BMD, and was itself committed to the operational deployment of the direct-ascent AS AT 
system. 
The area of space-based ballistic missile defence was a possible area of conflict between 
the Army and the Air Force, the Army having responsibility for ballistic missile defence, 
and the Air Force having responsibility for all space operations. At these early stages in 
the development of space-based BMD there does not seem to have been a great deal of 
rivalry between the two services over this mission. It remains a possibility as further 
development of such weapons proceeds towards deployment. The most likely outcome of 
such a competition would be that the Army retained responsibility for terminal defence, 
and the Air Force gained the responsibility for space based defence. (A further possibility 
might be that a new branch of the armed services is created to take control of operations in 
space.) A reason for the lack of interservice rivalry at this stage may have been that the 
Army and the Air Force had formed an alliance to push mobile land-basing of the MX in 
conjunction with LoADS and Homing Overlay. 
It is evident that the proposals put forward by the 'laser lobby' and High Frontier were 
strongly opposed by both the Army and the Air Force. There were several reasons for 
this. Firstly, both services were committed to the deployment of more conventional 
systems. Further, both the Army and the Air Force were keen to promote temiinal defence 
of MX missiles using LoADS and Homing Overlay as a neat solution to the vulnerability 
of the MX missile. The space-based BMD systems represented a complicating factor in 
the MX basing debate, which might hold up the deployment of the MX. Secondly, any 
crash programmes aimed at developing exotic beam weapon technologies would take 
funds away from the more conventional defensive programmes such as LoADS and 
perhaps also away from offensive weapons programmes. Thirdly, crash programmes to 
develop more exotic technologies, when these were still immature, might spoil the 
chances for these programmes in future. Finally, while both the Army and Air Force had 
their own research and development programmes on the more exotic technologies, they 
were opposed to the timeframe for deployment that was being proposed by the 'space 
weapons lobby'. 
The reactions of the Army and the Air Force to the proposals put forward by the 'space-
weapons lobby' were to be expected from the model of the way in which military 
technology is shaped developed in section 1.2. A sub-unit of the Army, the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Agency had been given responsibility for the BMD mission, and had, 
over several decades developed a terminal BMD system in which this mission had become 
embodied. Similarly with the Air Force, which had developed a direct-ascent ASAT 
interceptor based on 'conventional' technologies. Both services were expecting to deploy 
their systems in the late 1980's. The exotic technologies proposed by the 'space-weapons 
lobby' were seen as a threat to these 'conventional' programmes, and so were resisted by 
preparing technical reports unfavorable to the near-term prospects of space-based 
weapons, and by actively lobbying Congress and the Executive Branch. 
CH. 5: THE MAKING OF THE 'STAR WARS' SPEECH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
When President Reagan made his so-called 'Star Wars' speech on 23 March 1983, it was 
widely reported the next day that he had two main reasons for giving it. Firstly, his 
defence policy was coming under increasing pressure from the nuclear freeze movement: 
the House of Representatives looked certain to pass a freeze resolution after Easter in 
1983. By posing a nuclear umbrella Reagan might be able to seize the moral high ground 
from the freeze movement. Secondly, there was growing opposition in Congress to 
increased military spending because of the mounting deficit. Reagan's speech was 
carefully timed to coincide with the Congressional debate on the defence budget.^ Two 
other themes were evident in the early press reports, which gave some clue as to the 
origins of the Star Wars speech. Firstly, it was suggested that Reagan's long-standing 
interest in ballistic missile defence had been aroused six weeks earlier in a meeting with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secondly, it was suggested that in making the speech, Reagan 
had gone against the advice of several White House and Pentagon aides.^ 
In this chapter I will consider the background of, and lead-up to. President Reagan's 
March 23 speech. Starting with Reagan's "long-standing interest in ballistic missile 
defence", I will consider the influence on Reagan of the 'space-weapons lobby' and the 
way in which members of this group were placed to influence the policy of the Reagan 
Administration. Next I will consider an early attempt by the Reagan Administration to 
protect the population from the effects of nuclear war, through a civil defence programme. 
This attempt failed miserably and only served to generate more opposition to the 
Administration's strategic modernization plan. The growing peace movement, particularly 
in the form of the "freeze movement", was, by the end of 1982, presenting a strong 
challenge to the Reagan Administration and can be seen to have strongly influenced the 
decision to make the speech. Finally, I shall consider the decision to make the 'Star Wars' 
speech. Starting with a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were preoccupied with 
the MX basing problem, Reagan and senior members of the National Security Council 
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became convinced of the need for strategic defence and began to hatch the speech in the 
utmost secrecy. 
5.2 REAGAN - A LONG STANDING INTEREST IN BMD? 
It would seem that well before he made his so-called 'Star Wars' speech on 23 March 
1983, which eventually led to the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
Ronald Reagan had an interest in implementing a new strategy which would not hold 
Americans as nuclear hostages. General Graham, who had advised Reagan on military 
matters during the 1976 Republican primaries, claimed that, even then, Reagan had 
questioned the strategy of deterrence, based as it was on purely an offensive capability. 
"He said it didn't make any sense to him", said Graham. "It was like two men with 
cocked pistols pointed at each other's head; if either man flinched, then you blew the 
other's brains out. It just doesn't make any sense". ̂  
In the summer of 1979 Reagan paid a visit to the North American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD) at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. During the visit Reagan observed NORAD 
radars tracking thousands of objects in space, and asked the commanding officer General 
James Hill, what NORAD could do to stop an incoming Soviet missile. "The answer 
was, 'Nothing'", Martin Anderson - Reagan's adviser on domestic policy and an 
economist from the Hoover Institution - later recalled.̂  Reagan recalled this incident in an 
interview with journalist Robert Scheer during the 1980 Republican primary election 
campaign:^ 
NORAD is an amazing place.... They actually are tracking several thousand objects 
in space, meaning satellites of our and everyone else's, even down to the point that 
they are tracking a glove lost by an astronaut that is still circling the earth up there. I 
think the thing that struck me was the irony that here, with this great technology of 
ours, we can do all of this yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at 
us. I don't think there's been a time in history when there wasn't a defense against 
some kind of thrust, even back in the old-fashioned days when we had coast 
artillery that would stop invading ships if they came. 
In August 1979, shortly after the visit to NORAD, Martin Anderson, who had 
accompanied Reagan, drafted a campaign memo urging Reagan to propose the 
construction of a "protective missile shield against Soviet intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, perhaps exploiting laser beam technologies"S in conjunction with a build-up of 
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conventional forces and accelerating the development of strategic offensive weapons such 
as the cruise missile and the MX. Anderson further pointed out that such a strategic 
defence would be more "appealing" to Americans than the prospect of nuclear annihilation 
under the doctrine of MAD. ̂  Reagan's senior campaign adviser, Michael Deaver, advised 
against making this proposal. Deaver is reported to have liked the idea but not the timing, 
fearing Reagan might appear to be too much the radical hawk "if he proposed sharp 
changes in traditional nuclear doctrine".^ 
A toned down version of Anderson's memo was, reportedly, incorporated into the 1980 
Republican platform which called for "vigorous research and development of an effective 
antiballistic-missile system, such as is akeady at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as 
more modern ABM technologies". It also called for new offensive missiles and an 
"overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union".-3 
Not only did Reagan show an early inclination towards ballistic missile defense but in the 
lead-up to his election he received further encouragement from members of the 'space-
weapons lobby'. In the summer of 1979 Wallop and Codevilla sent Reagan a copy of 
their article "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense", which was 
about to appear in Strategic Review. Reagan is reported to have returned the paper later 
with comments and annotations.^ In February 1980, General Graham, who was one of 
Reagan's military advisers for his 1980 Presidential campaign briefed Reagan on his ideas 
about strategic defence. Reagan was reported to be very interested and writing down 
notes.^ On 12 December 1980," Reagan, then president-elect, was visited by Senator 
Harrison Schmitt, the incoming chair of the Senate subcommittee on science, technology 
and space. At this meeting Reagan signaled to Schmitt his interest in developing an 
effective antiballistic missile system based on laser weapons because he wanted to alter 
strategic policy toward one of protection rather than mutually assured destruction. ̂  
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5.3 THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE 'SPACE-WEAPONS 
LOBBY' 
When Reagan did come to power, a number of people on his transition teams had links 
with the 'space-weapons lobby', or were themselves space-hawks who advocated space-
based ballistic missile defence. His important defence and foreign affairs transition teams 
were staffed by people who were counted amongst the members of the 'Madison Group' 
or were members of the Committee on the Present Danger. Saffire has claimed that 
'Madison Group' members John Carbaugh, Sven Kraemer (Senator Tower), Tidal 
McCoy (Senator Gam), Richard Perle (ex-Senator Jackson), and Mark Schneider 
(Senator Gam) were on Reagan's Defence transition team. Saffire also claims that 
'Madison Group' members Michel Pillsbury and David Sullivan were on Reagan's Arms 
Control transition team; John Carbaugh and Richard Perle the State Department transition 
team; and, Mark Schneider and Angelo Codevilla (Senator Wallop) the CIA transition 
team.^ 
Manno has pointed out that Edward Teller and retired Air Force General Bernard 
Schriever, both long-time space-hawks, were on Reagan's Science Policy transition team. 
Teller, we have already seen, was pushing for the development of the x-ray laser for 
ballistic missile defence. Schriever, who wrote the transition report on space had, even 
before the time of Sputnik, been publicly proclaiming that space would be the 
batdeground of the future.^ In a speech Schriever made to Air Force Academy cadets in 
April 1981, he said that there was "no question that space weapons will someday play a 
part in national defense".^ In an interview in January 1983, Schriever advocated a "radar 
surveillance system which allows you to spot everything that's moving, either on the 
surface or above the surface of the earth. And if we had ... a high-energy laser, or 
particle-beam weapon, or something else along with the pointing and tracking ability to 
knock down airplanes and missiles, then you wouldn't even need to knock out cities; you 
could knock out forces: You could pin your enemy down on earth. What would they do? 
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If I control the high ground and you can't move, what are you going to do? You're going 
to negotiate a surrender. That's what it's all about".^ 
All up, during the presidential campaign and the transition process, 46 members of the 
Committee on the Present Danger served on Reagan's advisory task force. After Reagan 
had been elected the CPD maintained its influence, with some 51 members of Reagan's 
Administration having served on the Board of Directors of the CPD.2 It did not 
necessarily follow that the CPD members who were serving in the Reagan Administration 
would automatically advocate ballistic missile defence, especially space-based ballistic 
missile defence. As we have seen some CPD members gave priority to the build-up of 
offensive nuclear weapons (perhaps in conjunction with terminal defence to protect 
missile silos), and others to the deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence to 
provide population defence, as a way of achieving superiority over the Soviet Union. 
Two prominent members of President Reagan's defence transition team, William Van 
Cleave and Scott Thompson, were known to be "firmly on the former side". Those, such 
as Daniel Graham, who favoured the defensive option found themselves outside of 
Reagan's circle of influence in the early years of the Administration.^ 
Patrick Tyler has labeled groups such as the CPD and the 'Madison Group' as the 
"survivalists", a group who believed that the United States needed to prepare to fight and 
win a nuclear war. The "survivalists" claimed that the United State's ICBMs were 
vulnerable to Soviet missiles, and pointed to Soviet civil defence programmes and 
research into lasers and particle beams for antiballistic missiles defence as evidence of 
Soviet intentions to win a nuclear war. They argued for the "hardening" of command, 
control and communications networks and the development of ABM weapons. The 
"survivalists" rejected the doctrine of mutual assured destruction arguing that their 
strategic doctrine - mutual assured survival - was morally superior. They were well 
represented in the Reagan Administration, dominating the National Security Council and 
the Pentagon hierarchy, according to Tyler.^ 
That Ronald Reagan could be counted amongst the "survivalists" is evident from an 
interview that was conducted by Robert Scheer in 1980. Reagan complained that the 
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Soviets had violated SALT I and the ABM Treaty, and didn't hold to the same notion of 
deterrence:^ 
The idea was the Mutual Assured Destruction plan ... that in an exchange of 
weapons both countries ' populations would be decimated. And they didn't hold to 
that - and for several years this was a failure of the interpretation of our intelligence. 
... We paid no attention to the fact that the Soviet Union had put a high-ranking 
general... in charge of civil defense. And they had come to the conclusion that there 
could be a nuclear war and it could be winable - by them. 
Reagan thought that it was "time to turn the expertise that we have in that field... loose on 
what do we need in the line of defense against their weaponry and defend our population, 
because we can't be sitting here - this could become the vulnerable point for us in the 
event of an ultimatum". In addition to developing active and passive defences against 
nuclear weapons Reagan thought that developing "superior offensive ability may also be 
another form of defence", pointing to the tension that existed in the CPD between 
offensive and defensive weapons.^ 
During his 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan had argued that the so-called 
'window of vulnerability' - one of the important tenents of CPD dogma - represented a 
major threat to the security of the United States, and what's more that the Carter 
Administration was responsible for this. The 'window of vulnerability' was the supposed 
vulnerability of the United States' land-based ICBMs to a first-strike attack by Soviet 
land-based ICBMs. It was argued that this 'window' would open in the early 1980's with 
the deployment of new, more accurate, Soviet ICBMs, and would not close until the 
United States had deployed the MX missile in a survivable basing mode. Reagan was 
pushing heavily the line that the MX missile, with its ten 300 kiloton warheads and high 
accuracy was the panacea to cure this problem, along with other offensive strategic 
weapons such as the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles and so on.^ On entering office, the 
Reagan Administration initiated a large military build-up aimed at closing the 'window of 
vulnerability', and seemed to be moving towards a war-fighting capability. In October 
1981, fragments of the top-secret National Security Decision Directive #13 were leaked to 
the press. This included a plan for "controlled escalation" in a nuclear war that would 
allow the United States to win the war.^ 
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5.4 REAGAN'S CIVIL DEFENCE PLAN 
As a prelude to ballistic missile defence - an active form of defence - the Reagan 
Administration attempted to implement a nationwide civil defence programme - a passive 
form of defence. At a meeting of the National Security Council on 3 December 1981, 
President Reagan committed his Administration to the first major increase in funding for 
the civil defence programme in two decades. In so doing Reagan acted against the advice 
of his Office of Management and Budget and Air Force General David Jones, Chair of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decision was, however, in line with the Republican party's 
1980 platform, which had pledged "to create a strategic and civil defense which would 
protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is 
protected".^ 
The plan was publicly disclosed on March 29, 1982, a seven-year civil defence 
programme that would, supposedly, save 80 percent of the population in the event of a 
nuclear war. The aspect of population protection was just one amongst a number of 
considerations however. Included in a list of four objectives which Reagan issued to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was to be responsible for the 
plan, were (i) that civil defence was an element of the strategic balance, which, in 
conjunction with strategic offensive forces "should assist in maintaining perceptions that 
this balance is favorable to the U.S."; and, (ii) that civil defence would "Reduce the 
possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in times of a crisis".^ 
As part of the US$4.3 billion plan, Reagan proposed to Congress an increase in the civil 
defence budget for FEMA from US$127 million in FY 1982 to US$252 million in FY 
1983. Most of this money was to be used to plan for "crisis relocation", that is, the 
orderly evacuation of people in "high risk" areas - in major cities or living near military 
installations - to "low risk" areas in the countryside, where they would be accommodated 
in primitive, anti-radiation fallout shelters. It was planned that this crisis relocation would 
take place when the Soviets began to evacuate their cities as a prelude to launching a 
nuclear attack, supposedly giving the United States three days warning.^ 
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The civil defence plan proved to be neither popular with the public nor congress, serving 
only to stir up more opposition to the nuclear arms race. FEMA officials were charged 
with being advocates of limited nuclear war, civil defence being held to increase the 
resolve of nuclear war fighters to launch an attack. Furthermore, the idea of crisis 
relocation became the "butt of ridicule from coast to coast", many cities and counties' 
refusing to cooperate with the FEMA. The City Council of Cambridge, Massachusetts for 
example "rejected a plan for a mass exodus to Greenfield, Massachusetts" and published 
instead a booklet advocating nuclear disarmament.^ 
In April 1982, the Senate Armed Services Committee refused to support Reagan's plan, 
and instead set the budget for FY 1983 at US$144 million, much less than the US$252 
million that Reagan had sought. It was reported that almost every Senator attending the 
closed meeting of the SASC "contended that there was no way to protect civilians from an 
all-out nuclear attack and that to try to do so would be a waste of money". Several 
Senators "also warned that to undertake such preparations would only fuel the movement 
here and abroad against further development of nuclear weapons". Even the committee's 
hawkish chairman. Senator John Tower was reported to have questioned the 
administration's claims about civil defence.^ 
5.5 THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT 
The movement that the Senators were worried about was the growing Freeze Movement, 
which had been called into existence largely by the Reagan Administration itself. It seems 
to have had its origins in 1979 when the Senate refused to ratify the SALT n treaty. The 
American Friends Service Committee called a meeting of arms control and disarmament 
advocates to try and develop new strategies to stop the arms race. The strategy devised by 
the meeting was to freeze the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to 
worry about disarmament at some later date.^ By AprU 1980, Randall Forsberg, one of 
those present at the meeting, had published the first freeze "manifesto", and along with 
Randy Kehler was organizing a mass movement based around the freeze. Kehler 
managed to get non-binding freeze resolutions placed on the ballot in the November 1980 
elections, in three senate districts in western Massachusetts. Even while Ronald Reagan 
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was sweeping to power, the freeze resolution carried by a margin of 2 to 1 in those 
districts, even though all returned a vote for Reagan by a considerable majority.^ 
The freeze movement gained momentum throughout 1981, mainly as a grass-roots 
movement and it wasn't until early 1982 that it began to make an impact in Congress. The 
first freeze resolution was introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) 
and Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon) on March 10,1982, and called for the United States and 
the Soviet Union to "pursue a complete halt to the nuclear weapons race", and to negotiate 
a mutual and verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear 
arms, and then to pursue mutual and verifiable reductions in the nuclear stockpiles. On the 
day of its introduction the resolution was co-sponsored by 17 senators and 122 members 
of the House of Representatives, and it soon had 25 co-sponsors in the Senate and 125 in 
the House.2 
However, even before Senators Hatfield and Kennedy had the chance to present their 
resolution. Senators Henry Jackson and John Warner drafted a counter proposal with the 
aid of Jackson's former aide Richard Perle. This resolution argued that a freeze on nuclear 
weapons should be imposed only after the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated 
"equally and sharply reduced levels of forces". The resolution was introduced into the 
Senate on 30 March, 1982 and was co-sponsored by 62 senators. President Reagan 
publicly supported this proposal, claiming that it was the Soviets who had the superior 
nuclear forces. In the Senate, the freeze was rejected "on a near party-line vote in the 
Foreign Relations Committee".^ 
Several Freeze resolutions were also introduced into the House, and it was here that it had 
its greatest success, when on June, 1982, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 
26-11 to recommend freezing US and Soviet nuclear weapons at current levels, with 19 
of the 21 Democrats and 7 of the 16 Republicans voting in favour of the motion.^ On the 
5 August, 1982, a freeze resolution introduced by Clement Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) failed 
by only a narrow two-vote margin to pass, the vote being 204-202 against.^ Donner 
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claims that this loss was quite impressive nonetheless, given that some 2000 corporate 
lobbyists opposing the freeze were reported to have applied pressure before the vote.^ 
The Administration's approach to the freeze movement was twofold: firstly, to express 
sympathy with the ultimate aims of the freeze supporters, but claim that their methods 
were wrong, and secondly to claim that they were being manipulated by the Soviets. For 
example, on March 11, 1982, the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military 
Affairs, Richard Burt, expressed sympathy for the "spirit that motivates the freeze 
efforts", but argued that it was misguided because: (i) the US would be frozen into a 
position of military inferiority; (ii) the negotiation of arms control agreements such as 
START required a strategic modernization programme to give the US negotiators 
credibility; and (iii) that the freeze did not go far enough, the US being engaged in 
intermediate nuclear forces talks which would go far beyond the freeze.^ President 
Reagan, at a press conference on 31 March, 1982, said that because the Soviets enjoyed a 
"definite margin of superiority" it would be "disadvantageous - in fact, even dangerous" 
for the United States to agree to a freeze.^ On October 4,1982, Reagan, indulging in a bit 
of red-baiting, claimed that the freeze movement was "inspired by not the sincere, honest 
people who want peace but by some who want the weakening of America and so are 
manipulating honest people and sincere people".^ Casper Weinberger claimed that "A 
nuclear freeze would be one sided, and would not be matched by the Soviets".' 5 
Notwithstanding the admonitions from the Reagan Administration and the difficulties that 
freeze resolutions encountered in Congress, the freeze movement and the peace movement 
in general continued to grow. From freeze resolutions being passed at 300 New England 
town meetings, in 30 city councils and in six state legislatures at the start of 1982, the 
movement had grown by August 1982 to freeze resolutions being passed at 400 New 
England town meetings, in more than 120 city councils, and by one or both houses in 12 
state legislaUires. Active freeze campaigns were underway to put nuclear freeze proposals 
on the ballots in the elections that were to be held in November 1982. On June 12,1982, 
to mark the United Nations' Second Special Session on Disarmament, nearly a million 
people marched in New York, the largest demonstration in the history of the United 
States.^ In the elections, nuclear freeze resolutions won in eight of the nine states and in 
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the District of Columbia, and in all but two of the other 29 jurisdictions in which they 
were on the ballot. The freeze resolution passed even in California, President Reagan's 
home state, by a margin of 52.5 to 47.5 percent, the state in which both sides had 
mounted their largest campaigns.^ 
Besides coming under mounting pressure from the freeze movement, the Reagan 
Administration ran into even more trouble in the form of the American Catholic Bishops 
who were responding to the renewed concern about nuclear weapons. In June 1982 the 
Bishops put out the first draft of their pastoral letter - The Challenge of Peace: God's 
Promise and our Response' - which oudined the Church's position on nuclear weapons. 
On 26 October, 1982, the Bishops released the second draft of their pastoral letter, which 
was even stronger than the first, despite condemnation from and heavy lobbying by the 
Reagan Administration. (For example, William Clark, Reagan's National Security 
Adviser had sent a seven-page letter to the Bishops arguing that a nuclear freeze would be 
counterproductive because it would "remove the incentive for achieving reductions".) The 
second pastoral letter called for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and deep cuts in 
the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.^ Furthermore, the Bishops argued that nuclear 
weapons were immoral. "We find", the Bishops wrote, "the moral responsibility of 
beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives". They rejected the 
production, use and threatened use of nuclear weapons, and even advocated that the 
United States move forward with unilateral disarmament initiatives.^ 
5.6 THE MAKING OF THE 'STAR WARS' SPEECH 
In the lead-up to his 'Star Wars' speech, as we have seen, Ronald Reagan had quite a deal 
of contact with members of the 'space-weapons lobby'. Daniel Graham had spoken to 
Reagan about his ideas on strategic defence in February 1980; Senator Harrison Schmitt 
had spoken to Reagan on 12 December 1980 about space-based infrared lasers for 
ballistic missile defence; Graham had met with Reagan again in February 1981 and 
shortly after with his Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger; Karl Bendetsen, William 
Wilson, Joseph Coors and Edward Teller met with Reagan on 8 January 1982, and 
subsequently on two other occasions, one in the early months of 1983; Edward Teller had 
met with Reagan alone on 14 September 1982 and urged him to develop x-ray lasers for 
ballistic missile defence; between October 1982 and January 1983 Teller is reported to 
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have met repeatedly with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All in all, before he made 
his speech, Reagan had met with members of the 'space-weapons lobby' on at least seven 
occasions. 
Although President Reagan was favourably disposed to space-based ballistic missile 
defence, senior members of the Administration reacted much more cautiously to the 
approaches made by the 'space-weapons lobby'. One early supporter in the Reagan 
Administration was Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. On the other hand, Richard Burt, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, seems to have been set against it. 
In an August 1981 memorandum on the High Frontier study Burt argued that while Bud 
Redding's GBMD concept had an "outside chance of being feasible ... its cost and the 
stiff technical requirements it would have to meet make its prospects much less sanguine 
than" General Graham suggests.^ In a January 1982 memo to Haig, Burt went further, 
arguing that, on the advice of the Army, the cost of the GBMD and site defence would be 
prohibitive. "Even then", Burt argued, "many technical uncertainties would remain along 
with any number of possible countermeasures available to the Soviets". Further, Burt 
thought that "a high-energy BMD laser system in space is still more than a decade away, 
if it is feasible at all". Summing up, Burt claimed that "while General Graham's ideas 
have much innate appeal, they have serious technical and economic shortcomings that are 
well recognized in the technical community".^ 
The opinion of the Defense Department seems to have been quite similar. Writing to 
General Graham in September 1982 Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said 
that it was "somewhat of an overstatement" to say that the High Frontier proposals had 
been "widely accepted as practicable". Carlucci pointed out that such a system would be 
very expensive, and he was not sure "[wjhether this would be a wise expenditure of 
defense funds''.^ Even Caspar Weinberger, writing to Graham in November 1982, only 
four months before Reagan made his speech, was not so sure about the High Frontier 
proposal. Weinberger told Graham that both he and his Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, Richard DeLauer, differed with Graham "on availability of 
^ "Haig Seeks Space-Based Weapons Report", Aviation Week and Space Technology r May 25, 1981, pp. 42-42; Department of State, Action 
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technology to support such a policy". They were unwilling to "commit this nation to a 
course which calls for growing into a capability that does not currently exist". Weinberger 
said that his advisers had "serious reservations with High Frontier's projections on the 
availability of off-the-shelf technology and components, at affordable cost and within 
schedules we can project".^ It is evident that Weinberger and Burt had been heavily 
influenced by the arguments of the Army and Air Force conceming the High Frontier and 
'laser lobby' proposal. 
That some of Reagan's senior advisers were not overly in favour of space-based ballistic 
missile defence was not a major obstacle. The decision to go ahead with the 'Star Wars' 
speech was made without consulting them. 
In February 1983, General John Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called 
a meeting with the other Chiefs of Staff to discuss what they would talk about with 
President Reagan at the next of their monthly meetings. At this meeting Admiral James 
Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed that the Chiefs consider the "possibility 
that new technologies would make it possible to defend against a Soviet ICBM attack". 
Watkins did not propose a crash programme. He suggested only that the United States 
might pursue the technological advantage it held over the Soviets in this area, in careful 
consultation with its NATO allies.^ 
Watkins, a devout catholic, was reported to have been deeply troubled by the pastoral 
letter put out by the Catholic Bishops which condemned nuclear weapons, and was 
actively involved in the church's nuclear ethics debate. He had, reportedly, made his 
doubts about the ethics of the policy of MAD the focus of a secret Navy White Paper. At 
the meeting with the other Chiefs, Watkins argued that it was "more moral" to protect 
Americans than to leave them vuhierable to nuclear annihilation under the MAD doctrine. 
"Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them", he is reported to have said. 
Admiral Watkins was influenced in his thinking by Edward Teller, with whom he had met 
on several occasions between October 1982 and January 1983, Teller briefing him at 
length on the x-ray laser. Further, during this same period Watkins had several meetings 
with Robert McFarlane, Reagan's deputy National Security Adviser.^ 
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Watkins was not the only member of the Joint Chiefs who had been got 
at by the 'space-weapons lobby'. In August 1981 General Graham had 
written to General Edward Meyer, the Army's Chief of Staff to tell him 
"what brand of snake oil I'm peddling these days". In June 1982, 
Robert Richardson of High Frontier had written to General Charles 
The Joint Chiefs met with President Reagan on February 11,1983, largely to discuss the 
vulnerability of land-based ICBMs and the basing of the MX missile. We have already 
seen that the issue of MX basing had become a major headache for the Reagan 
Administration and the Pentagon, and that the fortunes of BMD had become closely 
linked to this.^ The Joint Chiefs were reported at this time to "see an urgent need for a 
new ground-based ABM to help overcome the vulnerability of America's Minuteman 
ICBM force and any future deployment of MX missiles".^ The Chiefs suggested five 
options to Reagan regarding the problem of ICBM vulnerability, including shifting from 
reliance on land-based ICBMs toward sea-based ICBMs, increasing the level of 
conventional forces, expanding the Navy, and strategic defence. Out of these Reagan 
selected strategic defence as his preferred option. The Chiefs' ideas about strategic 
defence were reported to be "vague and philosophic in tone", not distinguishing between 
the protecting of missile silos and the protection of cities, or between the different forms 
of ballistic missile defence.^ According to General Edward Meyer, then Army Chief of 
Staff, "The next step, we figured, would be to put a group together and see what was 
feasible and what the alternatives were". However, when Admiral Watkins presented his 
briefing on strategic defence President Reagan is reported to have "perked up".'̂  
Robert McFarlane, who was also present at the meeting is reported to have been 
preoccupied with strategic defence. McFarlane had read Watkins' White Paper and had 
been briefed on the x-ray laser by Edward Teller. When Admiral Watkins brought the 
topic up at the meeting McFarlane is reported to have "stepped in to elaborate on the theme 
of a new strategic vision". He was concerned about the effect that the growing peace 
movement would have on the Administration's strategic modernization plan, and with the 
new weapons systems that the Soviets were bringing on line, especially a mobile land-
based ICBM which would put at risk the United States' land-based ICBMs but be 
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themselves invulnerable. The idea of a space-based strategic defence system as a way of 
stealing the thunder of the peace movement had been pushed by Edward Teller, and was 
one of the main selling points of the High Frontier study. McFarlane in a later interview 
claimed that strategic defence "was an initiative whose time had come".^ 
Robert McFarlane may not have been the only member of the National Security Council 
who had an interest in space-based ballistic missile defence. In 1981 it was reported that 
the NSC was considering the policy issues associated with this area "to take advantage of 
the new technology to defend ourselves against attack and in so doing gain a quantum 
leap ahead of our adversaries". The NSC was interested to move into this area, an 
Administration official claimed, "because of departmental policy issues and bureaucratic 
lethargy". 2 
Within hours of the February 11 meeting, and unknown to the Joint Chiefs, McFarlane 
assigned three senior Air Force officers on the staff of the National Security Council to 
work on the concept of strategic defence. The project for this small group soon became to 
draft a short speech - known as the 'Annex' - outlining the new vision of strategic 
defence, which was to be included as the last five minutes of a speech that Reagan 
planned to deliver on March 23,1982 to support Defense Secretary Weinberger's call for 
a 10 percent increase in the defence budget.^ This would be a so-called "threat speech", 
the alarming depiction of the Soviet threat which routinely preceded an administration's 
appeal for an increase in military spending. McFarlane ordered that the Annex was to be 
kept secret from those who were writing the first part of the threat speech, and also from 
the Pentagon and State Department, and other bureaucracies outside the White House 
which might expect to be informed. The fear was that the plan might be killed off if 
knowledge of it leaked out. ̂  
George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, was given only five days warning of 
the forthcoming speech, and was given a role in its drafting, but only as an afterthought it 
would seem. According to an NSC member Keyworth was included only after they asked 
themselves: "How can the president go on the tube directing a major high-technology 
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins op. c i t . , p. 25. 
2 Clarence Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology Expanding", AWST, May 25, 
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initiative and tell his science adviser nothing?" McFarlane called Keyworth into his office 
on the morning of March 19, 1982, to inform him about the Annex. Herken claims that 
McFarlane told Keyworth that the President had only decided to go ahead with the speech 
after discussing it with William Clark, the National Security Adviser and McFarlane the 
previous day. The President had asked a question, McFarlane told Keyworth. "'Is now a 
good time to renew our efforts in strategic defence?'" Keyworth is reported to have been 
"shocked" by Reagan's question, and inclined initially to say no. However, he 
remembered the findings of a year long study on emerging defence technologies that had 
been conducted by the White House Science Council and completed in January 1983. 
This study, although dubious about the military utility of the exotic beam technologies in 
the near future, argued that some of the requisite technologies such as adaptive optics, 
were developing rapidly. After some hesitation, Keyworth finally answered "yes" to the 
President's question.^ 
Keyworth was to entertain serious doubts about his answer over the next 24 hours. He is 
reported to have sought advice from Salomon Buchsbaum and William Baker, two 
members of the White House Science Council, and he may have sought advice from 
others. The reaction from his scientific colleagues was reported to have been almost 
entirely negative, Keyworth being encouraged by some to publicly resign over the issue. 
He had his doubts assuaged at a subsequent meeting with McFarlane and his deputy John 
Poindexter.2 
During the next two days after this meeting Keyworth was chosen to be the messenger to 
inform senior officials in the State Department and the Pentagon of the President's 
intention to include the Annex in his speech. Some of these officials were reported to be 
stunned, and "deeply upset" that they had not been involved in the decision to make the 
speech.3 In the final days before the speech some of the officials who had been informed 
weighed in with protests, and managed to influence the eventual form of the speech, 
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which was not yet set in concrete. Those writing the speech were evenly divided between 
including the promise of high technology conventional weapons as well as strategic 
defence, but decided, for the sake of simplicity, to concentrate only on strategic defence. 
They were caught between offering protection to only missile silos or to the whole 
population. Reagan apparently decided this one, telling the speech writers that the last 
thing he wanted was "some kind of string of terminal defenses around this country". 
Finally, the speech writers were worried about the offensive potential of the weapons that 
could be used for strategic defence. (Robert McFarlane is reported to have discussed with 
Keyworth the possibility of assassinating Muammar Qaddafi using space based lasers, 
but Keyworth thought that this would not be very cost effective.) ̂  
When Secretary of State George Shultz was informed of the Annex, two days before the 
speech, he was apparently livid. Shultz had not been consulted and was given an "eyes 
only" copy of the speech which he was not allowed to share with any of his advisers, 
even Paul Nitze his arms control adviser. (Nitze learned about the speech on the morning 
of 23 March.) Shultz was woiried about the impact the speech - with its hint of a shift 
away from offensive to defensive weapons - would have on the European allies. On this 
same day Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Richard Perle - who were in Lisbon, negotiating agreements on several military bases -
were also informed, as were the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2 The draft of the President's 
speech was cabled to Weinberger and Perle in Lisbon. Seeing the paragraphs outlining the 
Strategic Defense Initiative tacked onto the end of the speech, Perle said he was 
"stunned". Perle informed Weinberger of the speech and the Defense Secretary was 
happy to leave matters in Perle's hands.^ 
Once they learned of the speech, Richard Perie, ringing from Lisbon, and George Shultz 
arranged a number of meetings with President Reagan and McFarlane to voice their 
concerns. They felt that the Soviets would find the speech too provocative, as with such a 
system the United States had the potential to launch a first strike attack and protect itself 
from the retaliation. These arguments, according to Greve, led to the inclusion of this 
sentence in the speech: "I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and 
raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be 
viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that". Both Perle and Shultz 
argued that the speech had to take into consideration the effect on NATO allies, Perie 
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pointing out that as Western Europe was much closer to the Soviet Union its perspective 
on defence was considerably different to that of the United States, and Schultz stressing 
the need for consultation. These arguments led to the inclusion of the following line in the 
speech: "Tonight, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing 
the need for closer consultation with our allies I'm taking an important first step". 
Further, Perle was able to limit the focus of the strategic defence that was being proposed, 
to protection against only ballistic missiles. Originally it was proposed that such a system 
would protect against bombers and cruise missiles as well, but Perle argued that this 
would make the system too complex and costly.^ 
The speech also reflected the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that strategic defence 
not interfere with the acquisition of new offensive nuclear or conventional weapons. 
According to Greve their influence "appeared more powerful the following day when the 
White House briefers explained that 'Star Wars' would be a consolidation of existing 
research programs, not a Manhattan Project, and that no new spending for research was 
foreseen in 1983 and 1984".2 
The list of senior Administration officials who were given little or no warning about the 
speech is quite long. Fred Ikle, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, learned of the 
speech only nine hours before it went to air, and pleaded in vain to be allowed to inform 
NATO leaders. Richard DeLauer, tiie Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering was informed at the same time. John Gardner, the Director of defensive 
systems at the Pentagon, and Robert Cooper, the Director of DARPA were not informed 
at all, and listened in surprise as Reagan announced what would potentially be a large new 
research and development program.^ These were people who might well be expected to 
have sabotaged the efforts of the President and his NSC advisers to get the strategic 
defence on the national agenda. 
The importance of President Reagan's March 23 speech was that it had raised space-based 
ballistic missile defence to the level of a national priority which was backed by tiie 
President. Before this it had been a collection of research and development projects which 
were having to play second fiddle to more conventional weapons development 
programmes of the Army and the Air Force, which were much nearer to operational 
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deployment. The President's speech was by no means the end of the shaping process for 
space-based BMD weapons. It just moved it into a new phase, which is still in progress. 
5.7 WHY 'STAR WARS*? 
That President Reagan played a major role in placing space-based ballistic missile defence 
on the national agenda is undoubted. But his role must be placed in context. Reagan in 
many ways was a product of the Committee on the Present Danger. He had swept to 
power pointing to the growing 'Soviet threat' and a 'window of vulnerability' which was 
opening and through which the Soviets might launch an attack. Reagan vowed to close 
the 'window of vulnerability' and to reassert American dominance over the Soviet Union 
through a massive military build-up. Both the 'Soviet threat' and the 'window of 
vulnerability' had been contrived and sold to the public by the CPD. Reagan was himself 
a member of the CPD and his administration was dominated by CPD members. The 
rhetoric and the policies of the Reagan Administration in the area of foreign policy and 
defence were copy-book CPD. Both a build-up in offensive counterforce weapons and 
civil and ballistic missile defence were part of the Committee on the Present Danger's 
agenda, but many of Reagan's key advisers argued that the build-up of offensive 
weapons was a priority. 
It was this build-up of offensive weapons which created massive problems for the Reagan 
Administration, problems for which space-based ballistic missile defence was a possible 
solution. Firstly, there was the MX basing debacle. The MX was, for the Reagan 
Administration and the Pentagon, the key to closing the 'window of vulnerability'. 
However, the Reagan Administration was unable to find a solution that was politically 
acceptable to the public. Congress, and the combined weight of the Air Force and the 
Army. Because of this, the Reagan Administration was being forced to put MX missiles 
back in Minuteman silos to keep the MX programme alive. These were the very missile 
silos which they had claimed were vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Ballistic missile 
defence was being pushed by the Army and the Air Force as a way of making the MX 
invulnerable to such an attack. 
Secondly, there was the 'freeze movement', which was just part of a resurgent peace 
movement in the United States and Europe, which had grown in response to the military 
build-up instigated by the Carter Administration but continued with a vengeance by the 
Reagan Administration. The peace movement had influenced groups such as the Catholic 
Bishops to come out against nuclear weapons and to declare them immoral. Similar action 
had been taken by the Mormon Church in response to massive opposition to the basing of 
the MX in Utah and Nevada. The 'freeze movement' grew so large that it gained influence 
in Congress, and held the potential to halt the Reagan Administration's military build up, 
threatening deployment of the MX. From the Administration's viewpoint, the 'freeze 
movement' threatened to freeze in place the 'window of vulnerability'. 
Although Reagan seems to have favoured space-based ballistic missile defence for quite 
some time, it was not until his meeting with the Joint Chiefs in February 1983 that he was 
moved to act, and elevate it to national importance. The 'space-weapons lobby' seems to 
have played an important part in planting the idea of space-based ballistic missile defence 
in Reagan's mind, and in the minds of his key advisers. This was a deliberate effort on 
their part. Graham, Wallop and Teller realized that if they were going to have space-
weapons deployed in the near future, then they would have to convince the President, as 
they were sure to, and actually did, run into stiff opposition from the Pentagon. Only the 
President could impose a decision on the armed services. The groups which had the best 
access to the President had the greatest chance of influencing the President's decision. All 
of the groups operated within the same ideological framework as the Reagan 
Administration which made access easier. It seems to have been Teller's group, which 
included members of Reagan's so-called 'kitchen cabinet', which had the easiest access. 
The members of the 'space-weapons lobby' urged that space-based BMD be used to 
provide a 'nuclear umbrella' and to implement a strategy of Mutual Assured Survival. 
Such a strategy could be sold as being more moral than Mutual Assured Destruction as it 
proclaimed to protect Americans but not kill Russians, and so had the potential to 
undermine the nuclear freeze movement. 
That the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the possibility of balHstic missile defence seems to 
have been very much connected to the issue of MX basing. The possibility of space-based 
BMD to solve the problem of MX basing and to steal the thunder of the peace movement 
seems to have been taken up and pushed by senior members of the National Security 
Council. Given the President's predisposition towards space-based BMD it would have 
taken little to convince him of the need for such weapons. Having gained Presidential 
support, a deliberate strategy seems to have been developed by these NSC members to 
keep the scheme under raps, so that the armed services and senior officials in the 
Department of Defense and State Departments could not sabotage their efforts. When they 
were informed, only two days before the speech was made, senior officials such as 
Richard Perle and George Schultz did weigh in with protests, but it was too late to make 
much of a difference. 
The study of the making of the 'Star Wars' speech has shed some light on the function of 
the Executive Branch in the weapons development process. It is evident that like the 
armed services, contractors and weapons laboratories, the Executive Branch is itself a 
complex bureaucracy. In the area of weapons development it seems to be the National 
Security Council, Department of Defense and State Department which are most important, 
but departments like the Office of Management and Budget also have some influence. In 
this case it seems to have been the NSC which played an important role. The political 
nature of weapons technology is evident also. The importance of space-based BMD to the 
senior staff in the National Security Council was not so much any military role that it 
might have, but rather its political function of undermining the freeze movement and 
regaining support for a build-up of offensive nuclear weapons. 
CH. 6: CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have considered the development of space-based ballistic missile defence in 
the late 1970's and early 1980's, leading up to President Reagan's speech on 23 March 
1983, in which he announced a research and development programme to make nuclear 
weapons "impotent and obsolete". I have focused on four groups, which I call the 'space-
weapons lobby', which were pushing for the development of ballistic missile defence 
during this period. I have traced the evolution and progress of the groups which 
comprised the 'space-weapons lobby', paying particular attention to the ideology of the 
different groups, the interests which they brought to bear on the problem of ballistic 
missile defence, and the way in which the ideology and interests of the different groups 
influenced the technologies which they were advocating for ballistic missile defence. I 
have considered the links that the different groups had with the Reagan Administration 
and the way in which they attempted to sell the idea of ballistic missile defence to the 
Administration. Also I have considered the way in which the Army and the Air Force 
reacted to the proposals which were being put forward by the 'space-weapons lobby'. 
A major aim of this thesis was to use the case study of the development of space-based 
ballistic missile defence to explore, refine and extend the model of the weapons 
development process constructed in section 1.2. This model is based on Kaldor's notion 
of a weapons system, a technological system interlinked with a social organization, 
around which the armed forces have become functionally organized. The weapons system 
serves to differentiate the armed services (Army, Air Force, Navy), and to define the lines 
of command within the different armed services. The concept of a weapons system 
explains why the armed services act as a conservative force in the weapons development 
process. As each service, and military unit, is associated with a certain military mission, 
and the capabilities required to undertake this mission have become embedded in both the 
weapons and the social organization of that military unit, any radically new technologies 
pose a risk for organizational survival, and so are resisted. 
Kaldor argued that in peacetime, there were two main institutions which provided an 
impetus to the weapons development process, essentially the defence contractors and the 
weapons laboratories. Firstly, Kaldor argued that the weapons laboratories act as the 
source of 'revolutionary' technologies, which have to be taken up by "maverick 
constituencies" in the military. Secondly, Kaldor points out that the defence contractors 
are required to make a profit, but also are dependent on the armed services for their 
contracts. This leads to a follow-on imperative for the defence contractors in which they 
are always seeking to develop the technologies for the next weapons programme in 
collusion with the armed services. The impetus to the weapons development process that 
was provided by these two institutions is then mediated by the armed services. 
In this thesis I made four modifications to Kaldor's model. Firstly, it was modified to 
take into account the role of Congress and congressional committees, and the Executive 
Branch in the shaping process. In particular, based on the work of Schurmann, the 
importance of the President is emphasized. Secondly, it was argued that the model needs 
to take into consideration the different levels of complexity at which bureaucratic politics 
operates in the armed services: inter-service rivalry, intra-service rivalry, and bureaucratic 
disputes within military units. Thirdly, it was felt necessary to locate this bureaucratic 
model within the wider political context, both on a domestic and an international level. 
Finally, it was felt that the model needs to take into consideration the function that 
weapons serve beyond their military or economic role. Hence there is a need to consider 
the ideology of the groups which are involved in the weapons development process. 
Although the case study of the development of space-based ballistic missile defence has 
provided much support for the model developed in section 1.2 it would seem necessary to 
make four main changes. Firstly, when considering the shaping of a particular weapons 
system, it is important to take into consideration the different levels of complexity at 
which bureaucratic politics operates in the defence contractors, weapons laboratories, and 
Executive Branch of government. Neither the defence contractors nor weapons 
laboratories can be treated as single actors, but are comprised of different departments and 
project groups. These departments and groups may be in competition with each other, and 
any weapons development project must be placed within its institutional context. 
Similarly, in the Executive Branch it is necessary to be sensitive to the inter-departmental 
rivalry and intra-departmental rivalry that may have a bearing on the weapons 
development process. 
Secondly, some modification is required to the concept of a follow-on programme. Given 
that the prime contractors are likely to be working on several weapons contracts and 
development projects at any one time, and that they are dependent on the armed services 
for future contracts, it might not be in the contractor's interest to push every development 
project as a follow-on programme. As was the case with Lockheed and laser weapons, 
the armed services may oppose certain projects which they feel threaten their more 
conventional programmes which have near-term deployment prospects. The armed 
services might threaten to withdraw current contracts from, or not award future contracts 
to, a defence contractor which is pushing a weapons system which they feel is too exotic. 
Thirdly, it is too simplistic to argue that defence contractors with an economic interest, 
and weapons laboratories with a scientific/technical interest, are the only institutions 
which provide the impulse to the weapons development process. In addition to these it is 
possible that the institution providing the impulse might be essentially ideological or 
political in nature. A good example of this is the High Frontier group led by Daniel 
Graham. In general it would seem that these groups bring people with a political mission 
together with those from defence contractors or weapons laboratories. This has important 
consequences for the nature of the technology that is developed, as it would seem to be 
the ideology of these groups which shapes the broad nature of the weapons system which 
is being proposed. 
Finally, when considering the development of a particular weapons system it must be 
remembered that it is just one of many weapons systems that exist or are in the process of 
being developed. It may be that the development of one weapons system has implications 
for the development of another. Thus, the factors which are shaping the development of 
one system may, indirectly, have an influence on the other weapons system. An example 
of this was provided by the MX missile and ballistic missile defence. The debate on the 
basing of the MX missile influenced the development of space-based BMD as ballistic 
missile defence was one of a number of options which could be used to make the MX less 
vulnerable. As the competing basing modes ran into trouble, the chances for ballistic 
missile defence improved. 
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